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ABSTRACT

Juveniles who commit such serious offenses as nonnegligent homicide, rape, assault, and robbery constitute an increasing concern for the criminal justice system. Persons who commit these offenses force a balancing of conflicting demands for offender rehabilitation and community protection. This report, the result of a comprehensive effort conducted for the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquent Prevention, aims to: (1) identify behavior-changing treatments currently in use with serious juvenile offenders and (2) determine what is known about their effectiveness. The author presents the program characteristics that appear to be successful, regardless of the specific treatment modalities applied, and suggests research strategies for improving the knowledge base for future program decisions. (Author/VG)

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INTERVENING WITH CONVICTED SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS

PREPARED UNDER A GRANT FROM THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, LEAA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DALE MANN

R-1930-DOJ
JULY 1976

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

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PREFACE

Juveniles who commit such serious offenses as non-negligent homicide, rape, assault, and robbery constitute an increasing concern for the criminal justice system. More than any other offenders, these force us to balance conflicting demands for offender rehabilitation and community protection.

This report is the result of a comprehensive effort—conducted for the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention—to identify behavior-changing treatments currently in use with serious juvenile offenders and to determine what is known about their effectiveness. It identifies those program characteristics that appear to be correlated with success, regardless of the specific treatment modalities applied, and suggests research strategies for improving the knowledge base for future program decisions.

The author, a Rand consultant, is on the faculty of Teachers College, Columbia University.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

According to the 1974 *Uniform Crime Reports* (see Table 1), 27.2 percent of all arrests in the United States for serious crimes were of juveniles under the age of 18 (and about 10 percent of all were of children under 15). The crimes involved are non-negligent homicide, armed robbery, aggravated assault, forcible rape, and arson. We estimate that (not counting those adjudicated as adults) some 6,000 youths have been convicted of these crimes and are subject to some form of treatment aimed at rehabilitation. This report examines the kinds of treatments used and their effectiveness, to assist the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in determining how best to proceed to improve the quality of current practice.

At present, the technology of behavior-changing interventions is weak and provided at relatively high cost by an institution that does not normally command much public support. Public decisionmakers must attempt to satisfy two partially incompatible demands—that serious juvenile offenders be punished, incapacitated, and deterred, and that they be rehabilitated. The difficulty is compounded by an extreme lack of hard data about treatments and outcomes specific to serious juvenile offenders. Because of its impact on policy choice, this analysis therefore considers the context of juvenile justice policy along with data about program efficacy.

The complexity of the problem is evident even within its definition. The states vary widely in denying juvenile status to youths older than 18, 16, and even 14. Depending on the definition, the number of all juveniles in custody is between 34,000 and 40,000. We estimate that, of that group, about 15 percent or 6,000 juveniles have been convicted of the five serious presenting offenses and are subject to treatment.

The second problem lies in characterizing seriousness. Is a serious crime the same as a dangerous one? Are all violent crimes serious? Must there be a pattern of repetition before a juvenile can be labeled a serious offender? While this analysis used an agreed-upon definition of seriousness derived from the juveniles' presenting offense, the parameters of seriousness remain an important consideration.

Does amenability to treatment vary between serious and less serious juvenile offenders? We found no evidence that it did. Most practitioners and most analysts reject both the idea of a behaviorally distinct category of such offenders (except of course with respect to the presenting offense) and of a distinct set of treatments premised on a category of seriousness. Thus, while the security of incarceration may vary, the treatment does not. Second, the lack of behavioral distinctions suggests that from this perspective at least, serious and less serious offenders may be treated in the same programs. In fact, that is the practice of the field. We did not encounter any programs concentrated exclusively on serious juvenile offenders.

Table 1
TOTAL ARRESTS BY AGE, 1974

Offense	Age								
	All Ages	Under 15	Under 18	10 and Under	11-12	13-14	15	16	17
Total	6,179,406	606,548	1,683,073	71,384	135,553	399,611	325,482	377,420	373,623
Percent distribution	100%	9.8%	27.2%	1.2%	2.2%	6.5%	5.3%	6.1%	6.0%
Criminal homicide: murder and non-negligent manslaughter	13,818	206	1,399	10	31	165	264	395	534
Forcible rape	17,804	771	3,455	42	115	614	624	891	1,169
Robbery	108,481	9,984	35,345	571	2,019	7,394	6,999	8,894	9,468
Aggravated assault	154,514	7,943	26,300	814	1,696	5,433	4,796	6,528	7,033
Arson	10,756	4,098	6,318	1,333	1,065	1,700	908	720	592

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1974, p. 186 (5,298 agencies; 1974 estimated population 134,082,000).

15.

Types of Treatment Aimed at Behavioral Change in Juvenile Offenders

INTERVENTIONS BASED ON CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

These may be divided into those that seek to change behavior by changing the individual's motivations and feelings, versus behavior modification, which changes specific behaviors directly without going into the individual's psychodynamics. Behavior modification is also often used along with psychotherapy. Psychotherapy techniques include psychoanalytic methods, transactional analysis, Gestalt therapy, etc., on a group or individual basis.

INTERVENTIONS BASED ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

Since delinquency is often thought of as caused by the social context and peer group influence, these treatment techniques stress the restructuring of the social environment and the positive use of the peer group, as in guided group interaction (GGI). Treatment may be institutional, or in a community setting (as a condition of probation). GGI has been particularly successful with hard-core delinquents from one-parent families.

INTERVENTIONS BASED ON SCHOOLING

The use of schooling as a behavior-changing treatment for offenders is based on two facts: (1) the vast majority of juvenile offenders experienced failure in school, and (2) social and vocational advancement for such juveniles is blocked without academic training.

INTERVENTIONS BASED ON CAREER EDUCATION

The assumption here is that delinquency will continue unless the juvenile has a socially acceptable method of earning a living and pursuing a career. These interventions stress vocational training and job skills as a way to modify the youth's opportunity structure and thus intervene in his delinquency.

How this Study Was Conducted

After a comprehensive search of the available research and practice literature, four study teams each covered one of the intervention types listed above. Each team prepared case analyses of one or more program sites. A summary analysis was

circulated to a panel of experts (see App. C), whose comments and criticism formed the basis for extensive revision.

Summary of the Findings

Our first finding is predictable but important: *The data adequate to support finely grained judgments about the relative efficacy of the various treatment modalities do not exist.* Many programs do not keep track of the offense characteristics of their wards. Treatment outcomes are stated in terms of behavior within the institution, which may not persist when the juvenile returns to the street. All of this makes it very difficult to premise improvements in practice on known relationships between treatment characteristics and changed behavior.

Second, as we have mentioned, *we did not encounter any programs that were concentrated solely on behavior-changing efforts with this population.* This lack of distinction appears reasonable given that there are no agreed-upon treatment-related behavioral characteristics of serious juvenile offenders.

We next turned to the general question of "What works?" Enthusiasts for one treatment modality or another have sometime made claims of nearly universal efficacy. We found no such sufficient interventions. We did, however, find *limited success with each of the four treatment modalities.* While these positive effects were not as well documented, as dramatic, or as long-lasting as might be wished, each of the four treatment modalities could legitimately claim to have changed some behavior on the part of some juvenile offenders. A number of factors may account for that: (1) practice in each group was grounded in a technology about human services; (2) each area was staffed by professionals who believed in their practice; and (3) youth is a somewhat plastic period.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS

In looking more closely at "what works," we found some remarkable similarities in programs across the four types of treatment.

Client Choice

Successful programs maximized the discretion of the individual about whether or not to enter a program, which program to enter, and how long to stay. (This feature of successful behavior-changing practice may be difficult to reconcile with punishment and the involuntary nature of incarceration.) The useful effects of client choice included a smaller and more tractable population of offenders in treatment. Finally, client choice is worth trying if for no other reason than that compulsory participation does not work.

Participation

As involvement or ownership in a program increased, so did the prospects for

more thorough, lasting, and functional change. Strategies that maximized the involvement of the offenders in their own rehabilitation made those individuals more sensitive to their own behavior, more accessible to peer influence, and more likely to support new behavior.

Learning Theory Features

A number of standard components of learning theory were features associated with successful practice.

Clear Tasks. Those situations which elicited the most successful performances on the part of serious juvenile offenders did so, at least in part, because the juveniles could understand just what they were supposed to be doing.

Behavior Models. Emulation is an important learning technique. Programs that sought to instill responsible, fair, consistent, and thoughtful behavior in juveniles often succeeded by having a staff that acted in this way, with which the juveniles could identify.

Early and Frequent Successes. Since persistent failure was a hallmark of these youths, it was important to give them reasons to believe in themselves and in their own efficacy. Tasks structured to be eminently "do-able" contributed to that end. Persons who believe that they are defeated by something or somebody whenever they try to get ahead ("external locus of control") often stop trying or move into areas that are not socially sanctioned. Frequent successes tend to give a youth a sense of confidence ("internal control"), which encourages trying hard.

Reward Structures. Successful programs organized their incentives to reinforce behavior which could be perceived as desirable by both the program staff and the clientele. The rewards were *significant*, and they were contingent on *relevant tasks* where achievement was a *realistic expectation*.

Credible or "Integrated" Training. The most effective training situations were the most similar to the real-world place where the new behavior was to be lived. Vocational training programs, for example, needed to have machinery and working conditions like those used in the world outside.

Availability of a Wide Range of Techniques

Virtually everyone agrees that serious juvenile offenses, like juvenile delinquency in general, spring from many different causes. While no single technique works for everyone, many techniques are useful for some offenders. Diagnosing and prescribing one treatment for an individual is highly imprecise. Therefore, programs need to have many different sorts of treatments available. When one fails, another can be tried. When one has moved a given child or youth as far as it can, another technique can be employed. Or, several different techniques can be used concurrently over the same intensive treatment period. The larger the population of juvenile offenders, the more important it becomes to have an array of treatments to match the range of needs.

Heuristic Management

The best programs we encountered seemed to be using their failures as a guide to new initiatives and eventual success. They were conscious of their own perfor-

mance and took a frankly problem-solving, trial-and-error attitude toward their work. Given what is known—and especially what is not known—about intervening with serious juvenile offenders, such a heuristic management strategy is emphatically indicated.

Lock Up, Give Up, or Try Harder?

What to do about serious juvenile offenders is similar to the give up/try harder dilemma of social welfare programs in general. The deter-incapacitate-punish purposes versus the rehabilitation purpose means that give-up alternatives are really lock 'em up alternatives, since few would argue that serious juvenile offenders be left at liberty untreated. (Some would argue that present treatment programs are just that—neither incarceration nor effective rehabilitation.)

GIVE UP

As a group, the give-up alternatives are based on the view that treatment does not work. (On the evidence gathered for this study, that view is overstated.) Others attack treatment as disguising a multitude of abuses of juveniles, as a waste of money, and as an excuse for depriving juveniles of their right to due process. In this view, the purpose of institutionalization should be scaled back to what it is capable of providing, such as some punishment for the offender and some temporary security for society.

But note that the reforms the proponents wish to achieve can be achieved without abandoning attempts to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. The cases for "justice," for determinate sentences, and for deinstitutionalization are not so weak as to depend on the prior dismantling of treatment programs. Indeed, reforming the adjudication part of the juvenile justice system may improve the treatment area. For example, if status offenders were distinguished from serious offenders, who might more justifiably serve determinate sentences, then time now spent on the former might be available to the serious offenders and the whole process might be improved.

TRY HARDER

The evidence supports the "try harder" conclusion more than the "give up" conclusion, but how much harder should we try? The answer will depend in part on comparison of the needs of the relatively few serious juvenile offenders with other groups competing for public funds. We believe that the limited successes of the various treatment modalities justify continued support—in conjunction with a strategy for program assessment and improvement AND with substantial reforms in other parts of the system.

Management Options for a Program of Research, Development, Dissemination, and Evaluation

The National Institute can affect practice in a number of ways; those to be discussed here focus on R&D management as a tool for bringing about change. Because of the lack of hard data, we recommend adopting a hypothesis-testing strategy in the management of the Institute R&D support programs. The features we have identified above under Characteristics of Successful Programs can be formulated as a set of hypotheses about good practice, and then used to guide the Institute's research. For example, if building up the juvenile's self-confidence is plausibly related to desired changes in behavior, then roughly similar programs which do and do not employ this method can be monitored over time.

Another set of hypotheses to be tested can be constructed from the hypothesized causes of delinquent behavior. One such hypothesis is that some delinquency happens without apparent motives or antecedents; other instances are caused by the situation; still others are compelled by internal psychological forces; and, finally, some delinquency is chosen on the basis of its risks and rewards.

The choices available to the Institute depend heavily on the knowledge available about treating serious juvenile offenders. Demonstration programs and targeted research both assume a large stock of reliable knowledge, while atheoretical basic research assumes that nothing is known. Middle-range options, described below, seem the most appropriate under actual conditions.

PLANNED VARIATIONS

This research management strategy isolates a series of theoretically important variables and then arranges for them to be applied, usually in a concentrated and mutually exclusive fashion, in a number of different sites. For example, a planned variation experiment in correctional education might support comparisons of (1) computer-assisted instruction, (2) peer teaching, (3) open classrooms, and (4) differentiated staffing, in four separate sites, each dealing with similar populations under otherwise similar conditions. If outcomes differ, then we will know more about what works and how well than is now the case in correctional education.

NATURALLY OCCURRING EXPERIMENTS

Given the range of institutions providing services to serious juvenile offenders, given the lack of a cogent theoretical basis, and the consequent lack of an orthodoxy, it is inevitable that a relatively large number of approaches will be tried across the country at any given moment. That diversity provides a pool of naturally occurring experiments which may be studied to considerable effect.

EVALUATION AND DOCUMENTATION

Evaluation is the process of monitoring a program's activity in order to make

decisions about its support. Documentation looks at largely the same activities, but is *not* directly connected to the continued well-being of the project being documented. Documentation in this case would be carried on solely in order to gain a better understanding of treatment effects with dangerous juveniles. While evaluation deals with the success, failure, or improvement of a particular site, documentation addresses the same questions at a more aggregate policy or strategy level.

CONCLUSION

A program of planned variations that took maximum advantage of naturally occurring experiments (including those funded by non-Federal sponsors) and relied on a documentation and analysis procedure—not solely on an evaluation procedure—should be able to yield significant information about treatments for serious juvenile offenders. Such an effort would draw upon existing programs and technologies and could be rather flexibly managed. This recommended activity should be distinguished from current practice by its scope, intensity, and duration.

At the present time, no single actor or group of actors in the juvenile justice system has the incentive, the inclination, or the resources to undertake such a task. It is hoped that the National Institute will remedy the existing oversights with respect to treatment programs for serious juvenile offenders.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This review of the state of treatments for serious juvenile offenders has been built on the contributions of many people. The various treatment modalities were studied by teams led by Gail L. Zellman and Theodore S. Donaldson of The Rand Corporation, Professor C. Ronald Huff of the University of California at Irvine, and William Gschwend of Human Resources Consulting, Inc. Their major contributions are reflected in their authorships of Secs. II, III, and V. Practitioners too numerous to list generously gave the project staff their time and comments.

Early drafts of this report were reviewed by a panel of experts in the field, listed in App. C. Their comments were extraordinarily thorough and thoughtful. Robert K. Yin and Joan Petersilia, both of Rand, also made helpful comments on early drafts.

I had the help of a number of people during the preparation of this report. Amy Cohen provided able assistance during the field work. Julie Blackman of Teachers College, Columbia University, made substantive and editing suggestions. Barbara Falsey of the New School for Social Research also contributed greatly to the drafting, editing, and substantive analysis. Darlene Sinnah-Yovonie in New York and Mary Sauters in Santa Monica facilitated and coordinated the critical production aspects of this work. Peter Greenwood, director of Rand's Criminal Justice Studies Program, gave me the rare combination of support plus criticism plus autonomy that always characterizes his supervision.

In a work built on so many inputs, I owe a large debt to the various contributors. But, of course, the responsibility for any errors in this report is solely my own.

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I. THE PROBLEM AREA

There are few things more capable of provoking public outrage than publicity about a young person convicted of a serious crime. The public's fear about, revulsion from, and fascination with dangerous crimes combines with contradictory attitudes toward youth to produce a difficult climate for policymaking. The competition between the rehabilitation purposes and the punishment-incapacitation-deterrence purposes of the juvenile justice system is one consequence of that climate, and it impacts decisions at every level from political leadership to service delivery.

Competing attitudes exist even about whether the courts should be involved in juvenile problems at all. Norval Morris has called the juvenile court a "moral busybody."¹ Its critics claim that it does more harm (by labeling, disruption, etc.) than good, especially where subsequent treatments fail to rehabilitate. On the other hand, there is an awareness that some juveniles engage in seriously assaultive behavior and that, in many cases, the court seems unwilling or unable to "stop them."

In a way, this is a conflict of images: the harmless truant locked away for years, versus the evil young punk who is back on the street with a mild reprimand for mugging an old woman. Like many images, these may be more vivid than accurate, but like most they contain a kernel of truth. The so-called juvenile "status offenses" still clog courts, but in 1974 juveniles also accounted for more than one-quarter of the persons arrested for the offenses here defined as serious. A basic injunction for delinquency policy may be, "Let the kids alone whenever possible"²—but the problem here is to decide when and for whom that isn't possible.

Defining "Serious Juvenile Offenders"

This study is addressed to two questions: What sorts of interventions are used with serious juvenile offenders and how well do they work? However, the complexity that makes improving the juvenile justice system so difficult is apparent even within the definition of the terms. For example, what is a "juvenile"? The states vary widely in denying juvenile status to youths older than 18, older than 16, older than 14. The gravity of the presenting offense is an additional factor for some jurisdictions (e.g., one 17-year-old who commits a robbery may be tried as a juvenile but another 17-year-old accused of homicide may be waived to an adult court). For our purposes, we have accepted whatever definition of "juvenile" status operated to place the serious offender in a treatment program.

WHO IS "SERIOUS"? CONVICTION AS A CRITERION

But the real difficulty lies in defining the term "serious." Is it the same as

* References and notes for each section of this report are given at the end of the section. An overall bibliography is also provided.

"dangerous"? What role does "violence" play? Are all person-related crimes serious? In early discussions with the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, we agreed upon a scope for this analysis that would concentrate on those juveniles who had been convicted* of non-negligent homicide, armed robbery, aggravated assault, forcible rape, and arson.

The first problem with using this criterion is that the population convicted of such crimes does not include all of the guilty population, and may include some innocent parties as well. But, as Norval Morris has written,

Why use the criterion of conviction? The short answer is that it is the only reliable available basis. Granted the severe distortions due to lack of detection, arbitrariness of arrest, prosecution and conviction, and plea-bargaining, what other acceptable evidence of past violent behavior do we have?³

A second problem concerns distinguishing between the offense and the status of the offender. Someone convicted of armed robbery, for example, was a serious criminal, even a dangerous one, at the moment of the armed robbery. Prior to that moment, was he or she dangerous? Is he or she dangerous now? Will he or she be dangerous again? If we use the presenting offense to identify serious juvenile offenders, have we in fact identified *dangerous* juveniles? Perhaps yes, perhaps no; all that has been achieved is a retrospective classification of some of the young people who have committed serious crimes. For some of the newly labeled "serious offender" group, the commission of the crime is the only time in their lives in which they were, or will be, dangerous to others. Violent crimes in the future may come from other juveniles who have now been convicted of only minor offenses, or they may come from people who have no referral record at all. The juvenile labeled serious or dangerous may never repeat such an offense.

CHRONICITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE

An alternative approach to the identification of a population of serious offenders might stress repetitive delinquency. In the Wolfgang, et al., longitudinal cohort study in Philadelphia, 18 percent of all juveniles with any type of delinquent record had five or more offenses and thus were classified as "chronic recidivists."⁴ These chronic recidivists were responsible for 51 percent of all the delinquent acts committed by the cohort group. While five or more offenses might seem to have tagged a population of serious offenders, of the more than 5,000 total offenses committed by these chronic recidivists, only 329 offenses are within the *Uniform Crime Reports* index categories closest to our definition (criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and arson). Thus, even within this chronic or repetitious group of offenders, only 6.2 percent of their offenses were serious ones.⁵

And so we come back to the seriousness of the offense as our only meaningful category. And yet, focusing on seriousness and defining it by presenting offense implies that there are behavioral or treatment-relevant differences between a category of serious offenders and another category of less serious juvenile offenders. We

* In many jurisdictions, juveniles cannot technically be "convicted" of anything except delinquency. We use the term here for convenience, to mean adjudged delinquent on the grounds of an offense that is included in the list agreed upon for this study.

need to ask, In what sense are those categories real and are there correlative differences related to the interventions or treatments which are applied to the serious juvenile offender? Most practitioners and analysts in this field reject both the idea of a behaviorally distinct category of such offenders⁶ and the idea of a distinct set of treatments premised on a category of seriousness. If what is done to these youths is guided by what is believed about them, then the initial and superficially simple problem of defining the group will have real consequences for public policy.

We can better understand the problems involved in attempting to define and treat serious juvenile offenders by considering three major areas of uncertainty that can arise in defining the group: (1) issues of social values, (2) issues of fact or science, and (3) moral issues.

Explicitly or not, these interrelated issues pervade the whole judicial process. Social value questions are involved primarily in the lawmaking and law implementing process; issues of fact are involved in detection and adjudication; and the final stage of the judiciary—the disposition—is *in itself* a moral question, what to do with someone's life.

SOCIAL VALUES

One type of social value issue is the decision about what behaviors are socially intolerable and warrant the label "serious delinquency." At this stage the focus is on the act, or event, not the actor—on such questions as What is considered deviant? Of the behaviors now labeled delinquent, how many should we regard as *serious* delinquency? Many people now agree that status offenses such as truancy, curfew violation, running away from home, can be tolerated and dealt with outside the judicial establishment. But within the remaining set of offenses—those that would be considered criminal if committed by an adult—further decisions need to be made. At this point it becomes increasingly difficult to be specific, and words such as *violent, aggressive, dangerous* are applied.

An example of the range of meanings which a single one of these terms can be construed to include is found in a recent report on school violence. The definition of school violence was expanded from serious crimes against persons or property committed within the boundaries of a school, to include:

... any event that *significantly* disrupts the education of students in public elementary and secondary schools. The major problems that fall within this definition are: vandalism, personal assault, gangs and inter-group clashes, fear of violence, intruders and weapons.⁷ [Emphasis added.]

Pulling a fire alarm is likely to seriously disrupt a school, but is it a crime or a prank? School graduates return to schools to "visit," but is it the case that dropouts "intrude"? How does one measure "fear of violence" and to whom does one attribute it? How, in fact, does one measure "seriousness"? "Serious delinquency" can be explicitly defined by *statute* or derived by empirical *research* concerning public attitudes about which delinquencies are "serious."

The first method is a way of legislating assumptions about societal values. If, for example, it can be assumed that the society at large values personal safety over property ownership, then those offenses which result in harm to "life and limb" can *a priori* be deemed more serious and dealt with more harshly. The establishment of

"index crimes" is one example of this method. Another is the recommendation made by the New York State panel on juvenile violence that juveniles be held for a minimum of one year if found to have committed those acts which if committed by an adult would be: first- and second-degree murder, first-degree rape, first-degree manslaughter, etc.⁸ But, to be meaningful, all the relevant dimensions of the offense should be clear. The acts of a 16-year-old holding up a liquor store, and an 8-year-old "borrowing" milk money from a smaller peer may both be classified as highway robbery.⁹ In order to delineate "serious juvenile offenses," the dimensions of intent, the degree of harm, and the victim-violator relationship may have to be added to the offense description.

The second way of categorizing offenses, empirically, has been demonstrated by Sellin and Wolfgang, who assumed that the degree of physical harm, the amount of property loss or damage, the age of the offender, etc., all influence the *perceived seriousness* of a delinquent event. Via magnitude estimation and category scaling they derived an index of perceived seriousness for the "real incidence of delinquency during a given period or in a given area."¹⁰ (While the judgments of the raters about seriousness for various delinquent events are designed to describe the delinquency of an area, the methodological focus is on the events.)

Sellin and Wolfgang argue the need for "social research and sociological inquiry [to] reflect the current structure of society."¹¹ Policy about delinquency ought also to reflect the current structure. A necessary step in that direction is the determination—by judicial fiat or empirical test—of a consistent set of offenses that constitute serious delinquency.

FACT-FINDING AND SCIENCE

Questions of *fact and science* are a second concern. Several important issues are involved: (1) the detection of crime, (2) fact-finding about the crime, (3) prediction of additional crime. The first is essentially a practical problem involving surveillance and reporting. Both undetected delinquents (offenders who are not caught) and differential handling (offenders who are caught for one crime and recorded for something else) mask the true numbers of serious offenders. For example, while violent crimes are considered among the most accurately reported, some victimization studies have shown that only 50 to 60 percent of all violent crimes are reported.¹²

For those offenses that are reported, and for which a juvenile is apprehended, there remains the problem of fact-finding. Arrest is not conviction. Traditionally, conviction has not been a concern of the juvenile court. Because of its benevolent intent it was presumed that anything the court might do with the juvenile would be in the child's best interest—whether he or she was guilty or not. Now there is much more concern with the due process rights of minors and the abuse of social evidence in juvenile courts. Still, the problem of uncertainty as to whether a juvenile is guilty or not clearly impedes the identification of groups of offenders.

Even given a resolution of fact—i.e., the determination that the juvenile *did* commit the "serious offense"—there is the question of whether he is apt to do so again. Any attempt to define serious juvenile offenders needs to decide if the criteria for the category will refer to past behaviors alone or include prediction of future

behaviors. The trend has been to include future behaviors by predicting or otherwise identifying seriousness in terms of a potential for "dangerousness." Correctional efforts here have had no more success than that experienced by the mental health field. As yet no predictive technique demonstrates clear utility.

While some theoreticians are ready to throw in the prediction towel, policymakers are hesitant to do so. Fact-finding, after all, may or may not refer to a single, unique, and situationally determined event. Disposition anticipates the moral questions, and the issue of prediction becomes increasingly salient. If part of the justification of a disposition (especially imprisonment) is based on the idea of public safety, then clearly some estimate of an individual's future threat to that safety is required.

Don M. Gottfredson describes prediction as involving two independent assessments, those of the criterion categories and of the predictor categories.¹³ Criterion categories involve value issues—i.e., the identification of delinquent and nondelinquent behaviors. Predictor categories involve the kinds of information required for estimating an individual's future involvement in delinquency. In a review of prediction studies, Halatyn describes two of the issues faced in addressing the prediction categories—the predictive limitations of violence as an infrequent event, and the inadequacy of theories and typologies of violence.¹⁴ Briefly, the less frequent violence is for individuals, the more difficult it is to find something other than the violence itself which discriminates between the target population and all others. Efforts to identify the potentially violent have been notoriously flawed—either by their inability to exceed chance, or if they have done so, by the cost of having identified vast numbers of false positives.

Halatyn's second point has to do with a "hypothetico-deductive" model. That is, we need a clearly specified set of factors that are plausibly—and hopefully causally—linked to the outcome of serious juvenile offenses. Such a model would tell us something about causation and thus also about both prediction and treatment. While empirical attempts have so far been unable to detect any significant differences between groups of offenders, these attempts have not always been guided by adequate theories of violence or typologies of offenders. As Hans Toch has pointed out, "violence is a brew of many ingredients."¹⁵ Among the ingredients may be family background, reference groups, environmental and situational conditions, interpersonal relations, etc. Recent work on aggression, for example, may provide some clues for a recipe of violence, but the clues require elaboration. E.g., under what environmental, intra- and interpersonal stimuli is aggression apt to be manifested in physical violence as opposed to verbal abuse?

THE MORAL ISSUE

The last category of definitional problems is moral. Moral questions involve the resolution of competing rights—here the rights of a juvenile to be free from restraint and the rights of society to be protected. Ideally, decisions at this point are made on the basis of perfect knowledge: (1) a clear and public recognition of the behaviors considered serious; (2) sure determination of fact; and (3) complete insight into the possible outcomes of any decision. But those criteria are simply unavailable in this policy area. Because of that, there should be a restrictive definition of "seriousness," and the consequences of that restrictive definition should extend both to the numbers of youths so identified and the treatments applied to them.

While the complex nature and consequences of defining the serious juvenile offender group may be understandable, it is also understandable that their sole characteristic—the gravity of the crime they have committed—overrides more subtle and problematic distinctions. Administrators and politicians, along with the public, are justified in demanding that Something Be Done. This report examines the sorts of things now done with serious juvenile offenders and makes some estimates about the effects of those interventions. Concluding sections deal with steps which can be taken to improve this aspect of juvenile justice.

Estimating the Scope of the Problem

How many serious juvenile offenders are there? The *Uniform Crime Reports* for 1974 indicates the following:

- Slightly more than one-fourth (27.2 percent) of all the arrests in the United States for crimes defined as serious by this study were arrests of juveniles less than 18 years old.
- About one-tenth (9.8 percent) of all arrests for those same categories of serious crime were arrests of juveniles 15 years old or younger.

Some of the raw data indicate one dimension of the problem. In 1974, persons under 18 were arrested for:

Percent of All Arrests for This Offense		
1,399	Murders	10.1
3,455	Forcible rapes	19.4
35,345	Robberies	32.5
26,300	Aggravated assaults	17.5
6,318	Arsons	58.7
72,817	Total	27.2

In the first six months of 1975 in New York City, there were 3,794 arrests of juveniles under 16, including 27 for homicides, 147 rapes, 696 felonious assaults, and 2,924 robberies.¹⁶

The Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency determined that over the 1960-1973 period, "Violent crime by persons under 18 jumped 246.5 percent."¹⁷ Part of this increase can be attributed to an increase in the number of people in the crime-prone young years. Estimates by Wolfgang and by Sagi and Wellford attribute between a third and a half of the increase in violent behavior to a simple increase in the number of young people.¹⁸ An additional part of the increase can be attributed to improvements in crime reporting. Halatyan argues that, "comparing 1967 and 1972 UCR data on violent crimes by persons under 18 years of age, it can be seen that this group accounted for 24.3 percent of all crime in 1967 and 25.6 percent in 1972 ... a negligible increase."¹⁹ Thus, although the rate of violent crimes among the juvenile population may have remained stable, along with the proportion of all

violent crimes committed by young people, there has been an undisputed increase in the absolute number of such crimes committed.

The *Uniform Crime Reports* data give a general indication of the sort of problem posed by serious juvenile offenders. Of course, arrests are not convictions, but then neither are arrests a very good index of the incidence of crime. A general rule of thumb is that four crimes are committed for every arrest. As a whole, serious crimes are more accurately reported, but that also varies by offense: rapes are more under-reported than homicides, etc., although only about 75 to 90 percent of all homicides become known to police.²⁰ Still, it would not be very difficult to multiply the number of arrests by some figure to estimate the actual, and impressive, incidence of serious violent crimes by youths.

The sequence from arrest through various processing stages to disposition to treatment is as important with serious juvenile offenders as it is with other groups. But any attempt to estimate the numbers of juveniles involved in serious crime, and of them, those who are in some form of treatment program, is circumvented by the lack of hard data in the field. Our discussion is therefore only a little more than hypothetical. It is based on the *Uniform Crime Reports*²¹ and the information collected by the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence in New York State.²² Figure 1 attempts to give some indication of the numbers of juveniles involved in delinquency in general, and specifically in serious crime. Each block represents a point at which some kind of decision is reached or action taken regarding these youths. The numbers in the blocks are our very rough and tentative estimates of the numbers of youth continued or lost at each level.

The blocks made up of broken lines indicate the youths who are "processed out" of the system. The solid lines indicate those youths who are passed on to the next level. The percentages next to the arrows indicate our rough estimates of the proportions in each category. Those estimates are explained in the notes immediately following the figure.

Of particular note here is the number of juveniles involved in serious crime who are "processed out" of the system at various levels. It is often assumed that the youths who wind up in correctional facilities of one sort or another are the "hard-core" serious offenders. That is not the case. While vast numbers of juveniles who are retained have *not* been involved in serious crime, many of the juveniles who are released have at one time been considered to be involved in serious crime.

Our interest in programs of behavioral intervention requires some estimate of the population of serious juvenile offenders who are subject to treatment in institutions. There are two recent and credible (though differing) estimates of the number of juvenile offenders in institutions.

(1) LEAA's *Children in Custody* reports that as of June 30, 1973 there were 45,694 juveniles incarcerated in all publicly operated state and local facilities.²³

(2) Vinter, Downs, and Hall in *Juvenile Corrections in the States: Residential Programs and Deinstitutionalization* report that in 1974 33,664 juveniles were in state-run institutions and in community-based residential programs.²⁴

The two figures differ in what they include. By adjusting them to reflect our criteria, we may derive a more satisfactory estimate of the juvenile offender population which is being treated in institutions. The LEAA figure of about 46,000 (while




Fig. 1—The juvenile population and juvenile offenders by types and stages of adjudication

Notes to Fig. 1

^a Bureau of the Census, *Estimates/Population of U.S. by Age, Sex, and Race: 1970-1975* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce Services, No. 614, November 1975, p. 25), "Table 2. Estimates of Residual Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Race: July 1, 1970-1975." Estimated juvenile population 13-17: 21 million.

^b Most self-report studies indicate that nearly all youths at one time or another have committed a delinquent act. Generally the behaviors detected in these studies are not serious, and there is no reliable way of estimating the undetected amount of serious delinquency in the population.

^c FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1974. The items considered serious here are criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and arson.

^d We were unable to locate any data on the numbers of those juveniles arrested who are referred to the courts. The *Uniform Crime Reports* state, however, that about half of the juveniles arrested are handled by the individual law enforcement agencies without preferring a formal charge or referring them directly to juvenile authorities (UCR, 1973, p. 35).

While it might be assumed that the proportion referred would be considerably higher for juveniles involved in serious offenses, the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence in New York State reports that "the proportion of juveniles charged with violent crimes who are diverted at court intake is approximately the same as the proportion of juveniles charged with less serious crimes" (Task Force Report I, Memorandum 3, *Report to the Governor from Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.*, The Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence).

^e The percentages here are based on figures reported by the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence, New York State. The report indicates that in New York City 67.1 percent of the petitions for index crimes are dismissed or withdrawn, and 59.3 percent of such petitions are dismissed or withdrawn upstate (Task Force I, Memorandum 3). We have averaged these and are using 63 percent for our calculations. We are unable to estimate how similar these proportions are to those throughout the country. Vinter, Hall, and Downs in *Juvenile Corrections in the States* (National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, Institute of Continuing Education, University of Michigan, 1976) report that New York State has the lowest rate of institutionalization. From this point on, the estimates for retained, judicially handled, and treated offenders may therefore be low.

^f These percentages are based on the dispositions reported by reason for petition in the Governor's report (Task Force I, Item III). We have divided the dispositions into two groups—those indicating treatment, and those either clearly not indicating treatment or ambiguous. The former consists of placement or commitment to private institutions, private agencies, division of youth, state training school, or department of correction. The latter category includes discharged to petition, discharged with warning, and foster home placement. Of a total of 236 youths, 77, or 33 percent, were in treatment; 67 percent were not.

LEAA's *Children in Custody* estimates that a total of 45,694 juvenile offenders are in publicly operated institutions. The figure of 102,000 juveniles in treatment may be too high. "Treatment" here, however, includes private institutions and agencies, whereas the former figure includes only publicly operated and state-run residential facilities. In addition, "treatment" can go on anywhere, not only in institutions.

In the next discussion, we derive an estimated population of 6,000 serious juvenile offenders in institutional treatment. Several factors might point to a reconciliation of these two estimates. First, as we have mentioned, there is reason to believe that using New York State ratios underestimates the national population. Second, the ratios are based only on the offenses of homicide, arson, and rape. Our definition of seriousness includes aggravated assault and armed robbery. Adjusting for those factors would bring the 4,500 figure closer to 6,000.

it includes Federal institutions)* is too high for our purposes, since it includes the substantial populations in detention centers and in reception and diagnostic facilities, not all of whom will be exposed to treatment programs. The Vinter, Downs, and Hall figure is too low because it excludes both Federal institutions and those community-based programs that deal with serious juvenile offenders but on a nonresidential basis. How much too high and too low are these estimates? Since we do not know, let us take a round figure, 40,000, as a compromise estimate of the number of juvenile offenders in institutions.²⁵

But how many of the 40,000 population of institutionalized juvenile offenders meet our defining characteristic of conviction for a serious offense? Existing data will not support a precise figure, but there is a general consensus on estimates in the neighborhood of 11 to 16 percent as the proportion of the juvenile offender population that is regarded by experts as the serious offender group.

- Wolfgang estimates that 10.8 percent of the crimes committed by youths 10 to 17 years old in 1972 were violent crimes (defined similarly to this report).²⁶
- In the State of Michigan about 12 percent of the institutionalized delinquents are sent to the State's maximum security facility (see below).
- Judge Lindsey G. Arthur of the Hennepin County (Minnesota) Juvenile Court estimates that 16 percent of those adjudicated as juvenile delinquents in that jurisdiction have committed major offenses.²⁷
- The National Assessment of Juvenile Correction's sample of correctional programs indicates that about 15 percent of delinquents who are in institutions self-report that they are there because of "person crimes."²⁸

Since estimates of the serious part of any population of juvenile offenders range between 11 and 16 percent, 15 percent is a round number that may err on the conservative or overestimate side. While the 15 percent figure is admittedly inexact,²⁹ it can still yield a very rough estimate of 6,000 juveniles who have been convicted and incarcerated for serious offenses.

Are those 6,000 juveniles a problem for public policy? Although their crimes may be serious, they are a very small fraction of the youthful population. There are currently more than 21 million youths in the United States in the 13- to 17-year-old group.³⁰ If all 6,000 came from this four-year segment of the population, only one juvenile in 3,500 would have been convicted and institutionalized for a serious offense, say armed robbery, in any given year. *Children in Custody* reports a total of 794 state and locally operated institutions for delinquents.³¹ Although not all of these institutions deal with serious juvenile delinquents, it is apparent that most institutions will have very small numbers of them (probably fewer than ten).

Yet at an aggregate level, serious juvenile offenders remain a persistent problem. Because of the crimes they have committed, they are regarded as dangerous. Because they are young, they are thought to deserve opportunities to change themselves or to be rehabilitated. The two perceptions merge into one aspiration for

* We were unable to locate exact data on the numbers of juveniles in Federal institutions. The Federal system in general attempts to get juveniles handled by the states. The only notable exceptions are serious juvenile offenders who are American Indians and have committed offenses on reservations. Many of these are held at the Federal facility in Englewood, Colorado.

successful treatment when it is recognized that a successful intervention also reduces the danger posed to society by this group.

Two other recent reports have dealt with related topics. The *Report to the Governor, of the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence in New York State* had three parts: (1) an attempt to collect and examine court records on the numbers of violent offenders, (2) the identification of the policy issues involved in isolating such a group (labeling, etc.), and (3) an exploration of the effectiveness of the service and treatment components of juvenile justice in New York State. The Panel was able to document both the numbers of such juveniles brought to the attention of the courts, and their subsequent dispositions. Statewide in New York 44.4 percent of the petitions involving homicide, arson, rape, other sex crimes, robbery, assault, and possession of a dangerous weapon were dismissed at factfinding and at disposition. Of these petitions, 14.9 percent were simply withdrawn. Regarding the delivery of services to violent youth, the Panel concluded that:

the service and treatment components of the juvenile justice system in New York State lack accountability, coordination and planning. Until this is changed, our efforts to control the violent juvenile will be too slow, wasteful, ineffective, and discriminatory.³²

Paul Strasburg at the Vera Institute of Justice has been examining the question of violent juveniles.³³ Strasburg points out that the term "violence" usually connotes something about the juvenile's internal state or the outcomes of that state. Unfortunately, it says nothing about the more productive matters either of the causes of violence or of the precise definitions of violent acts. Strasburg argues for a restrictive definition of violence (the commission of a specific act plus a pattern or repetition of such acts). An additional important part of Strasburg's work in progress is the documentation of the scope of the problem, e.g., are violent and nonviolent juvenile offenders processed differently, and if so, how, why, and with what effect?

Treatments

The range of treatments with this population is extensive and includes:

- Guided group interaction
- Psychotherapy
- Psychoanalysis
- Transactional analysis
- Gestalt therapy
- Behavior modification
- Milieu therapy
- Family therapy
- Career education
- Schooling in correctional institutions

Those techniques are provided in a variety of settings ranging from secure correctional facilities or institutions to community-based programs. At least some ad-

judicated serious juvenile offenders seem to be in all of the following institutions and programs:

- Adult prisons
- Correctional facilities or training schools
with a range of security characteristics
- Mental hospitals
- Group homes
- Community-based day treatment programs
- Community-based secure facilities

(Some serious juvenile offenders are not in public facilities but have rather been released in the custody of their parents for placement in private boarding schools, military academies, sanatoria, etc. This solution is generally restricted to offenders from families of at least middle-class status. One obvious effect is to guarantee that public institutions for juvenile offenders serve an underclass population.)

With a range of institutions providing an array of treatments, what can be said about the effectiveness of those treatments? The array of treatments can be grouped under a much smaller number of major headings which reflect shared assumptions about the causes of delinquent behavior and about its proper treatment. Sections II through V of this report present the results of analyses of these areas by the project's four study teams. Following is a brief introductory summary of the treatment types.

TYPES OF TREATMENT AIMED AT BEHAVIORAL CHANGE IN JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Interventions Based on Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry

These may be divided into those that seek to change behavior by changing the individual's motivations and feelings, versus behavior modification, which changes specific behaviors directly without going into the individual's psychodynamics. Behavior modification is also often used along with psychotherapy. Psychotherapy techniques include psychoanalytic methods, transactional analysis, Gestalt therapy, etc., on a group or individual basis.

Interventions Based on Sociology and Social Work

Since delinquency is thought of as caused by the social context and peer group influence, treatment techniques stress the restructuring of the social environment and the positive use of the peer group, as in guided group interaction (GGI). Treatment may be institutional, or in a community setting (as a condition of probation). GGI has been particularly successful with hard-core delinquents from one-parent families.

Interventions Based on Schooling

The use of schooling as a behavior-changing treatment for offenders is based on two facts: (1) the vast majority of juvenile offenders experienced failure in school,

and (2) social and vocational advancement for such juveniles is blocked without academic training.

Interventions Based on Vocational Education

The assumption here is that delinquency will continue unless the juvenile has a socially acceptable method of earning a living and pursuing a career. These interventions stress vocational training and job skills as a way to modify the youth's opportunity structure and thus intervene in delinquency.

No Treatment

Another area of significance can be called the "no-treatment" situation, in which the juvenile simply does time without exposure to any interventions or treatments. It would be a mistake to assume that there is no institutional effect on juvenile offenders in these no-treatment instances. The fact of incarceration and the effects of peer cultures are too powerful to ignore. Perhaps a more descriptive title would be no-intended-treatment. However it is conceptualized, the no-treatment area is significant for several reasons.

First, the Rand project staff has been assured that there are youths at (unspecified) places in the juvenile justice system who are not being schooled, vocationally-trained, group-guided, behaviorally modified, or anything else. Sometimes that situation is attributed to their punitive isolation, sometimes to the fact that they are held in places too small or too remote to have programs, sometimes to official indifference. It follows, then, that the people responsible for no-treatment situations are not clamoring for attention. Although we have been assured that they exist, we don't know where.

A second reason would recommend attention to the no-treatment case: The developing pressure to create or acknowledge the juvenile's right NOT to be treated assumes some things about that state that may or may not be true. One major justification for a right not to be treated is to avoid harm or at least to minimize the personal intrusions that characterize some interventions. It would be useful to know what happens to juveniles who receive no treatment.

The third argument for some attention to the no-treatment case involves the question of "maturing out" of delinquency. The drop in recidivism rates as the age of a cohort increases is sometimes explained by the juveniles growing out of the storms of adolescence or at least toward the opportunities of adult status. In either case, the diminishing recidivism rates are attributed *not* to the purported effect of any of the interventions applied but simply to the phenomenon of growing up or growing out of crime. Longitudinal study of no-treatment individuals would contribute to knowledge about that phenomenon.

Fourth, better information about no-treatment cases would provide baseline data against which to measure the added (if indeed it is added) efficacy of various programs.

Although there are important reasons for understanding what goes on in this area, we were unable to gather any data about it.

The following sections of this report discuss each of these treatment efforts in more detail, including the underlying theoretical assumptions, the characteristic features of the treatment, the available data about the outcomes of those treatments, and a case study illustration from each area.

Methodology Employed in Developing this Report

This project was originally conceived as a secondary analysis of existing data. Major reliance was to be placed on empirical data developed from previous research efforts which met tests of methodological rigor of the sort used by Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks.³⁴ In the probable absence of a sufficient stock of such research studies, we had determined to rely on program evaluations, progress reports, and data collected for management purposes internal to the various projects. Such "practice data," from a range of projects within each treatment area, could then have been analyzed with case survey procedures recently developed by Robert Yin.³⁵

In fact, neither of our preferred procedures turned out to be feasible. For reasons which are discussed below, the data simply do not exist. The frequently lamented absence of reliable and valid information in the criminal justice field generally is compounded in the juvenile justice area and then multiplied again when the focus is on this specific class of juvenile offenders.

This project commissioned searches in the half-dozen major computerized data bases relevant either to juvenile justice or to our component treatment fields. In an effort to locate all available data on serious juvenile offenders, these computer searches employed 108 general terms or descriptors and 114 special terms within the individual treatment areas. Each search was conducted by a reference librarian familiar with the subject data base, after detailed discussions with the project staff concerning the purposes of this analysis. In general, this procedure allowed us to tap both primary sources (published materials) and fugitive sources (unpublished reports, memos, program analyses, etc.). Titles and abstracts which included any of the 200-plus key descriptors for the project were then reviewed for relevance and the full documents were acquired wherever appropriate. (See App. D for a list of the data bases searched and terms employed.)

A second level of bibliographic search considered the card files at five major university centers with specialized training facilities related to this area. We also contacted the half-dozen leading national research projects whose work appeared most relevant to this project. These other projects (most of them Federally funded) made many of their own sources and analyses available to us.

Two strategies were employed in these search efforts. The principal investigator supervised a series of centralized searches and provided the team leaders in the various treatment areas with relevant information. Since each team leader was expert in that particular treatment area, they developed their own searches as well. Thus, using all the bibliographic resources available in the field and employing centralized and decentralized search procedures, we made a comprehensive survey for data relevant to the question, What is being done with serious juvenile offenders, and (especially) with what effect?

When that extensive effort demonstrated conclusively that data sufficient to our

purposes have not yet been collected, we began an intensive effort to tap informal networks in this field and to produce our case analyses. Informal networks, or "invisible colleges," are common in many fields, including juvenile justice. Because of the expertise of the team leaders and because of the importance of the project, we had enthusiastic cooperation from literally hundreds of practitioners and academics in all parts of this field.

These people agreed that there are no data of the sort necessary to support precise determinations about the relative efficacy of various treatments for serious juvenile offenders. (Searching for something which does not exist is always a frustrating business, since it can easily degenerate into excursions down an infinite regress of blind alleys. Although we were disappointed to receive the unanimous opinion of others that sufficient hard data do not now exist, at least their unanimity verified the results of our own efforts.)

Participants in the informal networks were interviewed (generally by telephone) with respect to any topics of this analysis relevant to their expertise. They were also used to identify potential case study sites.

In the case analysis procedure, each study team located one or more sites which represented the most intensive application of that area's characteristic treatment methods to the largest number of juvenile offenders meeting our criteria. These two characteristics—(a) concentrated provision of a particular treatment to (b) as high a proportion of serious juvenile offenders as could be located—allowed us to examine the features of each treatment modality in the most germane setting. In each instance, study team members made visits to their project sites and prepared extensive case studies. These case studies form part of the basis for the analysis in Secs. VI and VII.

Finally, we made a concerted effort to tap the expertise of practitioners and analysts in juvenile justice. The relative lack of empirical data placed a premium on verifying the judgments of the project staff by subjecting those judgments to the critical scrutiny of panels of experts. Thus, the project circulated draft material at a stage far earlier than would otherwise have been the case, and we made a maximum effort to reflect those expert opinions in this report. (Brief identifying information about the draft readers appears in App. C.) Nonetheless, the responsibility for this analysis rests solely with the author.

Notes

1. Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, *The Honest Politician's Guide To Crime Control*, University of Chicago Press, 1970.
2. Edwin M. Schur, *Radical Nonintervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973, p. 155.
3. Norval Morris, *The Future of Imprisonment*, University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 92.
4. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Robert M. Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*, University of Chicago Press, 1972, p. 89, Table 6.1. "Offenders and Offenses by Delinquent Subgroups."

5. Ibid., p. 102, Table 6.15. "Crime Code of Offenses by SES and Race of Offender: Chronic Offenders."

6. Edwin Schur has, for example, noted the lack of characteristics that distinguish between youths who are and who are not adjudicated as delinquent. Delinquents are "seen as not having special personal characteristics, nor even as being subject to socio-economic constraints, but rather as suffering from contingencies. Youthful misconduct . . . is extremely common; delinquents are those youths who for a variety of reasons drift into disapproved behavior and are caught and 'processed'." (*Radical Nonintervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem*, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 23.) A contrary piece of evidence is from Peterson, Pittman, and O'Neal, who conclude that, at least for violent juveniles, there is evidence that they are more likely to come from homes in which the father left the mother while the child was very young and the juvenile is still living at home. (Richard A. Peterson, David J. Pittman, and Patricia O'Neal, M.D., "Stabilities in Deviance: A Study of Assaultive and Non-Assaultive Offenders," *Journal of Criminal Law and Police Science*, Vol. 53, March 1962, pp. 44-48.)

7. Michael Marvin, et al., "Planning Assistance Programs to Reduce School Violence," prepared for LEAA by Research for Better Schools Inc., Philadelphia, 1976, p. 16.

8. New York Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence. *Report to the Governor from Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., Task Forces I, II, III*, Albany, New York, 1976, Xerox.

9. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "The Culture of Youth," in *Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime*, Task Force Report for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 150.

10. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency*, Wiley, New York, 1964, p. 300.

11. Ibid., p. 231.

12. U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Crime in Eight American Cities*, July 1974, cited in Thomas V. Halatyn, "Violence Prediction Using Actuarial Methods," manuscript, Research Center, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Davis, California, April 1975, p. 52.

13. Don M. Gottfredson, "Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and Delinquency," in *Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime*, Task Force Report for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, App. H., pp. 171-187.

14. Thomas Halatyn, "Violence Prediction Using Actuarial Methods."

15. Hans H. Toch, *Violent Men*, Aldine, Chicago, 1969, cited in Thomas Halatyn, *ibid.*

16. *The New York Times*, August 14, 1975. Arrests in this category were up 19.4 percent from the same period one year earlier.

17. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, Committee on the Judiciary, *Juvenile Delinquency*, Senate Report No. 93-1424, Washington, D.C., December 19, 1974, p. 2.

18. See Thomas V. Halatyn, "Youthful Violence: An Overview of Selected Topics," paper prepared at Research Center, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Davis, California, March 1975, mimeographed, pp. 12, 13.

19. Halatyn, *ibid.*, p. 17.

20. Halatyn, *ibid.*, p. 6, citing Geis and Monahan.

21. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1973 and 1974.

22. New York Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence, *Report to the Governor*.

23. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Children in Custody*, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, May 1975, Washington, D.C. The types of institutions and their populations are as follows:

1. Detention centers	10,782
2. Shelters	190
3. Reception and diagnostic centers	1,734
4. Training schools	26,427
5. Ranches and forestry camps	4,959
6. Half-way houses	713
7. Group homes	889

24. Robert D. Vinter, George Downs, and John Hall, *Juvenile Corrections in the States: Residential Programs and Deinstitutionalization, A Preliminary Report*, National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, School of Social Work, University of Michigan, 1976.

1. State institutions	25,424
2. State ranches and camps	2,577
3. Community-based residential facilities	5,663

25. Substantially higher figures can be supported by using different assumptions. For example, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency reported that 10 percent of "the one million juveniles [who] enter the juvenile system" will be incarcerated. Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Committee on the Judiciary, *Juvenile Delinquency* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Senate, Report No. 93-1424, December 19, 1974) p. 2.

26. M. E. Wolfgang, *Crimes of Violence*, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, 1970, cited by Thomas V. Halatyn, "Youthful Violence: An Overview of Selected Topics," pp. 11-12.

27. Defined as "Homicide, Aggravated Vandalism, Rape, Aggravated Assault, Arson, Robbery, Unlawful Entry, Burglary, and Bodily Self Injury . . ." Lindsey G. Arthur, *In the Matter of the Welfare of J.E.C.* (State of Minnesota, County of Hennepin, District Court Juvenile Division, February 25, 1975) p. 2.

28. Rosemary C. Sarri and Robert D. Vinter, *Time Out: A National Study of Juvenile Corrections*, Table 2.11, "Types of Self-Reported Commitment Offenses by Sex" (Ann Arbor, National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, University of Michigan, 1975, draft manuscript courtesy of the authors). This 15 percent is something of an overestimate for our purposes since it includes person offenses deemed "minor" by the FBI report codes (assault, and assault and battery). Contrarily, the 15 percent may underestimate juveniles accused of dangerous crime, since nearly all states allow juveniles charged with the most serious offenses to be waived to the criminal justice system. Thus the juvenile justice system may be missing data on some of the most serious offenders. For a discussion, see Mark M. Levin and Rosemary C. Sarri, "Juvenile Delinquency: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Codes in the United States," *National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections*, University of Michigan, 1974, pp. 17-18.

29. The Wolfgang, Figlio, Sellin figure of 18 percent for "chronic delinquents" has sometimes been applied to the "dangerous" population. But since, as we have already discussed, only 6.2 percent of the crimes committed by that group could be described as serious, it seems an overestimate for our purposes. See above footnote 1.

It would also be inappropriate to use the roughly 73,000 arrests of persons less than 18 for serious index crimes as an estimate of the "dangerous" population as it is defined here, because (a) Arrests grossly exceed convictions, especially with juveniles. (b) Some juveniles have multiple arrests. (c) Police may arrest for more serious crime than is appropriate in order to justify force to control suspects at the scene of the crime. (d) The UCR data include all robberies, not only armed robberies. (e) Some proportion of the juveniles arrested are bound over or waived to adult criminal courts.

30. Bureau of the Census, *Estimates of Population of U.S. by Age, Sex, and Race: 1970-1975* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce Series P-25, No. 614, November 1975) "Table 2. Estimates of Resident Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Race: July 1, 1970-1975."

31. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Children in Custody* (see note 23).

32. New York Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence, *Report to the Governor*.

33. Paul Strasburg, "Violent Delinquents: A Report and Recommendations to the Ford Foundation," Vera Institute of Justice, New York, April 1976 (draft).

34. Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, *The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies*, Praeger, New York, 1975.

35. Robert K. Yin and Karen Heald, "Using the Case Survey Method to Analyze Policy Studies," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 20, September 1975, pp. 371-381.

II. PROGRAMS BASED ON PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

Theodore S. Donaldson and Gail L. Zellman

Treatment programs are defined here as organized, theoretically based efforts to deter violence and serious offenses by juveniles who have been adjudged delinquent. The interventions considered in this section are based upon the theories of psychiatry and clinical psychology. While clear *theoretical* differences exist between the various schools of practitioners—particularly between psychotherapists and specialists in behavior modification—it should be realized that these differences are not generally reflected in practice. As discussed below under the heading of Treatment, techniques are freely borrowed across theoretical lines, and there is general agreement on the components of a good treatment program for juveniles. Behavior modification is often used as an adjunct to psychotherapy, to change behavior directly while long-term personality changes are being sought. This should be borne in mind while reading the following brief descriptions of theoretical orientations.

Theoretical Perspectives

PSYCHOTHERAPY

The Psychoanalytic Approach

One of the pervasive theoretical orientations among clinical psychologists and psychiatrists is psychoanalytic. Although classical psychoanalytic theory is concerned primarily with the development of an internal awareness, more recent versions of this perspective have come to describe the implications of internal difficulties on interpersonal relations. Therefore, psychoanalytic theory provides a relevant causal picture of violent behavior.

While the original theories of psychoanalysis explained adolescence only as a reworking of infantile trauma and conflict, more recent theories have added the independent contribution of an adolescent developmental phase. Implicit in the consideration of this developmental phase are notions of social interaction, in which the individual is an active participant (as proposed by such neopsychoanalysts as Erikson and Adler), and not merely the passive recipient of socializing forces whom Freud describes. Marohn summarizes some of the causal factors of delinquency:

Adolescence can be understood as the interaction of a number of different lines of development, and delinquency can be understood as resulting from problems in superego development, ego deficiencies or distortions, object searching, disordered defensive constellations, deviant libidinal development, a failure of socialization, substitute libidinal gratification, severe

guilt, a disease of the psychic structure, and the like. But, in addition, some of the new ideas on narcissism and the self contribute greatly to our understanding of the adolescent process, and in particular the delinquent process.¹

This list describes personal disorders to explain interpersonal problems. To the extent that the "repairing" of psychic difficulties brings an end to destructive behavior, the psychoanalytic approach is an effective one. Unfortunately, in practice, it is often difficult to match internal problems with their external manifestations.

Transactional Analysis. Both *transactional analysis* and *Gestalt therapy* represent attempts to stay closer to actual events in their causal explanations of behavior than do psychoanalytic theories. Although they deal with internal states and their external counterparts, they are not directed at finding the beginnings of these internal states in the distant past. Both approaches focus on present experiences, on the here and now.

Transactional analysis (TA), developed by Eric Berne, is based on the assumption that each person has three different ego states—coherent systems of feelings and behavior—which Berne calls the Parent, Adult, and Child. (These states are distinct from the psychoanalytic ego, superego, and id.²) A person will act differently depending on which ego state is uppermost at the time. This form of psychotherapy emphasizes the transactions and "games" that take place between the Parent, Adult, and Child of different persons. The objective is to discover the "life script" that has led the person into difficulties and to create a new, more appropriate life script.

Gestalt Therapy. Gestalt therapy, developed by Fritz Perls, assumes that each person naturally seeks a harmonious integration between his personal needs and the demands of society, but that many people are blocked from achieving this integrated balance by unfinished business in their development that prevents them from knowing and acting upon their true feelings. The therapeutic process is directed toward achieving an intense self-awareness and ability to express present feelings clearly and directly. Psychodramatic techniques are used to enable the patient to relive and complete his unfinished business, so that he no longer engages in what Perls calls "self-interruption."³

The kinds of psychotherapy described here vary in terms of the emphasis they place on such things as developmental factors, social influences, and cognitive factors, but all pay much attention to motivation and insight. In addition, all attempt to establish causal links between internal states and observable behaviors.

BEHAVIORISTIC APPROACHES

By contrast, *behavioristic theories* are framed in behavioral terms, and avoid theoretical constructs that are considered nonobservable. Behavior modification, which employs a stimulus-response concept to explain, and response reinforcement to alter the occurrence of particular behaviors, represents an extreme case of this behavioral approach. The fundamental tenet of this approach states that behaviors are called out by stimulus conditions and reinforcers (roughly equivalent to rewards). Since behaviors are reinforced and maintained by external stimuli, behaviors can be modified solely through the manipulation of these external factors. In this view, early experiences are important only insofar as they establish behavior

patterns (stimulus-response associations) that become self-sustaining and thus difficult to break. The approach is effective in extinguishing violent behaviors to the extent that positive social behaviors occur and can be reinforced in a variety of settings.

Behavior modification has been the treatment of choice in classrooms, mental hospitals, and juvenile delinquent facilities because of its low cost and demonstrated effectiveness in producing relatively rapid changes. There is some evidence that it is also more effective than other forms of therapy in treating certain specific behavior syndromes, such as phobias, anxiety reactions, and insomnia.⁴ (Disadvantages will be discussed in the more detailed section below.)

PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Along with the psychological explanations of deviant behavior, there is a growing interest in the influence of *physiological factors* on behavior. Some theories speculate that differences in maturational rates of the central nervous system and other physiological relationships account for the delinquents' lack of control and inclination to violence. More generally, the positive response of violent children to tranquilizing drugs (e.g., thorazine, compazine) suggests that physiological disorders are, at least in part, causally related to violent behavior.

However, it is a difficult diagnostic task to identify physiological disorders as the causes of violent behavior. A physiological problem is usually discovered only after extended exposure to the juvenile (generally during treatment), through a series of modifications and revisions of an original diagnosis.

ECLECTIC APPROACHES

These brief descriptions of several theoretical approaches make them appear more clearly categorized than they actually are. In using them to understand delinquency there is much overlap, with the concepts of one being used in others, although they are often labeled differently. As a result, much of the current thinking about delinquency and its causes draws upon a variety of approaches. This *eclecticism* brings its influence to bear both in defining violent behavior and in identifying its causes.

Nearly every theory has something to say about the phenomenon of violence.⁵ As the preceding discussion indicates, each theoretical perspective describes violence in a different, unicausal manner. In contrast, the prevailing eclectic definition of violence points to its many causes and states that violence cannot be regarded as a single entity. Kalogerakis comments:

What varieties of behavior are encompassed by the term "violent act"? Can one group them together as variations of the same theme? The carefully calculated gang murder or organized crime would seem to have little in common with the knifing of an abusive alcoholic husband by a distraught woman. The known epileptic who suddenly becomes violent, the man overwhelmed by paranoid delusions who strikes out at his would-be tormentors, the humiliated child expelled from school who then sets fire to it, the teenager unable to deal with sexual feelings in a direct and appropriate way

who turns rapist—each differs greatly as to the motive, method, personality configuration and conditions necessary to evoke the violent response.⁶

A task force report by the American Psychiatric Association concludes:

Violent behavior results from complex interactions, psychological, social, cultural, environmental-situational and biological factors. Despite various attempts at classification, there exists no adequate typology of violent persons.⁷

In a review of theory and research on juvenile homicide, Adams concludes that no consistent background of personality features is connected with murder.⁸ In many cases, the causes of violence appear to be similar to those of nonviolent delinquency, but in other cases, violence and homicide appear as a specific syndrome. Adams suggests:

Hostile aggression in children does not seem to be innate or instinctive, but a reaction to deprivation and frustration arising from maturational disorders and environmental factors that fail to meet the child's needs.⁹

The multiple causes of violence and the importance of situational factors have led to treatment approaches that are not "pure," but represent the kind of eclecticism described here. This causally complex perspective hopefully will enhance our ability to predict the likelihood that a particular child will behave violently. While some slow progress is being made in determining indices of deviant behaviors, we are far from the place where accurate prediction is possible. Reasons for the failure in prediction of violence include the problems associated with one-shot diagnoses, a lack of understanding of causative factors, too few intensive and longitudinal studies, inadequate data bases, and poor experimental and analytic procedures. Further, the low rate of occurrence of violent events compounds the problems of prediction.

The efficacy of treatment techniques, which are developed from the causal assumptions reviewed above, suffers from these problems. Nevertheless, to the extent that each approach (or an eclectic combination of approaches) isolates and influences some of the factors causing violent behavior, treatment is not without impact.

Treatment

Some research seems to indicate that the effectiveness of a treatment is independent of the counselor's specific orientation and technique.¹⁰ One central condition in therapy is the reinforcement of what the therapist considers appropriate behavior, whether it is reinforced with rewards, empathy, or attention, as Truax concluded in an investigation of personality change due to psychotherapy.¹¹

Not only is there little difference in outcome between the various psychotherapeutic approaches, but differences between groups who do and do not receive therapy are slight or nonexistent, and usually do not last. However, these results do not necessarily show that therapy is ineffective. They may show that the therapy is not in fact working, but they may also mean that the therapy has not been implemented as prescribed, and/or our measures are too crude to assess the effects. Howard and Orlinski comment on these evaluations:¹²

No area of psychotherapy has suffered so much from simplistic thinking in the guise of tough minded pragmatism as has research on therapy outcome. The insistent demand to know if therapy "works" has obscured the extreme subtlety of the question and a number of commentators recently have been recommending that a more differentiated approach be taken.

In discussing treatment outcomes, it is essential to consider the complexity of a phenomenon like violent behavior. Unfortunately, just as it is difficult to determine particular causes for violent behavior, it is difficult to determine the treatment programs best suited to an individual. For example, some juveniles respond violently to psychotherapy.

VIOLENT REACTION TO PSYCHOTHERAPY

A nonsystematic review of juvenile records gave strong support to the idea that the imposition of psychotherapy may be a precursor to violent behavior. A number of youths who had no history of violence apparently rebelled violently against required therapy, perhaps because it is felt to be personally intrusive; perhaps because achieving self-understanding tends to be painful; perhaps because psychotherapy makes strong demands for interpersonal relationships and commitments. Marohn comments:

Offering a psychotherapeutic relationship often constitutes a trauma by stimulating a maternal transference characterized by fears and wishes for closeness, mothering and merger, which seemed to throw the patient into shock and trauma.¹³

This fact underscores the difficulty of fitting the treatment to the individual. As mentioned earlier, behavior modification appears not to evoke such negative reactions; administrators of institutions profit from the relatively rapid changes in behavior that occur.

BASIC COMPONENTS OF A GOOD TREATMENT PROGRAM FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Some basic dimensions of treatment are agreed on by most therapists who work with delinquents. These basic components of a good treatment program include:

- General health services
- Some kind of counseling or psychotherapy
- Education
- Family counseling
- Arts and crafts
- Recreation

In addition, outpatients may require:

- Housing (foster homes, halfway houses, etc.)
- Remedial education
- Job training and placement
- Financial aid

Most of these services are not available in the outpatient or released situation, and almost all practitioners feel that their programs are rendered less effective because these services cannot be provided.

Despite the overlapping mentioned earlier, it is possible to distinguish approaches based on psychotherapy from those based on behavior modification, for the purpose of describing them here. Following are brief descriptions of psychotherapy and behavior modification in action, with particular attention to specific behavior modification programs currently in operation.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Psychotherapeutic programs for offenders are usually inpatient services, although they usually provide a number of noninstitutional services and some kinds of treatment for outpatients.

There are no programs of this type designed specifically for the violent offender.* However, many juveniles admitted to psychiatric hospitals do have a history of violence which is frequently associated with school or home, but, except for homicide, their violence does not come to the attention of the courts.† Therefore, although these programs rarely admit juveniles with records of criminal violence, they do find themselves with some violent juveniles. More generally, juveniles in these programs range in age from about 12 to 17, are of both sexes and of diverse race and socioeconomic status.

To varying extents, psychotherapeutic institutions provide basic research, community service, and crisis intervention, and serve juvenile criminal justice functions. As a result, juveniles are referred from a number of sources, including juvenile court, schools, private psychiatrists, and emergency hospital intake.¹⁴ In many programs for delinquents, juveniles are screened before admittance and those who are mentally retarded, brain damaged, or severely psychotic are usually not admitted. In addition, some programs with specific research objectives exclude juveniles who do not meet their selection criteria.

Since there are no psychotherapeutic programs targeted solely for the violent juvenile, it is impossible to evaluate their impact precisely. Moreover, evaluations of program effectiveness in general are noticeably lacking. Hence, we do not consider any specific psychotherapeutic programs here. However, the absence of programs designed specifically for the violent juvenile does not imply that the causes and treatment of violence have been ignored by the psychological community. As a result of contact between counseling professionals and violent juveniles in juvenile courts and reform schools, there are established psychiatric and psychological opinions about what services a psychotherapeutic institution for violent juveniles should provide. These services focus on individual and group psychotherapy, which are intended to undo internal stresses, and thereby to alleviate the pressure for violent behavior.

* None were found in the literature review, and several psychiatrists interviewed stated that such programs do not exist: Richard C. Marohn, M.D., Carl Malmquist, M.D., Michael Kalogerakis, M.D., and Derek Miller, M.D.

† Michael Kalogerakis, M.D., personal communication.

Staffing and Cost

Institutional psychotherapeutic programs are quite expensive, costing approximately \$28,000 per year per juvenile.* In these programs staff-juvenile ratios are high, and the staff includes highly qualified professionals, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, teachers, psychiatric residents, and psychological and social work interns.

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

As mentioned earlier, *behavior modification* as a therapeutic strategy differs from psychotherapy in that its focus is on the behavior itself. It attempts to modify undesired behavior directly and does not investigate motivation, purpose, and psychodynamics. Behavior modification has been an extremely popular treatment modality for juvenile offenders, both as an adjunct to more intensive psychotherapeutic treatment and as the primary method of treatment.

Among the reasons for the popularity of behavior modification is its demonstrated effectiveness at managing, controlling, and changing targeted behaviors during the course of treatment.¹⁵ In addition, behavior modification programs are relatively inexpensive and simple to set up and implement.

Cost and Convenience

Stolz, et al., note that many behavior modification programs are carried out by paraprofessionals and by personnel who are generally less highly trained than is the case for more psychotherapeutically oriented programs.¹⁶ Certainly, the relatively low cost of such programs is a primary reason why behavior modification has been the treatment of choice in public institutions. Another reason is that behavior modification can easily be used to smooth the operation of institutions by controlling problem behaviors.

Criticism

Until recently, the Bureau of Prisons used behavior modification extensively in such programs as START and CASE (described below), where the stated objective was to work with offenders so that they could better control their behavior and make successful community adjustments.¹⁷ The programs quickly amassed a large number of critics, however. Opponents of the START program, for example, contended that prison officials were using behavior modification techniques not to rehabilitate the inmates, but to reinforce behaviors that would ease management and control problems.¹⁸ Indeed, behavior modification is probably more subject to misuse than psychotherapy because specific behaviors can be effectively eliminated within the context of a program. Gaylin and Blatte suggest that the effectiveness of this direct intervention is one reason why behavior modification is seen as considerably more threatening than psychotherapy.¹⁹

* P. Strasburg, cited in New York State Board of Social Welfare, *Foster Care Needs and Alternatives to Placement*, p. 45, note 7.

Model Programs

The CASE Project. A model behavior modification program operated within an institutional setting was the CASE project, which was begun at the Youth Training School in Washington, D.C., by Harold Cohen and James Filipczak. This project was continued at the Kennedy Youth Center in Morgantown, West Virginia, when the National Training School was closed down. The objective of the project was to expand the academic and social repertoires of the 41 incarcerated adolescents.

An incentive plan was established which used performance on programmed instructional material as the targeted behaviors for change in the project. By advancing through a self-contained, self-teaching learning curriculum, students earned points that could be exchanged for private showers, clothing, private rooms, and desired foods, among other things. Desirable social behaviors earned additional points.

The strengths of the CASE project included the fact that it provided clear rewards that were immediately contingent on the individual's behavior. Another factor that made this a model project was that it seems to have been run in a very ethical way, unlike some programs. The inmates were told just what the contingencies were and were afforded opportunities to earn points and tokens. A third factor that contributes to its being a model project is the fact that it was educationally oriented. Because learning can be measured incrementally and objectively, it is one of the easier areas of human behavior on which to develop contingency-based programs. Finally, the CASE project did not include any chronically violent delinquents. Hence, there proved to be no need for repeated or lengthy lock-ups in order to keep the program functioning.

Evaluation. Data presented by Cohen and Filipczak showed positive results due to this "token economy" program.²⁰ High rates of reinforced academic and social behaviors were observed as a result of the program. For example, all adolescents gained more than one grade level per year on the SAT (Stanford Achievement Test). Scores on IQ tests evidenced similar increases. The 41 students in the CASE project were compared with a similar group of students from the standard training school program. Follow-up data on recidivism was gathered at one-, two- and three-year intervals. At both the one- and two-year follow-ups, the CASE subjects showed considerably less recidivism. However, by the third year of the follow-up, the recidivism rates for the two groups were essentially equal. Additional comparisons of a group of students paroled directly from CASE and a group of students transferred to other institutions from CASE prior to parole indicated that the direct release group had a significantly lower rate of recidivism.²¹

Termination. Unfortunately, other behavior modification programs suffered from unethical administration. Despite its apparent success, the CASE project at the Kennedy Youth Center began to be closed down gradually in the early 1970s in reaction to severe criticism about the deprivation of prisoners at the START program in the Federal facility at Springfield, Missouri. The use of such techniques as aversive conditioning, in the guise of behavior modification, had come to the attention of the Bureau of Prisons, which subsequently withdrew its support of behavior modification programs within state institutions.

Centers for Youth Development and Achievement (CYDA). This program in Tucson grew out of the Achievement Place model. (Achievement Place is a community-based residential program, in which 6 to 8 youths live in a home in the

community that is run by "teaching parents.") CYDA is funded through contracts with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Arizona State Department of Corrections, and the State Department of Economic Security. Like Achievement Place, CYDA features a token economy, the development of reciprocal relationships, live-in "teaching parents," and the involvement of the youths in decisionmaking in their houses. All are adjudicated delinquents, and most have committed rather serious offenses (nearly all felonies). More than half have six or more arrests at entry, which underestimates the seriousness of their delinquency, since Indian tribal courts are notoriously lenient.

All CYDA youths are referred by courts: 80 percent from tribal courts and 20 percent from county, Federal, or state courts. CYDA operates twelve homes and a center, which includes a dormitory to which youths with severe behavioral problems are sent. (The dorm houses about 10 percent of the population at any given time. It seems to function effectively for the youths and for the community people, who are more willing to accept the program given this provision for quick removal from the community in case of trouble.) Most of the homes are in middle- or upper-middle-class neighborhoods. Homes generally include 5 to 8 boys (two homes house girls) and houseparents. Houseparents, who work most closely with trainees, are nearly all college educated and young. A few come to the job through the criminal justice system.

Youths are stratified into five treatment levels. Each level has specific behavioral goals, which must be achieved in order to progress to the next level. As a youth progresses through the level system he acquires more freedom from surveillance and more privileges. The goals of the CYDA focus on increasing the incidence of these constructive behaviors:

1. Accepting responsibility for the consequences of one's behavior.
2. Engaging in positive social interactions (especially in public schools).
3. Learning vocational, academic, and self-sufficiency skills.
4. Using leisure time in nondeviant ways.
5. Enhancing self-identity as an Indian.

Evaluation. CYDA had National Institute of Mental Health funding to conduct post-release investigations and evaluations of the CYDA program. The first study compared all 86 Indian youths treated by CYDA to all 112 Indian youths treated in other programs during the same period. During the first 12 months following release, 59 percent of CYDA youths had been arrested, compared to 81 percent of control youths; 8 percent of CYDA youths were reinstitutionalized, as compared to 42 percent of control youths. While the data indicate better performance of CYDA youths, lack of random assignment and lack of controls for length of time in treatment (CYDA average = 14.0 months, control = 8.0 months) leave the findings open to some question.*

A second, more tightly controlled evaluation has been done. Fifty youths were matched on age at commitment, offense frequency prior to treatment and length of treatment; unfortunately, they were not randomly assigned. During the first 12 months following release, 56 percent of CYDA youths and 88 percent of control

* There is also the possibility that a youth's CYDA status, if known, affected the behavior of juvenile court officers. Changes in adult rather than youth behavior sometimes account for apparent treatment effectiveness.

youths had been reinstitutionalized. However, Harris found that tribal differences alone accounted for substantial variations in post-release outcomes. This is probably due to substantial variations by tribe in community norms and tolerance of deviance.

A problem encountered with some frequency by CYDA is that successful "graduates" cannot be released. Unlike other programs (e.g., ITT at Chino, California) where release is blocked because parole reviewers do not believe the youth has changed, CYDA youths may be blocked from leaving the program because parole officers in the home area fear that changes which have occurred will not be maintained in the disorganized and deviant home environment to which these youth return.

Utility of Treatment Programs

The issues raised by the parole officers discussed above ask about the real, lasting effects of a treatment program. We will now identify the assumptions and components of the behavior modification approach and of psychotherapeutic approaches which enhance and endanger the lasting effectiveness of the treatment.

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

Although it has been consistently reported that behavior modification programs are effective in terms of changing target behaviors, the durability of these alterations has been subject to question. Two aspects of behavior modification programs are relevant here. First, the targeted behaviors must occur spontaneously and be reinforced. Unfortunately, often the frequency of such behaviors is low, in which case aversive conditioning may be employed to extinguish unwanted behaviors. Ethical issues become serious problems as a result of the paucity of spontaneous positive behaviors. The use of drugs which simulate death (succinylcholine) and electric shocks caused public officials to see behavior modification as a grossly unethical intervention strategy. While some programs did develop policy guidelines, investigators found they were largely disregarded. In effect, there were no controls over the programs. For these reasons, state institutions no longer use programs that are exclusively behavior modification.

A second perspective on behavior modification points at a lack of generalization as a major weakness. Specific behaviors are reinforced in particular settings. Beyond that setting, without the reinforcement, it is argued that the changed behaviors will revert to their original forms. However, behavior modification practitioners are highly sensitive to this issue. For example, Harris, who directs the CYDA program, contends that the fading of the token economy in concert with the establishment of relationships among the adolescents and between the youths and the houseparents promotes the generalization of the reinforced behaviors. In addition, Harris suggests that the community setting increases the similarity of stimuli between the program and the outside world.

A different view of the utility of behavior modification programs, which is relat-

ed to the issue of generalization, is given by psychotherapists. When reinforcers elicit compliance, they are functioning as extrinsic motivation. Believers in the importance of motivational states often contend that if these extrinsic motivators are not internalized and the behavior does not come to be intrinsically motivating, then when the reward is removed, the behavior will no longer occur. Unlike the typical generalization argument, this moves beyond the simple presence or absence of the desired behavior across different situations, and seeks to explain the phenomenon in terms of psychological processes. Understandably, this criticism of the utility of behavior modification is rarely considered by strict behaviorists. However, it raises the consideration of internal states, whose modifiability determines the utility of psychotherapeutic treatment programs.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Utility is a practical issue and it is difficult to make practical inferences from theoretical data. Unfortunately, we could not report here on any specific psychotherapeutic programs for various offenders. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider the typical effects of psychotherapy in a context designed for serious juvenile offenders.

Psychotherapy is a lengthy process, requiring the development of a deep relationship between the delinquent and the psychotherapist. The process seeks to develop in the adolescent an understanding of the relationships between his internal feelings (and motivations) and his external behaviors. Often this understanding is both difficult and painful to acquire. To the extent that trauma is created and leads to violent behavior, the path to nonviolent behavior is strewn with violent incidents.

Further, psychotherapy in most of its forms is a very verbal process. Juveniles must be able to define and describe their internal states with sufficient clarity to allow the therapist to make meaningful suggestions for dealing with those internal feelings. To the extent that such feelings can be depicted and dealt with, psychotherapy offers behavioral control through self-awareness. Violent behavior is controlled through an understanding of why violent behavior occurred in the past (distant or recent) and why it need not occur in the present and future. The notions of need and motivation are central.

NO TREATMENT

Finally, one question remains to be asked: Is psychotherapy, behavior modification, or an eclectic combination better than no treatment at all?

This is a particularly important question to ask since adolescent delinquents are under study. Maturation effects might well account for the apparent effects of treatment programs. Unfortunately, this is an impossible question to answer empirically. In the literature reviewed by Davidson and Seidman, 82 percent of the studies on the effectiveness of behavior modification did not include equivalent no-treatment control groups.²² It would seem that the majority of the people who designed these programs believed any treatment to be better than no treatment at all.

Conclusion

Although we are far from understanding the dimensions which determine the ways in which a particular child will respond to a particular treatment, we must continue in our attempts to understand the sources of violence. Adams notes:

A major question is: what causes these aggressive reactions to be expressed by some children in such a violent manner? The answer can be found from more objective and intensive study of child offenders, their personality, and their environment. Follow-up and longitudinal studies are needed to see the effects of the homicidal act and treatment upon the youths. Other research must concentrate on the prediction of killers and consequently treat the children, preventing their homicidal acts. Too many try to solve the problem with a one-cause, one-cure approach. The important predisposition of variables that cause one to act out his aggression vary in different theoretical frameworks. The best explanation will probably be found in a combination of these frameworks.²³

With increased accuracy in the areas of prediction and diagnosis, adolescents could be placed in treatment programs best suited to their needs and most likely to be effective.

Notes

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III. PROGRAMS BASED ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

Ronald Huff*

Theoretical Orientation

The primary focus of most sociological/social work-based interventions is on the social context of human behavior. With the exceptions of extreme microsociological approaches¹ and very orthodox social casework practice, the cause of violence is seen in the social structure. The dominant theory of causality reflected in current sociological and social work literature is that of social determinism, varying from the extremely deterministic views of social learning theorists to the "neo-antideterminism" of those who favor Matza's "drift" theory² or other forms of "soft determinism." It follows, therefore, that most sociological/social work-based intervention strategies emphasize the restructuring, manipulation, control, or other use of the social structure. The assumption is that if social factors have operated to produce, or at least facilitate, delinquent behavior, then that same social milieu can be altered to facilitate lawful behavior.

Both sociology and social work tend to emphasize the importance of the offender's social environment. Sociology has its own body of knowledge, both theoretically and empirically based, and emphasizes knowledge-testing through empirical research. Social work, on the other hand, draws upon other social and behavioral sciences; it does not have its own knowledge base, per se, nor has it placed great emphasis on empirical research. Nevertheless, sociology and social work have shared a common interest in the amelioration of social problems through social action.

Sociological and social work-based interventions take place in a variety of settings. These settings can be classified as either institution-based or community-based, with a third setting—the small, community-based residential facility—having some characteristics of each type.

Based on a survey of the literature, very few sociological/social work interventions are being utilized with serious juvenile offenders. Seemingly, these intervention strategies are being employed with more general correctional populations, while those considered "serious" offenders are typically afforded more security and some behavior management techniques for control purposes (as described in Sec. II).

Treatment in Institutions

Group counseling procedures have become increasingly prevalent in correctional facilities. Perhaps the main reason is that group counseling is perceived as far

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more cost-effective than one-to-one counseling. Given the sparse number of professional treatment staff, continued reliance on individual counseling would mean that very few of the incarcerated population would ever receive counseling services. A second reason for the widespread adoption of group interventions is the acknowledgment that for adolescents the peer group is the single most important reference group. Finally, many researchers³ have reported on the importance of the inmate social system as a socializing factor in correctional institutions. These three factors have led to the increased reliance on group intervention techniques.

These group interventions have been as diverse as the theories of delinquency from which they emanated. However, whether it be positive peer culture,⁴ behavior modification (discussed in the preceding section of this report), some form of "milieu therapy,"⁵ a "just community" approach,⁶ "shared decisionmaking,"⁷ reality therapy,⁸ guided group interaction, or some other form of social intervention in a juvenile correctional institution, all have in common the acknowledgment of the social system as a force which can have a very negative impact on those incarcerated (perhaps reinforcing delinquent norms) or which can serve as a potent therapeutic tool.

GUIDED GROUP INTERACTION

One of the most widely adopted of the sociological/social work-based interventions in juvenile correctional facilities has been guided group interaction. For a variety of reasons, GGI appears to be one of the most useful interventions for our target population. It seems particularly useful for hard-core delinquents from one-parent households. For a description of GGI, see The Treatment Program under Green Oak Center, below.

Case Study: The Highfields Project

The first project in a civilian correctional institution to include GGI as a major component was the Highfields Project, which began in 1950.⁹ The project was located at the Highfields Group Rehabilitation Center in Hopewell, New Jersey. This minimum security residential group center served about twenty adjudicated male delinquents who were 16 to 17 years of age. These offenders resided in the facility along with the director and his family, a sociological intern, and the cottage parents. The offenders worked during the weekdays at the New Jersey Neuropsychiatric Institute and attended GGI sessions at Highfields five nights a week. The goal of the program was to treat these delinquent offenders on a short-term (three to four months), but very intensive, basis.

Evaluation. In an evaluative research study,¹⁰ Weeks compared boys graduating from Highfields during a three-year period with boys released from the New Jersey State Reformatory for Males at Annandale. Each boy in the sample was followed up for at least six months post-release. Weeks found that 63 percent of the Highfields boys, compared with only 47 percent of the Annandale boys, were able to complete the period of incarceration and avoid reinstitutionalization during the follow-up period. The apparent success of Highfields, compared with Annandale, was attributed to its differential effects on blacks. In fact, 59 percent of Highfields blacks

(compared with only 33 percent of Annandale blacks) were able to complete their program and avoid reinstitutionalization. The researcher hypothesized that the integrated program led to interactions between blacks and whites that assisted the blacks in adjusting in the larger society after their release from Highfields.

Some controversy has surrounded Weeks' study. Random assignment of boys to Highfields and Annandale was not possible; there were some qualitative differences in samples. Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement that Highfields was *at least* as successful as was Annandale—in a much shorter period of time and with significantly less expense. A later study conducted by independent investigators at Rutgers tends to substantiate the claim that Highfields was successful in accomplishing the goal of reduced recidivism.¹¹

Green Oak Center: GGI for Serious Juvenile Offenders¹²

At least one institution-based program is utilizing GGI with serious juvenile offenders. This 100-bed residential facility is the Green Oak Center in Michigan, which was established in 1960 as a "junior prison"¹³ or "readjustment center"¹⁴ for Michigan's most serious juvenile offenders. A maximum security special treatment unit, it consists of a one-story structure with five separate housing wings, located in Whitmore Lake (near Ann Arbor), Michigan. Green Oak Center is organizationally a part of, although physically and functionally detached from, W. J. Maxey Boys Training School. The Center serves delinquent males between the ages of 12 and 19 who cannot, for a variety of reasons, be accommodated in other facilities and programs within the State of Michigan's Office of Children and Youth Services (OCYS).

The Population Served. Only adjudicated delinquent males between the ages of 12 and 19 can be admitted to Green Oak Center. GOC residents have been found to be in need of a program offering maximum security, intensive treatment, special education, and a highly structured environment. They are regarded as multiply handicapped and are said to represent the highest concentration of socially and emotionally maladjusted and disturbed youth within the State's programs for delinquents. Approximately 12 percent (125) of Michigan's annual admissions of male youth to juvenile correctional institutions enter GOC. Diagnostic descriptions of residents range from neurotic disturbances and severe character disorders (sociopathy) to psychoses. In general, GOC is regarded as *the* placement for severely disturbed offenders who require lengthy institutional care. GOC operates at maximum capacity (100), with an active waiting list.

GOC's population primarily consists of urban youth (Wayne County, or Detroit, is the largest single source of referrals), many of whom are black. The residents of GOC are commonly characterized by extremely low self-esteem, a highly unrealistic self-concept, a history of consistent and severe failure, and a resultant lack of motivation. Their relationships tend to be quite inadequate, dominated by extreme distress and a lack of concern for others. They are typically described as socially inadequate in almost every way.

Educationally, about 80 percent of GOC residents function three or more years below their age-appropriate grade placement. About one-fourth of them have been described as educationally nonfunctional, in that they are unable to obtain overall achievement scores normally expected for fourth-graders on a standardized test.

An informal examination of the residents' data cards indicated that about 80

percent of them have committed violent, assaultive offenses; many of those have histories of repetitive violence. The approximately 20 percent who do not have a history of violent offenses are often offenders who have been transferred due to institutional management problems and emotional/mental disturbance. GOC has virtually no control over the selection process—i.e., they get the kids no one else wants. While GGI is not new, its implementation with a correctional population like that at Green Oak is unusual. Typically, those identified as serious offenders would simply be confined in a maximum security facility with a heavy custodial orientation. Although Green Oak Center is a relatively secure juvenile facility, one gets the clear impression that the number-one priority at the Center is helping the residents behave more responsibly. (GOC's formal goals include the rehabilitation of serious juvenile offenders while segregating these offenders in a secure facility.) The program philosophy implies the belief that in the long run, society is best protected by helping the offender become more responsible so that he can return to society without posing a threat to the safety of others.

The Treatment Program. Upon admission, each resident is assigned to one of the five wings of the Center. This also constitutes an assignment to a GGI group. Each residential wing has two such groups, directed by the wing counselor. There is little choice about assignment to GGI groups, since availability of space is a major problem and assignment to a wing dictates assignment to a group. The wing teams are headed by social workers and have considerable autonomy for decisionmaking, within overall institutional guidelines. The director clearly favors a participatory decisionmaking model, and this is reflected in the decentralized power structure of the institution. His plans for the future include further diffusion of decisionmaking power to the wing teams and to the groups of residents.

GGI has been the principal treatment intervention employed since 1972. Group leaders adhere closely to the theoretical design of GGI. They are nonintrusive, intervening only to redirect the group. The sessions are conducted by the residents themselves. The intended net effect of the ten GGI groups is to create an institutional milieu which is itself therapeutic. The principles of group dynamics are utilized to transform the peer culture into a prosocial system of values and norms, rather than the more traditional institutional social system that reinforces delinquent behavior and generates a status hierarchy based on antisocial or asocial behavior and values.

The small-group discussions at GOC involve up to ten boys, sitting in a tight circle. One boy is chosen by his peers to "have the meeting" that day. The meetings typically last about an hour or ninety minutes and are held four or five times a week. They focus on the boy chosen that day; his peers attempt to help him examine his behavior and improve upon it. Much confrontation accompanies these sessions, and there is constant pressure by the participants to be honest. Since the entire group may lose certain privileges when one of its members commits a serious infraction, there is considerable pressure to learn as much as one can about one's peers so as to make more informed decisions about things such as home leave or off-grounds passes. If such a decision results in an AWOL, for example, then the entire group may have to suffer the consequences.

One characteristic which distinguishes Green Oak Center's GGI program from some others is that the groups at Green Oak, while permitted a fair amount of decisionmaking autonomy, are not allowed to decide—or even to recommend—any

negative sanctions for a resident. This is a staff function. The director noted that the residents would tend to be too punitive in deciding on the appropriateness of certain sanctions. It is also noteworthy that GOC staff members are expected to avoid being too authoritarian (so as to permit the peer culture to work effectively as a treatment tool) but at the same time not avoid accepting personal responsibility for making those decisions which cannot be allocated to the groups.

Staffing. In addition to the director and the wing counselors, all of whom hold graduate degrees in psychology or social work, the staff includes group leaders on each of the five wings; three youth specialists on each wing; a core teacher for each unit; a vocational instructor on each of the teams; clinical services (one psychologist and several psychiatric consultants); program support services (a support services manager, four boys' supervisors, and six youth workers); and special education support services (including a secretary, two remedial language lab instructors, a health/physical education and recreation coordinator, a general studies teacher, a driver education instructor, some teacher aides, a recreation instructor, and two half-time recreation aides); and supportive clerical staff for the administrative office.

Costs. The cost of operating the entire Maxey complex, which includes GOC, is approximately \$41.00 per resident per day, or \$15,008.00 per resident per annum. The director of GOC believes that the Center's cost is probably close to that figure, perhaps slightly lower. These costs include all expenses related to the offender's stay at GOC (with the minor exception of the cost of the assigned community worker—a technicality which amounts to about 92¢ per day for each resident).¹⁵

Evaluation. A major caveat should be noted: The data on GOC are not available for certain kinds of variables, and in other instances the available data are for very short follow-up periods. This situation will be much improved when the new computerized system becomes fully operational. The system is beginning to provide useful longitudinal data on GOC residents.

The research design used to evaluate institutions treating delinquents in Michigan is a multifaceted one. It incorporates pre-, post-, and change scores on the Youth Opinion Poll, a 240-item test of attitudes and values containing six value scales (Self-Esteem, Nurturance, Locus of Personal Responsibility, and three scales assessing delinquency values and attitudes) and a locally derived scale known as Critical Indicators, which is relevant to specific treatment modalities. Finally, there are two validity scales—one for Infrequency and one for Social Desirability. The Youth Opinion Poll is administered verbally, since the reading skills of the target population are poor. An audiotaped presentation was developed and all subscales have been adapted to a true-false format for the purpose of verbal presentation.

A Community Care Telephone Questionnaire has been used and yields outcome scales for youth released from institutions. It has been demonstrated to track youths successfully at three months post-release (98 percent) and even at twelve months post-release (90 percent). The Community Care Rating scale is the primary recidivism index of the evaluation program. The scale is behaviorally specific, based on arrest and contact events. The three-month follow-up measure has proved reliable when tested against police and court records.

Other measures used include educational achievement data and case management data, such as length-of-stay statistics. The Institutional Service Division has adopted a standardized set of objectives and methods of measuring the attainment of those objectives.¹⁶

Recidivism. Based on three-month and twelve-month post-release date,¹⁷ Green Oak seems to do a commendable job, especially considering the nature of its clientele. For arrest data (which are the best indicators here, since "contact" with law enforcement officials might be expected for a recently released GOC youth, who is likely to attract some surveillance), the 1974-1975 baseline figure for GOC was 35 percent. This compares with arrest rates of 25 percent, 14 percent, and 39 percent for the other units of Maxey Training School, 12 percent for Adrian Training School girls, 18 percent for Adrian boys, 31 percent for youth camp residents, 40 percent for graduates of the "Intensive Treatment Program," and 27 percent for Arbor Heights Center.

Earlier data from the Longitudinal Evaluation Project indicated that:

Overall, boys sent to GOC achieved only slightly poorer outcomes than boys sent to other institutions. If the first, second, and third discharges were combined, 34 percent of the boys at GOC achieved good outcomes, vs. 37 percent of the boys placed at Lansing or Maxey.¹⁸

This evaluation must be supplemented by the reminder that GOC was dealing with the most serious offenders. These rates and percentages are not for control groups; rather, these rates compare GOC residents with residents of other facilities without controlling for the more serious risks associated with GOC residents, who tend to have both longer and more serious involvement in delinquent behavior.

Job and School Involvement. Baseline data on job/school outcomes for 1974-1975 (at three months post-release) again show GOC releases doing relatively well. Combining the categories "Job Full Time" and "School Full Time," 42 percent of GOC releases were involved on a full-time basis, compared with rates ranging from 18 percent to 47 percent for other institutions. In fact, when part-time involvement in job/school was added, GOC had the fourth best record of the ten institutions compared.¹⁹

Length of Stay. The average length of stay for GOC residents ($n = 96$) in the 1974-1975 baseline survey was about ten months. (None were released in less than three months, 40 percent were released in four to seven months, 33 percent released in eight to eleven months, and 27 percent remained longer than eleven months.) Comparable length-of-stay data for other institutional centers included: Intensive Treatment Program, 226 days; Arbor Heights Center, 799; Adrian Training School (girls), 393; Adrian Training School (boys), 334; combined youth camps, 163; and Maxey Training School, 305 to 317 days. Again, GOC's record appears impressive, especially considering the presumed need for lengthy treatment of more seriously disturbed juveniles and considering that GOC graduates do about as well as others in terms of recidivism.²⁰

Personality Traits. With respect to the data generated by the Youth Opinion Poll, GOC residents ($n = 35$) achieved the following results (the total number of possible points for each scale is indicated in parentheses).

Item	Result (Average)
Self-Esteem	Improved 4.1 points between pre- and posttest (out of a total 57)
Locus of Responsibility	Improved 1.2 points (20)
Nurturance	Declined 3/10 of 1 point (20)
Social Desirability	Improved 6/10 of 1 point (20)
Psychopathic Delinquency	Improved (lowered score) 9/10 of 1 point (45)
Neurotic Delinquency	Improved (lowered score) 2.8 points (30)
Subcultural Delinquency	Improved (lowered score) 1.6 points (25)
Total Delinquency	Improved (lowered score) 5.3 points (100)
Critical Indicators	Improved 4.2 points (94)

In summary, the Youth Opinion Poll Change Scores indicate that GOC youths improved on every indicator except Nurturance, on which they remained about the same. Compared with the other institutions, GOC scores surpassed two of them, were about the same as two others, and were inferior to four.²¹

Educational Gains. With respect to educational achievement, it is necessary to bear in mind that this can vary with the length of stay at each institution. Also, the educational emphasis varies from one facility to another. Therefore, we utilize an educational effectiveness index, as well as an average gain score. GOC residents did relatively well, even without taking into consideration their emphasis on GED (high school equivalency) and vocational training, rather than more traditional educational content. GOC residents ($n = 55$) released between July and December 1974 were involved in the study. The Stanford Achievement Test results revealed that while the average grade level of GOC residents at entry was 5.3, it improved to 6.1 by the time they were released (an average gain of .8, or almost a full grade level, within an average length of stay of 10 months). When youths released from GOC between January and June 1975 were added to the sample, the average gain in grade level remained at .8. Translated into an index of educational effectiveness (average gain/average length of stay), GOC had the fifth best effectiveness rating of the eight programs compared.²²

In its publication *Focus on Youth*, the Michigan OCYS stated:

Although adequate research data are not yet available, our observations concerning the effectiveness of the GGI program have been quite positive and most encouraging. The peer group culture has become very positive, encouraging and reinforcing adaptive, appropriate, mature and responsible behavior based on legitimate, pro-social norms and values. Behavioral incidents of assault and vandalism have been reduced dramatically. It has been possible to open the program increasingly toward more off-campus activities. Against previous years, trancies have gone down markedly to an average of 5.5 percent per month. Staff attitude and behavior appear to have become more positive and treatment oriented. Academic attendance and performance have improved consistently. The average length of stay of GOC youth has continued to decrease. Also, there has been a marked increase of positive feedback from both parents and community services workers concerning youth released from the Center's program.²³

Utility of Guided Group Interaction

The Green Oak Center program is a useful model for other institutions whose

staff are seeking to design an intervention strategy for serious juvenile offenders. Its salience is enhanced by several factors:

1. The differential effectiveness of GGI programs with the most difficult juvenile offenders. Stephenson and Scarpitti, in commenting on the evaluative research on GGI programs,²⁴ noted that one consistent finding is that GGI seems most effective with those who come from broken homes, have a fairly lengthy history of delinquent behavior, and are generally regarded as "poor risks." This description fits many of our target population.

2. The special effectiveness of GGI with black offenders, especially in the Highfields evaluation.²⁵ This finding assumes added significance when one considers that a disproportionate percentage of those arrested and convicted of crimes—especially violent crimes—are black. Furthermore, if Zimring's projections of demographic trends are accurate,²⁶ blacks will continue to play a major role in urban crime. If so, GGI-based programs might offer a useful institution-based intervention—*assuming*, that is, that the programs retain the racially integrated qualities which Weeks believed so essential to the success of GGI at Highfields.

3. It seems very likely that we will need to retain some institutions to deal with some juvenile offenders. It is unlikely that juvenile offenders who are perceived as dangerous will be permitted to remain in the community—at least not initially. If these suppositions are correct, then we shall need to give serious thought to institution-based interventions. They could be voluntary programs conducted in small facilities; in fact, those conditions would be much preferred to present ones.

It remains likely that we will need to develop, refine, and/or modify some intervention strategies to assist serious juvenile offenders in avoiding further criminality and further victimization of citizens. We need not victimize the offenders in the process. Guided group interaction, as practiced at Green Oak Center, affords us a humane alternative.

Treatment in the Community

Many issues cloud the development of "community corrections." Much of what passes as community corrections cannot properly be classified as such. Simply erecting smaller prisons and placing them closer to the city, for example, does little to enhance community responsibility or offender reintegration. On the other hand, the deinstitutionalization movement in both mental health and criminal justice has often resulted in releasing persons into the community with virtually no follow-up or supportive services, little concern for their social and physical well-being, and woefully inadequate housing and economic support. Such conditions may contribute to recidivism.

Terminology has caused some confusion. The terms "pretrial intervention," "diversion," and "alternatives to confinement" are often used interchangeably, even though they imply very different social control mechanisms. Many diversion programs amount only to a *delay* in processing the person through the traditional criminal justice system, rather than a diversion from the system.²⁷ Diversion programs seldom accept serious offenders. Furthermore, those who are accepted for diversion often are not afforded due process. Diversion, like pretrial intervention,

is preadjudicatory, while "alternatives to confinement" properly belong at the post-adjudicatory stage, as options for the judge to use in place of the training school or reformatory. We shall focus on this latter kind of program in considering community-based programs for serious juvenile offenders.

Most programs which offer alternatives to confinement do not accept serious juvenile offenders. Such programs tend to "screen out" those who have recidivated, committed more serious offenses, are mentally deficient, or appear to be mentally or emotionally disturbed. The offenders they do accept tend to represent little, if any, threat to the community. Status offenders and first offenders comprise a high percentage of those selected. Many of the offenses committed by those youths are the kinds of acts which many believe should be decriminalized. Programs which accept only the most "tractable" offenders do not have any substantial impact on the problem of serious crime and what to do about it.

COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS

One program which, although in its early and formative stages, appears to be addressing itself to more serious offenders is known as Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS). UDIS, which began in October 1974, is a cooperative effort of the Juvenile Court of Cook County (Illinois), the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and the Illinois Department of Corrections (Juvenile Division). The program operates in the Chicago area and utilizes a wide variety of alternatives to confinement. Project funding and administration are provided by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.

UDIS emphasizes the utilization of community resources to maintain the offender in free society, rather than relying on incarceration. The purchase-of-services arrangements which UDIS utilizes involve the coordination of many social agency resources. The theoretical assumptions implicit in the design of UDIS are that crime and delinquency are social phenomena which originate and are maintained in the community and, therefore, are best dealt with by the community itself.

UDIS is a significant departure from established correctional practice in Illinois. Prior to UDIS, Illinois was incarcerating a large percentage of those referred from Cook County as delinquents or probation violators. In 1973, the Juvenile Division had about 1000 youths in its institutions, at an annual cost of \$17,000 to \$20,000 each. The overall cost of maintaining the Juvenile Division's institutions for 1973 was about \$22 million. UDIS' grant proposal to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission noted that about two-thirds of the youth institutionalized in Illinois were not dangerous and could be treated in community programs for approximately \$5600 each (less than one-third of the institutional cost, or an overall savings to the taxpayers of \$9 million). UDIS is now dealing with many more serious offenders than had been envisioned in the program design stage.

UDIS' major goals are:

1. Establishing an adequate network of community-based services.
2. Reducing commitments to the large institutional facilities of the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, by 35 percent.

3. Providing services at a cost much less than institutional placement with the Juvenile Division.
4. Reducing recidivism to a rate less than the 50 to 60 percent rate experienced by youth released from training schools in Illinois.²⁸

UDIS was originally designed to serve youth "who have reached the point of last resort intervention prior to institutional commitment." This included those who were at risk of being committed or recommitted to Illinois juvenile institutions. It included probation and parole violators and repeat delinquent offenders. The UDIS grant proposal identified the need to focus on (1) teenage black males in Cook County (who constituted 70 percent of all new commitments and returned parolees in the Juvenile Division of Illinois' Department of Corrections for the period January-June 1974); (2) 13-year-old males (nearly all blacks, they comprise a significant percentage of commitments and were regarded as more amenable to treatment); and (3) girls (again, heavily skewed toward blacks). It was noted that the number of girls committing offenses that would require commitment to an institution was so minimal (only 49 in the January-June 1974 period analyzed) and so heavily black that there should be a significant effort to deinstitutionalize this group.²⁹

Since the project became operational, there has been a trend toward the involvement of more serious offenders. At the completion of the initial project year (October 1974 to September 1975), a total of 221 youths had been served; of these, 55 percent were offenders who had been charged with major felonies, including murder, rape, armed robbery, arson, and burglary. Twenty-nine (13 percent) of these offenders had committed crimes against persons, while 183 (83 percent) were property offenders.

The great majority of UDIS clients are referred directly from the Juvenile Court. They are not wards of the state, but participate in the project as a condition of their probation, as ordered by the Juvenile Court judge. Although many arrests have been adjusted at local police stations and petitions dropped "without prejudice," at least two findings of delinquency have been made for each UDIS participant.

A recent sketch of the UDIS population included the following observations:

The UDIS grant narrative projected the typical UDIS client to be a "healthy delinquent," i.e., emotionally sound, peer-oriented, streetwise and more reactive than most adolescents to the emotional tasks of their stage of development. UDIS staff has found that description basically accurate. Not many of these youths are leaders; rather, our clients seem to be the ones who get left behind and caught with "the goods." In addition, we have found a significant number of clients to be severely under-achieving in school (e.g., cannot read or write more than their own names).

A small—but significant—number of clients are severely under-developed emotionally and would benefit from mental health services. A small, but growing, number of clients experience problems that are family related, but they react externally (i.e., in a delinquent manner) rather than internally. These youths and their families should be serviced by traditional State and child welfare agencies. On the other hand, families of typical UDIS clients, while generally drained both economically and emotionally, tend to be somewhat intact and have workable built-in strengths.³⁰

The Program

Approximately 75 different placement sites have been utilized. These are con-

centrated in the Chicago area and include shelter homes, group homes, work camps, churches, etc. The network of programs developed by UDIS includes both community-based and noncommunity-based agencies. In some cases, clients have been referred to agencies which are located away from their home communities because of the service available there or to keep the client away from his original neighborhood because of anticipated undesirable effects.

Representatives of contracted agencies generally travel to the UDIS client where he or she is placed, so geographic proximity to social agencies has not been a problem. Nevertheless, there are some gaps in the service delivery system of UDIS and in its attempts to achieve the maximum benefits of community-based corrections. Some youths are serviced away from their homes or placement sites, generally for "therapeutic-programmatic" reasons. In these cases, the treatment plan incorporates the goal of returning the youth to his/her home as soon as possible. Where rural-based programs are used, they include elements designed to relate to the youths' original urban environments and to survival in that setting. These programs include transactional analysis* groups, "city exploration," and a vocational skills program. Contact with the offender's family—often in the form of counseling—is regarded as essential in the group home programs.

A six-month involvement in UDIS is the typical goal, but some remain longer. There is frequently pressure from the courts, prosecutors, and others, to place youths in residential facilities, rather than keeping them at home. UDIS is a coordinator and broker among several referring agencies and social service-purchase contract agencies. The multiplicity of granting agencies involved in the UDIS effort further complicates its organizational structure. The final aspect complicating UDIS administration is the range of services it makes available at 65 to 75 different sites.

Some of this complexity is reflected in UDIS's Juvenile Justice Policy Board, which was designed to oversee the program. The Board consists of representatives of the Juvenile Court, Department of Children and Family Services, Department of Corrections, the state parole board, the Chicago Police Department, and other representatives of state and local agencies involved in and affected by UDIS. The Board was conceived as an advocate for juvenile offenders facing possible commitment to institutions. Members of the Board were expected to press for the "least drastic alternative" available for juveniles charged with probation or parole violation or repeated delinquency. The Department of Children and Family Services set up an administratively separate unit, operating independently of the regular office and accountable to its own Juvenile Justice Policy Board and to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. This unit is responsible for the purchase of community-based services, individual placements, and the client tracking, monitoring, and evaluation components of UDIS. DCFS also assigned a Project Director and sixteen additional staff members to UDIS.

Evaluation

The heart of the evaluation component of UDIS is a system for tracking, monitoring, and evaluating UDIS clients. This system was developed by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University and permits continuous updating and

* Discussed in Sec. II of this report.

retrieval of client records, as well as short-cycle monitoring and evaluation of treatment services, costs, and selected outcome measures. The system focuses on the following questions:

1. What are the most effective and least costly ways of helping chronic delinquent offenders to avoid law-violating behavior in their own community setting?
2. What types of community-based programs and services seem to be the most successful with chronic delinquent offenders?
3. What lessons can be learned from the experience of the project for improving the performance or changing the juvenile justice system?³¹

One way of analyzing project outcomes is to compare the stated goals with measurable progress. UDIS had set out to establish a network of community-based services. The network has been developed over a wide range, including (at year's end) 65 to 75 different placement sites, varying from programs offered by traditional agencies to new services developed by community organizations specifically for UDIS clients.

Reduction in Commitments to Institutions. UDIS intended to reduce commitments to the large, more traditional institutional facilities by 35 percent. Such commitments have declined 75 percent, from approximately 80 per month to about 20 per month. It seems likely that UDIS accounts for a substantial portion of the reduction. However, other developments may also be related to this reduction. For example, UDIS may be having some latent or "spin-off" benefits such as the alteration of judicial and correctional attitudes, so that the decision to commit has become less frequent. In any event, the attribution problem here is a familiar one; the important point is that clearly UDIS has had significant impact on the lowering of the commitment rate.

Recidivism. UDIS set out to reduce recidivism below the 50 to 60 percent rate for youth released from traditional training schools in the Chicago jurisdiction. While longitudinal data are not yet available, at the completion of the initial year of UDIS, only 15 (7 percent) of the 221 youths who participated in UDIS during its first year had recidivated.

Costs. A significant part of UDIS' purpose is to provide services at a cost much less than institutional placement with the Department of Corrections. Costs in the UDIS program have been held to \$5444 per youth per year. This calculation includes all project administrative personnel and service costs and excludes no cost in any way budgeted or directly connected to the project. This compares favorably with the institutions of the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, where the average annual per-capita cost is \$12,500 (calculated on the basis of average length of stay of 7 months, followed by 5 months on parole).

Utility as a Model

UDIS appears to have good potential as a model of community-oriented corrections. It has demonstrated that it can offer alternatives to confinement for serious, as well as less serious, juvenile offenders without increasing the risk to the public. This is being achieved (at least on the basis of the first-year data) at substantially reduced comparative cost. If continued, the achievements of UDIS will be most

impressive. It will be especially interesting to monitor UDIS' success with the serious offender. If that success continues, it will pose a major challenge to traditional correctional assumptions about risk categories and classification systems.

Part of UDIS' success is reflected in the judiciary's increased confidence in the project. The aggressive advocacy work of the project staff has also been cited as an important factor in working with serious juvenile offenders. Project staff expressed the view that the greatest single barrier to increased referrals of serious offenders in the relative lack of aggressiveness and expertise of public defenders who act as youth advocates in the courts.

Other factors thought to be related to UDIS' success are:

1. An emphasis on *resource development*. The purchase-of-service agreements were negotiated frankly, without concealing the client population of very difficult and chronically delinquent youth. Services to be provided were explained in detail and costs were specific.
2. Attention to *procedural detail*. A great deal of time and effort was spent by project staff, probation staff, and the judiciary in working out mutually acceptable procedures.
3. A *committed and active policy board*. The board members seemed to see the project as important and met regularly. Since many were key administrators of the collaborating agencies, their subsequent participation was greatly facilitated.
4. The utility of the *tracking and monitoring system*. From the end of the first month, tracking and monitoring reports were available to project staff and board members. A few board members who were initially distrustful of the project's ability to produce good results changed their attitudes significantly in response to the information generated by the tracking and monitoring system. Project administrators and staff utilized the reports for self and program analysis.
5. The *flexibility of program staff*. Staff included a mix of bureaucrats and people with no experience in the bureaucracy. In general, they shared one characteristic: the willingness to shift roles to meet particular project needs at any given time. The organizational structure was loose and task-oriented. This latter characteristic is consistent with the experience in Massachusetts, where deinstitutionalization has been attributed in part to the willingness of staff to shift roles.

Conclusion

The cost-effectiveness of community corrections programs like UDIS seems clear. Moreover, such programs disrupt offenders' lives far less than segregation in institutions. They provide more natural living environments in every way. However, it seems unlikely that every juvenile offender—particularly some who have committed violent crimes against persons—will be included in community-based programs. For some individuals, institutionalization for some period of time may be necessary. But even for those persons, institutionalization need not be synonymous with "ware-

housing." We can make the institutions more humane and just, offer a program such as GGI on a voluntary basis, and progressively release these offenders.

Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin's important cohort (age group) study in Philadelphia³² indicated that juveniles who had committed only one or two offenses probably would not recidivate again. Given the enormous mechanical and ethical difficulties of accurately predicting violence,³³ we need to rely on interventions which do not depend on a predictive schema. We can, for example, focus on those juveniles who have *already* demonstrated that they are repetitively dangerous. Those who have committed three offenses are, according to the Wolfgang, et al., study, more likely to continue their criminal activities and reappear in the juvenile justice system than are the first or second offenders. If we were to adopt a policy incarcerating those who appear to present a danger to public safety *and* are multiple offenders, while treating others in community-based facilities ranging from totally open to relatively tight security, we might be able to improve both our effectiveness and our efficiency. Within such a policy, UDIS might well serve as a model for the community-based correctional component, while the GGI program implemented with serious offenders at Green Oak Center would be an appropriate model for those who have lengthy histories of serious criminal or delinquent behavior.

Notes

1. E.g., certain phenomenological/ethnomethodological studies which focus on idiosyncratic meaning and how one "constructs" reality.
2. This theory incorporates some determinism and some free will, interacting to produce behavior which in turn has contingencies for the actor. See David Matza, *Delinquency and Drift*, Wiley, New York, 1974.
3. See for example, Donald Clemmer, *The Prison Community*, Rinehart, New York, 1940; Gresham Sykes, *The Society of Captives*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1958; John Irwin and Donald Cressey, "Thieves, Convicts, and the Inmate Subculture," *Social Problems*, Vol. 10, 1962, pp. 142-155; and David Ward and Gene Kassebaum, *Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structure*, Aldine, Chicago, 1965.
4. For a complete description of positive peer culture, see Harry H. Vorrath and Larry K. Brendtro, *Positive Peer Culture*, Aldine, Chicago, 1974.
5. See Maxwell Jones, *The Therapeutic Community*, Basic Books, New York, 1953.
6. See Lawrence Kohlberg, et al., *The Just Community Approach to Corrections*, Moral Education Research Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974.
7. See Tom Murton, et al., *Shared Decision-Making as a Treatment Technique in Prison Management*, The Murton Foundation for Criminal Justice, Minneapolis, 1975.
8. See William Glasser, *Reality Therapy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1965.

9. Richard M. Stephenson and Frank R. Scarpitti, *Group Interaction as Therapy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1974, p. 64.

10. H. Ashley Weeks, *Youthful Offenders at Highfields*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1958.

11. Richard M. Stephenson and Frank R. Scarpitti, *The Rehabilitation of Delinquent Boys: A Final Report Submitted to the Ford Foundation*, Rutgers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967.

12. Information sources utilized in this assessment include a report on the Longitudinal Evaluation Project of Michigan's OCYS, conducted by UNCO, Inc. of Washington, D.C.; an in-house evaluation of the institutional centers of Michigan's OCYS, conducted by the Institutional Services Division in cooperation with the Social Services Evaluation and Analysis Division (Michigan Department of Social Services); Institutional Division Operations Letter No. 6 (dated September 29, 1975); a grant proposal prepared by the director of GOC and submitted to LEAA for funding; *Focus on Youth*, the 1972 Annual Report of Michigan's OCYS; and personal interviews and observations made during a site visit to GOC (December 1975).

13. "Life at Green Oaks: Things Are Improving," *Detroit Free Press*, May 30, 1974, p. 10.

14. Interview with Wolfgang Eggers, Director of Green Oak Center, Whitmore Lake, Michigan, December 15, 1975.

15. The method of computing the cost has been stated as follows:

In the absence of detailed cost data on individuals, our cost model had to be based on average costs and upon the individual information available in each case record, namely, placement and length of stay at each placement. Per capita treatment costs were developed (where possible for the past five fiscal years) for each placement or placement type. A special computer programming routine was developed to compute and store the cost of his care on each of the client records. The cost was generated by successive iterations through the client's placement history, multiplying the LOS (length of stay) of each placement times per capita cost of that placement and accumulating the products of each iteration.

It should be noted that institutional costs did not include capital expenditures, but were based on salaries and wages, supplies and materials, contract services, and equipment and maintenance items. (UNCO, Inc., *Longitudinal Evaluation Project of the Youth Services Program, Part II: Analysis*, Washington, D.C., 1975.)

16.

**EVALUATION STANDARDS USED BY THE INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES
DIVISION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES, DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, STATE OF MICHIGAN**

Objectives	Measurements
Self-Concept and Personal Responsibility	
1. Cause youth to improve in way they perceive themselves.	Self-esteem scale of Youth Opinion Poll.
2. Increase acceptance of personal responsibility for life consequences.	Locus of reinforcement scale of Youth Opinion Poll.
Socialization	
1. Decrease adherence of youth to delinquent values and attitudes.	Delinquent value scales of Youth Opinion Poll:
	(a) Nurture scale of Youth Opinion Poll.
2. Replace these negative values with values and behaviors which foster caring, concern, and helping.	(b) Helping behavior scale of Youth Opinion Poll.
Survival Skills	
1. Raise educational performance level of students.	Stanford Achievement Test.
2. Increase percent of students employed or enrolled in community school programs 3 months after release.	Job/school outcome scale of Community Care Telephone Questionnaire.
3. Increase percent of eligible students completing GED and drivers education.	(a) Percent of completions of high school equivalence programs.
	(b) Percent of completions of drivers education.
4. Cause students to complete a variety of special interest, occupational, and personal survival courses.	Educational transcripts will document number completing swimming and life-saving, first-aid/O.D. aid, occupational clusters, etc.
Length of Stay	
1. Increase percent released in 4 to 7 months.	} Length of Stay compilations.
2. Decrease percent remaining 11+ months.	
Institutional Environment	
1. Increase ability of health and safety committees to monitor health/environment conditions in centers.	Percentage of reliability on inspection records performed separately by committees and by medical personnel.
2. Increase number of health/environment problems raised and resolved by health and safety committees.	Monthly progress reports of committees.

Protection

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Improve protection of youth from physical harm. | (a) Assaultive behavior scale of Behavior Checklist (also self-injury and possession of drug scales). |
| | (b) Health maintenance reports. |
| | (c) Unusual incident reports. |
| 2. Improve protection of community/staff from harm by youth. | (a) Reduce number of trancies. |
| | (b) Reduce offenses while truant. |
| | (c) Staff assault scale of Behavior Checklist. |

Outcome Measures

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Decrease percent of youth arrested/charged within 3 months of release. | } | Outcome scale of Community Care Telephone Questionnaire. |
| 2. Actively assist Community Care in decreasing percent of arrested/charged within 12 months of release. | | |

SOURCE: Virgil Pinckney (Division Director, Institutional Services Division, Michigan Department of Social Services), "Institutional Division Operations #6" (memorandum), September 29, 1975.

17.

OUTCOMES AT 3 MONTHS POST-RELEASE AND 12 MONTHS POST-RELEASE

7/74 - 12/74 (N=54)		1/75 - 3/75 (N=20)	
No police/court contact	48%	No police/court contact	45%
Some contact	15%	Some contact	20%
Arrested/charged	37%	Arrested	30%
Unknown	0%	Unknown	5%
Arrests:		Arrests:	
Felonies	19	Felonies	5
Misdemeanors	0	Misdemeanors	0
Status	1	Status	1

Baseline 74/75 (N=74)

No contact	48%
Some contact	16%
Arrested	35%
Unknown	1%
Arrests:	
Felonies	24
Misdemeanors	0
Status	2

SOURCE: Institutional Services Division, Children and Youth Services, Michigan Department of Social Services, *The Institutional Centers: Program Baselines, 1974/1975* (September 25, 1975).

18. UNCO, *Longitudinal Evaluation Project*, pp. 9-13.
19. *The Institutional Centers*, p. 8.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
23. Office of Youth Services, Michigan Department of Social Services, *Focus on Youth (Annual Report for 1972)*, p. 39.
24. Richard M. Stephenson and Frank R. Scarpitti, *Group Interaction as Therapy*, pp. 175-188.
25. Weeks, *Youthful Offenders*.
26. Franklin Zimring, "Dealing with Youth Crime: National Needs and Federal Priorities" (unpublished paper, September 1975).
27. See Nora Klapmuts, "Diversion from the Justice System," *Crime and Delinquency Literature*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1974, pp. 109-131.
28. UDIS, Grant Application to Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, n.d.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
30. UDIS Summary, p. 2.
31. UDIS, Grant Application, p. 28.
32. Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972.
33. John Monahan, "The Prediction of Violence," in Duncan Chappell and John Monahan (eds.), *Violence and Criminal Justice*, Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975, pp. 15-31.

IV. SCHOOLING-BASED PROGRAMS

Theory

The aphorism for the letter "B" in McGuffey's readers was:

*"Thy ways to mend,
This book attend."*

Extreme expectations about schooling as a force for individual and social change have been one of the cornerstones of all social-welfare systems in this country. Until recently, almost every social-political problem has been supposed to be remediable if only we put enough money into schooling (e.g., cognitive deficits and Head Start, poverty and ESEA Title I, national security and the National Defense Education Act). State compulsory education laws require that schooling be provided to serious juvenile offenders at least until the minimum permissible school-leaving age (usually 16). Additionally, the ideology about education has been such that most juvenile and adult institutions continue to make education available for their entire populations.

SCOPE OF THIS DISCUSSION

The following discussion is not concerned with educational programs for juvenile offenders (or potential offenders) provided by regular public schools. It is concentrated on education aimed at a population of serious juvenile offenders most of whom are in institutions. Second, the analysis makes a distinction between education and schooling. Education is the sum total of learning, from all processes and sources; schooling is education mediated by the formal, institutionally provided teaching/learning process. The distinction is important, since prisons teach their inmates many things and to that extent are far more powerful educators than are prison schools. We are concerned here, not with everything communicated to juveniles by the fact of incarceration, the interaction with other inmates, and the culture of an institution, but rather with the teaching and learning provided by schooling in that situation. Third, this discussion does not deal with vocational or career education (a topic taken up in the next section) but with academic education.

MOTIVATION

A common belief among school people is that failing in school leads to delinquency. Testimony in the recent *Morales v. Turman* case estimated that less than 5 percent of the juveniles incarcerated in Texas were performing at their proper grade level. The average reading level was estimated to be five years below the norm.*

* *Morales v. Turman*, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Civil Action #1948, September 3, 1974. Cited in "Project 1975: Educational Neglect," National Education Association, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 32.

Children who are poor academic achievers in the major social institution of childhood, the school, are held to acquire a negative self-image, to be unable to progress toward vocational, social, or personal goals, and thus to turn to delinquency either from frustration and anger, or from a lack of other opportunities, or from a combination of both. When conventional goal attainment is blocked by failure in school, the child is labeled as a failure and the commitment to pro-social behavior is lessened.

(Recent critiques of schooling stress the sorting function of the public schools. That is, as one major conservator of social norms and their prevailing distribution, schools are *supposed* to discriminate against those who will not or cannot conform. To the extent that this critique is accurate, then schools cannot be faulted for having pushed out some children and neither can public schools be relied on to "remediate" a problem which they cannot acknowledge.)

Failure at school is widely regarded as a major precipitating, if not causative factor in delinquency. It follows, then, that remediating that failure will remove the blocks or open up the opportunities toward more acceptable behavior. Schooling the serious juvenile offender becomes a technique to make up for the failure of the juvenile at schooling. A similar line of reasoning applies where the school, not the juvenile, is held to be at fault; more schooling to remedy schooling failure. (Of course, it is not necessary to believe that the causes of delinquency are rooted in failure in school in order to justify providing schooling. Schooling may contribute to the rehabilitation prospects of a juvenile offender regardless of the causal forces of his delinquency.)

GOALS

The overall goal of schooling is always to provide the juvenile offender with the skills necessary to succeed as a conforming person. Correctional schooling has three goal sets: cognitive, affective, and vocational. Cognitive goals include performance in basic literacy, calculation, and language arts. Affective goals for juvenile offenders are often expressed in terms of "resocialization," "reversing a negative self-image," etc. Success at the more traditional cognitive tasks of the curriculum is held to contribute to this, but some schooling activities are geared to affective goals as well. (Intervention techniques other than schooling seem much more likely to affect this area.)

Longer-range goals for schooling deal with social mobility. To the extent that schooling can produce in its students a higher level of literacy or a more acceptable pattern of social relations, then those attributes are held also to enhance the vocational mobility of the now better-schooled offender.

Correctional educators seem to have a curious ambivalence about their goals. On the one hand, they need to maintain a sense of self-efficacy about schooling and its ability to change life circumstances, and on the other hand, they seem aware of the complex of powerful forces associated with delinquency—forces that are beyond the reach of schooling because they are rooted in social attitudes, economic realities, family problems, the peer group, and the media. Revisionist critics of public schools such as Jencks, Greer, and Ginsberg have argued that the public school system, working with a much more advantaged clientele than the juvenile offender, has still been unable to contribute much either to achievement on standardized tests or to

social mobility. How then can correctional education, especially with serious juvenile offenders, be expected to have much success?

The answer may be that it is not expected to have much success. It can be argued that innovation is an index of purposefulness: individuals or institutions committed to their tasks will try to find better ways of doing those tasks. But the prevailing state of correctional education, especially with serious juvenile offenders, is far from the best of available pedagogy. There is also a sense in which schooling is the least of the treatments provided to serious juvenile offenders. Other interventions, behavior modification, milieu therapy, etc., have the expectation of substantially modifying the individual at basic psychological or social levels. Not only are such interventions more glamorous than schooling, they are also more costly. Thus, if a correctional facility or training school offers nothing else, it is likely to provide some teachers, classrooms, and books.

Practice

The strategy of schooling with juvenile offenders proceeds in ways that are familiar—some would say, too familiar. An older person with an amount of formal training and state certification provides instruction, and hopefully facilitates learning. The interaction is structured and governed by the teacher. Various artifacts are provided to guide the student in learning—books, workbooks, audiovisual equipment, and so on. Students are grouped according to characteristics thought to be relevant to learning—age, tested achievement, subject matter, or some combination of those characteristics. Passage to a higher level of schooling is generally determined by paper-and-pencil performance.

This very traditional strategy describes the usual, if not the absolutely predominant, practice of schooling now in use with serious juvenile offenders. There are exceptions, but schooling practices that are more consonant with what is known about human behavior and learning psychology appear to be largely confined to the less serious juvenile offenders, and especially to programs operating away from correctional institutions. The schooling applied to serious juvenile offenders is similar to the state of the art in American public schools in the 1940s.

THE EDUCATEUR

One method of schooling juvenile offenders, which is widely used in Europe and Canada but has had little impact on the field in the United States, is that of the *educateur*—a specialized child care worker and child advocate. The model grew out of the problem of what to do with the thousands of children left homeless in Europe after World War II. Clearly, piecemeal services were inadequate; a new concept of total child care and a new professional, the *educateur* trained in psychology, social work, and community action, emerged.¹ Barnes described the task of the *educateur*-child worker as: "Promoting the overall development of the child, including his personality, social maturity, competence, health, and cognitive learning, developing adaptive capacity by means of joint action involving the young person, his total environment and the worker."²

The goal of the *educateur* is to convert the whole of everyday life into an educational or reeducational process, with an emphasis on developmental growth and resocialization. This approach has been used with juvenile offenders in France and in Canada. It is applicable in both community and residential settings. In the community the *educateur* can serve as an advocate in the use of, and an interagency liaison between, for example, the courts and various welfare agencies, seeking the best program and most consistent care. In residential settings the *educateur*, as specialized child care worker, can serve most of the functions now served by the not always harmonious cottage parent, teacher, and therapist. He might call in specialist help (for example, a geologist to lecture before a field trip), but the major responsibility for the adolescent's living and learning would be his.

In a discussion of the expansion of the child care worker's role in an *educateur* experiment at Carson Valley School in Flourtown, Pennsylvania, Barnes and Kilman described the worker's four major responsibilities: Individual work, group work, curriculum, and integration.³ The first two include initial contact, contracting, and the kind of group processes described earlier. Curriculum, rather than referring to a narrowly defined academic scheduling, is conceptualized as including "getting up and going to bed and all points in between." It is seen as involving two processes: (1) capitalizing on what happens and (2) designing the environment. The first refers to the use of critical incidents and daily occurrences in teaching and learning. For example, an outburst of anger might prompt a discussion of aggression. The second refers to the anticipation of group needs. Restless behavior, predictable on a lovely spring day, might, instead of presenting a behavior problem, be channeled into a biology field trip or a baseball game. The responsibility for integration is threefold. It includes (1) integrating the adolescent with himself through counseling, modeling, and the experience of success, (2) integrating him into the group life of the institution, and (3) integrating him through community action and reeducation into the larger social sphere. Again, the *educateur* model has had little impact on practice in the United States.

Case Study: Providence Educational Center (PEC)

The Providence Educational Center (PEC) in St. Louis, Missouri, is an LEAA Exemplary Program. This was the program which most closely met both criteria for this analysis—it deals with serious juvenile offenders, using a concentration of services from its treatment area.

PEC has five distinct service components:

1. An Assessment Center that provides extensive diagnostic testing and orientation to referred juveniles.
2. The Education Center, responsible for the academic program.
3. The Student Work Assistance Program that provides a work-study opportunity for students.
4. An After-Care component to help with counseling, alternative placements, and readjustment.
5. Two Group Homes, one for girls and one for boys.

The components exist in order to provide an array of services for juvenile offenders. The Assessment Center and the education programs are central to the overall effort.

About two-thirds of the Providence referrals are for serious or "impact" offenses, a stranger-to-stranger crime or burglary; one-third of the referrals are for multiple "impact" offenses. Using a more stringent offense-based definition (assault, armed robbery, attempted forcible rape, homicide) approximately 10 percent* of the Providence population would qualify as serious offenders, as of 1974.

Depending on definitions, the Providence program includes a significant fraction or a majority of youths who would fit a serious crime characterization. Yet it does so in a community setting and without making special provisions or employing differential treatment by type of crime. Providence is a useful case because it includes serious juvenile offenders, because it incorporates many desirable features in its educational programs, and because it appears to be successful.

Providence students are 12 to 16 years old (some work-study enrollees are older). Most are black and most are from nonworking poor families. Only about 2 percent are performing on grade level; most are one to four grades behind their age-predicted level of schooling.

The Center tries to individualize treatments. The first step occurs at the Assessment Center. (The Center has a waiting list for each of its monthly new groups.)

ASSESSMENT CENTER: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION

The first order of business at the Assessment Center is an explanation of the rules regarding attendance, cooperation, and conduct. Those rules are repeated frequently during a juvenile's month-long stay in the Assessment Center. About half of each day is devoted to instruction, the rest to interviews, testing, group experience, and counseling.

A variety of instruments have been used for testing (IQ tests, grade-level achievement tests, reading comprehension tests). The relative frequency with which tests are replaced indicates the staff's search for a better way to diagnose learning needs. The fact that the teaching/learning process begins at the Assessment Center helps with that. Court records, school records, material from the deputy juvenile officers, and data gathered from home visits by project personnel are all also entered into the diagnosis.

Prescribing the child's subsequent treatment is a major purpose of the Assessment Center. In general, the match between diagnosis and treatment seems closer than is ordinarily the case. The assessment staff tries hard to pinpoint particular learning needs of the child *and* to provide the subsequent teachers with precise behavioral descriptions of those needs (e.g., "unable to spell consonants from sound," "needs attention to division with decimals, use 'money' problems," etc.). Second, teachers from the academic component take part in the intake conferences where individual treatments are planned. Third, there is an education director responsible for coordinating the work of all the parts of the education process, including monitoring the sort of schooling which is later applied. The low pupil-teacher ratio of

* The small proportion of serious juvenile offenders in the PEC program reflects the juvenile justice field's low estimate of schooling, relatively unassisted, as a treatment technique.

PEC's classrooms facilitates the use of the diagnostic data; work with individuals is logistically possible.

Several factors account for what slippage does occur between application and diagnosis. Some teachers do not understand the diagnosis, or don't know how to teach in the recommended fashion. Other teachers may disagree and substitute their own professional judgment about what is needed, or the classroom dynamics may invalidate the prescription for an individual. Finally, the students themselves change over time. Part of the lack of match is useful, part of it is unavoidable. What does go on is about as close to the model of diagnostic-prescriptive pedagogy as that which occurs in the best-run public schools.

At the end of the assessment month, the student moves either to the academic program or to the vocationally oriented Student Work Assistance Program, which because of its vocational orientation will not be discussed further. St. Louis, like most cities, has more school buildings than it needs. The Board of Education leases part of one of its excess buildings to Providence's education program (hereafter, "PEC"). The space has been easily modified to fit PEC needs, although there is some concern that the neighborhood could be more accessible and safer for all concerned.

STAFFING

PEC's clientele is almost entirely black, the director of the program is white, the leaders of the components all are black, and so are about half of the staff members. Jobs are not assigned on grounds of race alone but there is a concern that PEC staff provide adequate role models for its clientele. Beyond that, there is a recognition that black adolescents need to learn how to cope *inter alia* with white people.

PEC prides itself on the credentials of its staff—all have advanced degrees. Moreover, all teachers are certified as teachers, a rarity in correctional education, where guards or other people not qualified in education are often pressed into classroom instruction. Unfortunately, the credential does nothing to guarantee teacher skills in PEC procedures. The procedures are more advanced than those taught in most teacher training institutions in the area and thus PEC staff members learn their profession on the job. Any sort of schooling is a demanding business; it involves applying an inadequate technology to uncertain situations in a context of high demands. Done well, correctional schooling would be even more demanding (which accounts for the frequently cited fact that good workers "burn out" in a few years). PEC attempts to provide extra assistance to its staff partly by close supervision and partly by weekly staff conferences.

TEACHING METHODS

The most important pedagogical features of PEC schooling seem to be (1) small groups, (2) team teaching, (3) ungraded classes, and (4) individually prescribed instruction. These features are rooted in an understanding of the needs of juvenile offenders for a schooling experience that departs significantly from the traditional model—a model at which these young people have failed or which has failed them.

Small Group Instruction

Traditional inner-city classrooms often have 30-plus students with one teacher. Most teachers place a very high priority on order and discipline and thus restrict the curiosity and volatility characteristic of adolescence. Additionally, the logistics of personal attention are greatly different in a one-teacher, thirty-students pattern from what they are in PEC's pattern of one to six or seven. The small class size makes PEC's other innovative features possible.

Team Teaching

Most PEC classrooms are staffed most of the time by two adults. Although there is now specialization in language arts, reading, and mathematics instruction, PEC teachers are trained as generalists in elementary education and thus can help with various aspects of the curriculum as necessary. The team approach also carries over to the classroom availability of other specialists, including counselors. For some purposes, the roles are kept distinct—teachers are not encouraged to provide intensive counseling, for example. Still the counselors and other specialists are in the classrooms enough so that the distinction is somewhat blurred.

Individually Prescribed Instruction

This is probably the central feature of PEC's approach. The relationship between individualization and successful instruction is a truism among educators, but realizing that ideal in practice has proved elusive. Still, the closer one comes to individual attention—especially with groups whose needs are as extreme as those of juvenile offenders—the more likely it is that there will be success. PEC's attempt at this, called "Individual Treatment Plans," begins in the Assessment Center and continues throughout an individual's career in the Center. The extent to which any given youth's progress will have been minutely charted varies; the diligence with which new treatment plans are detailed also varies by teacher, but the format is there and so also is much of the substance.

A second aspect of individualization is related to PEC's emphasis on basic skills. Center staff members feel strongly that, for example, functional literacy is necessary to adequate performance in virtually any area of later life. Where choices must be made between individualization and larger group instruction, the basic skills are individualized. In this as in other areas of teacher/learner interaction, the emphasis is on successful experiences for the youths; if a student is failing, then the programs adjusts the criterion until it is an appropriate expectation, i.e., one which the learner can and will reach.

Contact with Parents

PEC requires parental cooperation as a condition of admission. Contacts with the home begin at the Assessment Center stage and continue throughout the program. Absences for any reason require a detailed follow-up. Social workers concentrate home visits with the families of the most difficult enrollees. PEC staff members also provide liaison with other agencies, especially the courts and future employers.

MANAGEMENT

PEC is a not-for-profit corporation with the usual board of directors selected because of the various contributions they could make to PEC. The program also lives the sort of hand-to-mouth, cliff-hanging existence that is common among such efforts. The personal toll is high, but the programmatic consequences may be salutary. In the four years of its existence PEC has been through a number of changes that have kept it responsive to its clientele AND to its managers' accumulating judgement about how to serve its clientele. The management is avowedly heuristic, ready to change on the basis of results.

COSTS

Providing the whole range of PEC services to a group of 100 students has cost \$3,300 per capita for a 10-month school year (1972-1973). That cost was probably more than three times per-pupil expenditures in the St. Louis public schools at the time. (Current comparisons would need to take into account the extremely high cost of providing special education in public schools, especially in those systems under court order with respect to equalizing educational opportunity for special education students.) But when PEC's costs are compared to other, state-operated juvenile facilities, the situation is reversed. Missouri Hills, a minimum security facility, cost \$6,800 a year per capita *exclusive* of schooling (provided by a local district) while the state's maximum security facility spent \$11,000 per inmate for a comparable period. Thus, PEC's costs are somewhere between one-third and one-half of the cost of other facilities.

Even though PEC is much less expensive, it has a very low staff-student ratio and a range of clinical and therapeutic services not found in such profusion in other settings. The explanation for these discrepancies must lie in the community basis of treatment. PEC's academic program is a daytime operation and it is not staffed in an attempt to guarantee security. Those two facts reduce costs overall and also free resources that can be applied more usefully to treatment with juvenile offenders. As is pointed out elsewhere in this report, community-based interventions are desirable because of their efficacy; the fact that they are also cost-effective is an additional incentive.

EVALUATION

PEC has had more extensive and intensive evaluation than any other correctional education program encountered. The bulk of the evaluation has been performed in conjunction with its status as an LEAA exemplary program by the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council. The evaluation was based on retrospective and current records for the more than 100 juveniles enrolled in 1973.

Attendance

PEC had declared two goals: (1) to reduce recidivism and street crime among its enrollees and (2) to help them adjust to and function in public schools, their com-

munities, and jobs. As a step to those goals, PEC stressed (and stresses) a reduction of truancy. The program can't have an effect on enrollees who aren't there, and truancy increases the probability of other, less desirable sorts of associations and opportunities. Thus, truancy reduction from the levels which have characterized these youths in public schools is a desirable if prosaic goal. PEC enrollees had been truant from public schools an average of 55 percent of the year prior to their enrollment in PEC; at PEC, the same group's truancy rate fell to 16 percent.

Grade Achievement

Achievement testing is education's most widely used and widely disliked yardstick for program success. PEC students almost without exception had been significantly below national and city norms. During the evaluation period, the average mathematics achievement levels of PEC students increased from 3.6 to 4.5 (grade equivalents) and average reading levels rose from 4.4 to 4.8. Two-thirds of the students were achieving at the monthly rate necessary to gain a year's advance in math, and half the students were achieving at the same pace in reading. Given the fact that that pace is the predicted one for all children, and given the fact that PEC students had never before been close to that rate, their performance in the program (and the program's performance with them) is remarkable.

Recidivism

Recidivism was measured by referrals to court in the six months immediately after release. Seventy percent had no referrals during that period, 4 percent had a reduced rate of referrals, 18 percent had the same rate as before, and 9 percent had a higher rate.* Thus, three-fourths of the former students were improved after their exposure to the program, about 18 percent had not changed, and 9 percent got worse. Of special relevance to the serious juvenile offender is the fact that only 9 percent of PEC "graduates" were referred for impact crimes, in contrast with traditional treatment programs; St. Louis juvenile court officers estimated recidivism rates of 65 percent to 75 percent for all youths on probation.

School or Job Involvement

As an index of social adjustment, PEC gathered data to indicate whether or not its "graduates" were engaged in activities that were consonant with the program goals, e.g., enrolled in public school, participating in a vocational preparation program, working at a job, etc. Sixty-two percent had such favorable outcomes. (The program acknowledges one caveat: many of its graduates require more than one placement before they adjust successfully to the demands of large classrooms, jobs, etc. Partly because readjusting to the impersonality and banality of large group instruction in the public schools is so difficult, the program tries to return its students to regular class situations in less than two years.)

* Error due to rounding.

Summary

The PEC experience supports Martinson's conclusion about the more general area of skill development: "There is evidence that the general effect of skill development programs is favorable (or at least not negative.)"⁴ The total experience of PEC is an intensive one. An array of different sorts of treatment services and educational strategies are available, and there is a great deal of personal interaction to encourage their use. All of it is directed at producing cognitive and affective gains in the program's enrollees. For the students, PEC is clearly a more desirable alternative than going to the State's secure (and remote) training facility. Everyone associated with the program stresses that it *can* work, and students, who believe that, then act to make it so. Finally, performance in the academic part of the program can lead either back to regular schools or to a work-study, vocationally relevant opportunity in PEC's own Student Work Assistance Program. Thus, there are clear incentives and clear rewards.

The support PEC has had from the political levels of the city administration has been critical to its success. The Mayor's office has, for example, helped by making jobs available for the work-study program, and (in the past) by releasing some juvenile court personnel to work with PEC. Thus, for a minimal additional outlay of cash (about 5 percent of the PEC budget in 1973-1974), the city gets an alternative to detention, some place other than the public schools to put tough kids, a chance at their rehabilitation, and a lighthouse program. The neighborhood where the Center is located seems not to be much affected by the presence of the Center (in fact, there may be more apprehension from the Center about the neighborhood than vice versa).

Lack of Diffusion of a Successful Model

If PEC is not the only program offering advanced educational techniques to this sort of population, it is certainly the leader among a very small group. PEC's LEAA exemplary status has given it exceptional visibility in a field where the level of practice is grossly inadequate to the needs of its clients. Yet, despite PEC's demonstrated successes, and despite the LEAA print media dissemination efforts, there is only one other program that approximates the PEC approach (Project New Pride in Denver).

Instead of a diffusion of PEC-type services, there is a demand for PEC itself to provide additional services on a contract basis in the St. Louis area. That testament to the program's success is, however, a very limited strategy for diffusion. The program's administrators recognize that individual knowledge of the students is extremely important and that alone places an upper limit of perhaps 200 students on the size of a service-providing unit. Second, the administrative problems, which are already severe with a patchwork of short-term special-purpose grants, would be magnified. Third, the number of program compromises necessary to fit a PEC operation into other agencies would increase dramatically. Thus that route to diffusion even on a St. Louis regional basis is blocked.

Utility

There is no arcane magic in other institutions adopting teaching/learning techniques consonant with knowledge about how people learn. Staff training is required; the traditional curriculum does have to be revamped; instructional management practices do have to be changed. But those are changes which thousands of public schools and school districts have already been through. The dual functions of most correctional systems (physical security and rehabilitation), and the relative lack of training of many people in correctional education may hamper adoption. But maybe not. There may, for example, be fewer bad habits to be broken among correctional educators than among public school teachers. In short, PEC can be a model just as other good programs can serve as models. But the existence or publicizing of a model is never enough. The barriers to change are discussed in App. A, "Notes on Organizational Change and Systems Change."

Notes

1. Linton, Thomas E., "The Educateur Model: A Theoretical Manuscript," *The Journal of Special Education*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1971, p. 158.
2. Barnes, F. Herbert, "A Relevant New Professional with Youth." A paper prepared for joint meeting of the American Association of Workers for Children, the Association of Child Care Workers, and the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., March 1975.
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V. VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

William Gschwend*

"Idle hands make the Devil's play"

Theory

The concept of vocational education as a means of "keeping kids out of trouble and off the streets" is clearly not a new one. Its roots go back at least as far as the workhouses in Elizabethan England. The nomenclature of the original "Training Schools" movement for juvenile delinquency in late-nineteenth-century America reflects this idea, as does the proliferation of social welfare programs in the "war on poverty, inadequate housing, and unemployment" undertaken during the Johnson Administration.

In discussing vocational training programs for serious juvenile offenders, the underlying assumption is that in some cases delinquency is an expression of the frustrations some youths face in finding and developing meaningful careers. This assumption is related to several bodies of criminological theory. While the theories outlined below are applicable to a broad spectrum of treatment approaches, their relevance to vocational education will be stressed.

The theoretical justifications for vocational education most often cited are those of *anomie* and *opportunity structure*. Merton has described anomie as that condition of normlessness that arises when there is a lack of congruence between societal goals and the available means of attaining those goals.¹ In American society the goal is material-economic success; the sanctioned means of attaining it is the work ethic: hard work, thrift, and delayed gratification.

A vast majority of the youth currently involved in serious crime have neither the training for, nor access to, employment suitable for such goals. Many have failed in or been failed by school and are unable to compete for the few enough jobs available. As the economy shrinks, their competitive disadvantage increases. The economy currently has more people than jobs. Employers are thus able to impose schooling credentials as a criterion for employment (despite the lack of a relation between the employment and the credentials). Those juveniles who in even the best of economic conditions have only limited access to legitimate vocational opportunities find themselves faced with even more closed doors. Vocational education can be seen as an attempt first to give the juvenile the means of achieving access to societal goals, and, second, by doing so to implicitly reinforce those goals.

Related to anomie is the concept of *opportunity structure*, as described by Cloward and Ohlin.³ Given an anomic condition, various "subcultural" adjustments will obtain. These adjustments vary according to the opportunities available to the youth in his/her environment. Alienated youth may, for example, band together into the collectivity of a gang. The nature of the gang itself will vary according to the opportunities available in the sociocultural setting. Vocational education congruent

* Original draft by William Gschwend, Human Services Consulting, Inc., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

with realistic employment possibilities can be seen as an attempt to alter the perceived opportunity structure of a youth's environment, in order to discourage a delinquent adjustment.

A third body of theory, that of the social ecologists, includes the early work of Burgess and McKenzie⁴ and the recent work of Catalano and Weeks.⁵ The social ecologists point to three factors as determinants of human behavior: *role, place, and norms*. The idea is that one's behavior is at least in part determined by (a) one's role, i.e., one's position in the labor force, as well as one's social status, family position, etc.; (b) where one is physically, e.g., the location of employment and residence—field or factory, city or country, etc.; and (c) the norms associated with these roles and environments. A lumberjack, for example, behaves and is expected to behave very differently from a college professor at work and elsewhere.⁶

The role of the adolescent in American society is fluid, that of marginal child, marginal adult. Some theorists have attributed the *Sturm und Drang* of contemporary adolescence to the denial of access to a meaningful economic role, especially for the late adolescent male. The social ecologists might argue that if vocational training were able to provide a youth with a meaningful sense of role, then it might allow for a functional transfer of conventional behaviors from training to subsequent employment and other behaviors not directly related to work.

Treatment

Before describing in detail one example of a vocational training program for juvenile offenders, a description of some criteria for good vocational education, in general and with ex-offenders, is presented. It should be understood that while the discussion stresses job training, good vocational training cannot proceed without attention to the cognitive skills of the trainee, and his/her affective needs.

COMPONENTS OF A GOOD VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM

The most obvious and immediate component of vocational education is *skills training*, for example, computer programming and electrical appliance repair. This training should be pursued on modern equipment, and in fields in which employment and advancement prospects are good. A second component is *job-seeking and interviewing techniques*. A skill will do no good if the juvenile has no way of locating a position and, once an opening is located, is unable to present him/herself well to the prospective employer.

A third component is some kind of *follow-up and support services* once the student is placed. This would appear to be especially important for serious juvenile offenders, many of whom are unaccustomed to the rigidity of a 9 to 5, five-day-a-week regimen, and who may run into special adjustment problems.

A fourth component is a close relationship between the vocational training agency and the businesses and industries which are apt to employ the juvenile. Immediate job placement upon completion of a training program would be ideal.

Both work programs and on-the-job training programs meet this criterion, but information on the success of these programs is incomplete and not always encouraging.⁷

The last two components raise some issues related specifically to vocational training for ex-offenders. Currently, many job application forms ask, "Have you ever been arrested for something other than a traffic violation? If yes, explain." While employers are not always legally empowered to investigate the arrest and conviction backgrounds of their employees, there is always the fear that if the ex-offender answers honestly he will not get the job. If he lies or refuses to answer he may be "found out" and fired. Young people have trouble enough becoming employed without the added stigma of ex-offender status. Where the employer accepts the juvenile's offense record, there is the additional problem of his/her co-workers and the right of the juvenile to keep the record private. If the vocational agency working with the ex-offender is indiscreet or obtrusive in its follow-up procedures, the goal of maintaining the juvenile comfortably in his/her job may be circumvented.

A fifth component of good vocational education is a concentration on *career exploration*. While entry-level skills in a specific and promising area are a minimum expectation, the employment market is fluid. There is no guarantee that the fields in which there are openings today will even exist tomorrow. Therefore, some of the training should concentrate on generic skill development and vocational sampling.

While these criteria apply to all vocational education programs, additional special problems apply to juvenile offenders. The age and life experience of juvenile offenders generally limit their insight into vocational possibilities. Many offenders come from backgrounds where unemployment and underemployment are the norm. Asking them to adjust quickly to the norms of a working world when many have already failed to adjust to the similar norms of a school environment (i.e., regular attendance, nondisruptive behavior, diligence) is asking quite a lot, and a good deal of *resocialization* as well as vocational training will be required.

In addition, it may be that some serious offenders are developmentally and academically immature. Many will have come from a disruptive family environment with consequent emotional damage. Many others are far behind grade level in reading and mathematical skills. Deficits such as these call for an integration of remedial skills and vocational training. For example, mathematics should not be taught in the traditional sense but should contain elements directly related to the career fields in which the students are being trained. A machinist employs calipers and gauges, which can be used to instruct in decimals and fractions. Reading can be taught through parts manuals and industrial magazines.⁸

In the case of some serious juvenile offenders, confinement or removal from the community may be necessary. In most states, this means a juvenile correctional institution, whether large or small. This type of disposition has two effects on vocational education. One, it seriously limits the variety of potential vocational training experiences during the stay in the closed settings. Two, the average length of stay (six to eight months) is too short for any type of full training course leading to employability. While most studies demonstrate that the benefits of curtailing the institutional stay far outweigh any benefits accruing to a longer stay, planners of vocational programs in these settings are faced with the compounded problem of developing programs which contribute to the youth's development yet are feasible accomplishments within his/her expected length of stay.

We were unable to locate a program dealing exclusively with serious juvenile

offenders, and will therefore describe a program which included some serious offenders and seems to us to have a number of the components listed above and to be adoptable for use with serious offenders.

THE BUILD PROGRAM

The BUILD program in Harvey, Illinois, was begun in 1972 by a small group of black teachers and counselors who had been informally discussing the need for such a program since the 1969 riots. Near Chicago, the Harvey suburban area has a large black population as well as a low-status white population of industrial workers. The area has one of the highest suburban crime rates in the State of Illinois. The project was started by this group who volunteered their time and used borrowed spaces for an evening tutoring and job coaching program for 8 youths. The effort has grown in three years to a marginally financed but well equipped and staffed vocational education and job readiness skills program that has served 250 youths.

BUILD is financed by two sources: (1) it is reimbursed for the tuition of some of the students by the Illinois Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, and (2) it receives some funding from private donations. BUILD is currently seeking reimbursement from a local Board of Education under special education provisions which will pay the tuition of students not able to adjust to the regular public school setting. At present, however, many students attend free of charge. The program's financial position has had two main effects. On the one hand, it has hampered BUILD's vocational training diversification, but on the other hand, it has insured careful attention to the choice of equipment and technical instruction. These choices were facilitated by the volunteer assistance of businessmen and groups of locally employed craftsmen and technicians.

The Population Served

Enrollment in the program averages slightly over 50 youths at the present time. The program has an overall capacity of 75-100 youths.

- 92 percent of the enrollees are black and 8 percent are white.
- 67 percent are male—average age, 15.
- 33 percent are female—average age, 16½.

Of those currently enrolled, 7 youths have been adjudicated for a serious offense involving a crime against a person. While the remaining 46 youths have been adjudicated only for property offenses, approximately 15 percent of them are known by the community to have been involved in offenses against persons for which they have not been either arrested or adjudicated.

Admissions to date have largely been by chance—based on who walks in, or whom the courts happen to refer—rather than on a determinate intake policy. The Institute is prepared to accept more serious offenders should the courts send them. In general, students are admitted when it has been determined that they cannot reasonably be expected to function in the regular school program. Referrals come primarily from the juvenile court and the State Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. The intake procedures begun by the Social Service Department are actually the

beginning of the program's "needs assessment" rather than an admissions determination. If a referred youth really wants to come and he is in trouble, he is in.

Needs Assessment

The needs assessment includes (1) social work interviews with the youth and his/her family to obtain educational, health, and family history, and (2) vocational counseling interviews to assess the youths' vocational goals and interests, work attitudes, temperament and hobbies. Following the interviews, the vocational counselor and/or the psychologist usually administer one or more psychological tests to obtain a better idea of the youth's needs. Each youth in the program also has a complete optometric examination in BUILD's optometry testing laboratory, which will eventually be used to train technicians in that field.

Individualized Program

As soon as the needs assessment process provides the staff with sufficient data, a specific program plan is discussed with the youth, focusing on both short- and intermediate-range goals. The juvenile must agree to a program before training begins. It should be noted that there are no curriculum "demands" or "requirements" regarding which courses must be taken. There are, however, requirements within courses. There are no time requirements; instead, each student is allowed to progress at his/her own rate.

In addition to vocational and remedial teachers, each youth is assigned a counselor/outreach worker who at least initially picks up students in the morning and takes them home. The area lacks public transportation and most of the enrolled youth have a relatively low self-expectation and self-starting capacity. This "escort" practice both encourages attendance and affords the counselor the opportunity to become a familiar figure in the area and to the family, making family outreach and counseling somewhat easier.

Educational Program

The program day begins, interestingly enough, at 11:00 a.m. Staff members relate the relatively high average daily attendance rate of 82 percent to the fact that the starting time is consistent with the life style of the youth who stay up late at night. The staff feels the important thing is to get the youth into the habit of learning and training himself. Once that is accomplished, the adjustment to a more conventional day is easier. Students who have been placed and retained on jobs seem to support this rationale.

The selection of vocational areas for inclusion in the program has been carefully done. The focus is on a few areas in which there are known manpower needs, and in which there is opportunity for career advancement or job diversification. U.S. Department of Labor Job Market Analysis was used initially to determine what vocational areas fit that requirement. One example is the project's elaborate program in the graphic arts. A \$30 billion-a-year industry, graphic arts presents a wide range of skill categories—from basic printing production and machine maintenance skills to sales, estimating, and advertising layout. The graphic arts program is popular with the students, who relate to its career advantages. The two other major

vocational training areas are office machinery operation and maintenance and a soon-to-be-opened machinists training program. In each of these areas, equipment care and personal safety rules are stressed.

In addition to the specifically vocational aspects of the curriculum, tutoring and classwork are offered in reading and math to assist the students in preparing for the GED high school equivalency test and otherwise upgrading their skills in these subjects. Ultimately, about 50 percent of the enrollees get an equivalency diploma.

As the youths progress in technical skills training, a Job Readiness component is introduced. They are instructed in making job applications, in dress and job interviewing techniques, and in interpersonal relations on the job. Within time limits, some job finding is conducted by the staff. As funds and volunteers increase, this component will be increased. Consistent with the recommendations of most studies in the field, however, staff members do not usually attempt to intervene directly in the hiring procedure. The staff estimates that most youth should spend about two and one-half years in the program.

Staff

The BUILD staff consists of the following: executive director; assistant executive director; director of social service; assistant director of social service; psychologist; social worker; counselor/outreach workers (4); vocational evaluator; technical instructors (8); part-time clerical workers (13).

An important feature in staff functioning is flexibility in responding to the program youth and their families. The staff seems to be well acquainted with each student and sensitive to the interrelationships among the youths and between the youths and individual staff members. This flexibility and sensitivity is due at least in part to the small 1:5 ratio of full-time program staff to students.

The staff is predominantly black, reflecting the racial composition of the area and the student population. The role modeling and identification contribute to the effectiveness of the program.

An outstanding characteristic of the staff is their eagerness to allow visitors to wander about, talk privately to the students, and elicit their opinions about the program. (Many correctional programs are much more secretive.)

The following statements were typical of student comments about the staff and the program in general:

"Usually offenders are forced to do things—here people are *invited* and instructors don't deal from a superior level."

"They treat us like adults here."

"Every day you are told you can do anything if you put your mind to it."

"They don't have all kinds of attendance rules."

"They don't bug you about things—instead they keep telling you how good you can be."

The flexibility and sensitivity of the staff are apparent in their policies of managing student disruption. They are aware of the violent history and potential of many of the students, but rather than simply take strict disciplinary action, they try to

offer special attention in times of stress. When something seems to be building up in a student, a staff counselor sees him every day until the problems are talked out or in some way alleviated. The staff noted that often this stress is associated with problems at home. The availability of supervised temporary emergency quarters (group homes) is an important alternative to returning to an unsatisfactory home environment. BUILD hopes to acquire some apartments or houses for this purpose.

There are about two fights per week among students. These are handled by separating the antagonists and giving them both individual attention until the crisis is "talked down." Were individual attention not the norm of the program, these attempts might be seen as reinforcing aggressive behavior among the youth. The staff is not particularly disturbed by student fighting or emotional outbreaks, and their ability to (1) tolerate the fact that it does and will happen and (2) intervene quickly and nonpunitively enables them to maintain control and minimize interruptions to the program. After the outbreaks occur and during the "talk down" phase, the staff members learn as much as they can about what family, interpersonal, or situational occurrences precipitated the outbreak, and move to help the student resolve the problem.

Costs

BUILD Institute is a testimony to what can be done with extremely limited funds by careful fiscal management and the creative use of volunteers. After the initial equipment outlays, approximately \$2,000 per student per year is sufficient to cover the ongoing operating expenses of the community-based vocational program for 50 to 100 juvenile offenders. This compares quite favorably with the average \$10,000 per bed in a juvenile correction institution.

Evaluation

As might be expected because of fiscal and staff limitations and the absence of any interested program funding agency, a systematic follow-up has not occurred. The program administration hopes to interest some outside agent in performing an independent evaluation within the next year.

Employment. Records to date, although somewhat incomplete, indicate that approximately 90 percent of the enrollees have found employment, and that about half of these have found employment related to their training.

Schooling. About half earn a high school equivalency diploma.

Recidivism. Reliable recidivism data is not yet available.

Unexplained Finding. One unexplained finding is the fact that youths funded by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, who received a monthly allowance in addition to tuition, had a consistently lower attendance rate than the other students. This finding should be explored further. If the purpose of the living allowances was the reduction of financial stress to insure attendance, it appears to be having the opposite effect.

Generalizability of the BUILD Program

At least two questions have been raised about job training programs. First, how useful are programs designed to provide skills training if a recession has already

shut off access to jobs? When the national unemployment figures fluctuate around 10 percent (and go much higher for black, inner-city adolescents) job guarantees are unrealistic, and, if they are, how useful is vocational training?

The second issue is more specifically related to the area of the serious juvenile offender. It has been said of some diversion programs that they are rehabilitating Boy Scouts, especially when compared to the serious offender group. Many Job Corps staff members, for example, acknowledge that their services have little success with the "hard-core unemployed" and "hard-core delinquent."⁹ Serious crime, in fact, seems to have increased in periods of both economic expansion and recession. One explanation of this may be that those individuals involved in serious crime, including juveniles, exist outside of the American economy.¹⁰

It is as yet too early to report confidently that BUILD has succeeded in meeting these issues. But, as we have indicated, the preliminary data are encouraging, and hopefully more systematic information will be forthcoming.

An important consideration for the generalizability of the BUILD program, especially with serious offenders, is the size and composition of the staff. The relative intimacy between staff and youth, as well as the relative informality and lack of regimentation in a small program, contribute to this program's apparent success with troubled youth. The "talking down" of violent behavior, for example, requires a small staff-student ratio. The price paid by limiting program size to about 50 to 80 students is of course the fact that cost factors limit expansion into more vocational training pathways. Planning vocational services to include several smaller programs, each offering different career pathways, seems feasible, especially in urban areas, and should be explored further.

The BUILD program staff are emphatic about the need for anyone seeking to replicate this program to stick to bare essentials and exercise extreme caution in initial program spending. The financial experience of this program also underscores the value of engaging in negotiations with state agencies or school districts to obtain tuition, for the program youth.

Notes

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VI. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

This section draws on the work of the study teams to summarize the state of practice in the various groups of treatments. In reading the summary findings, the condition of the data base needs to be kept in mind. This is not simply a lament about the absence of analysis; instead, because this deficit is such a major impediment to program and policy management, it needs to be treated as a topic in its own right.

The Absence of Data

The absence of data about serious juvenile offenders is not without significance. Rather, it reflects society's evaluation of these young people. The things about which we care, we find ways to count (e.g., the gross national product, unemployment, and inflation). Serious juvenile offenders—the losers among the losers—were for a long time not a focus of public concern. The public assumption seemed to be either that they did not deserve attention or that they were beyond redemption. Other factors that inhibit data collection also need to be addressed.

Our interest has been in serious juvenile offenders, yet we have been unable to uncover a single program which focused primarily on treating youth who meet our offense-related criteria. The explanation is not with the criteria but with treatment practices that don't differentiate the serious juvenile offender from other juvenile offenders. This lack of differentiation stems from several factors to be discussed below and on the whole seems justifiable; but if these offenders are becoming a major concern then unobtrusive ways of tracking what is happening to them and to what effect will need to be developed. Such monitoring systems will need to anticipate a number of factors: the frequent lack of congruence between the nature of the offense and the disposition, the lack of fit between diagnosis/prescription and treatment, and management attitudes and concern for institutional reputations.

Offhand, it would seem likely that a juvenile presumed to be a serious threat to the community because of a past offense would be in a secure facility—i.e., that the security of the placement would reflect the gravity of the offense. If one reviews the files of juveniles held in the greatest security, however, this turns out not always to be the case. The place of detention is frequently governed by management concerns regardless of the presenting offense—"troublemakers" get locked up; "good timers" have fewer restraints. Clearly we do not wish to argue for a necessarily secure detention for those youth who meet our seriousness criteria. What we wish to point out is that the issue of offender management can sometimes obscure the distinction between serious and not so serious offenders, thereby clouding an analysis of what works with whom.

Some institutions do spend considerable time and effort testing and analyzing serious offenders, but the prescribed treatment then gets ignored for one or more reasons—a desire to distribute populations over all facilities, a lack of faith in the accuracy of the diagnosis or the efficacy of the treatment, or, as mentioned above,

management reactions to institutional behavior. Where the juveniles do receive the prescribed treatment, an adequate analysis of treatment effectiveness would still require long-term, broadly conceived outcome data per offender and per treatment group. Juvenile justice (along with most other people-serving institutions) is notorious for its disinterest about or inability to collect such data, a problem compounded by statutes intended to protect the privacy of juvenile records.

Part of that notoriety has to do with institutional reputations and attitudes. In an environment where correctional institutions don't correct, training programs don't train, and so on, very few places have much incentive to keep good records, especially records about those youths considered the least likely to do well. Where continuing appropriations from hostile legislatures or grants from skeptical sponsors are at stake, sometimes the most prudent course is simply not to collect very much unflattering data about one's lack of effect. In addition, some program administrators probably despair of having much effect on the serious ("hard-core") juvenile offender; others despair of being able to change programs; while still others are too hard-pressed or underfunded to collect good data. Perhaps the largest group is simply unfamiliar with data collection and analysis. This problem is not unique to the juvenile justice system. In very few areas of public policy are the existing data sufficient to support policy decisions, yet decisions need to be made. In the concluding section we will link this data collection effort concerning treatment efficacy to the management of the NIJJ research and development programs.

The Lack of Exemplary Programs for Serious Juvenile Offenders

Our persistent question, "Who is doing a good job with serious juvenile offenders?" regularly brought the same negative or puzzled response. While some programs for juvenile offenders include serious offenders and are doing useful work (as discussed above), there are no programs of concentrated assistance specifically for this group. Several factors push institutions away from providing separate programs. In the first place, the small number of youths involved means that most institutions will have only a handful of serious juvenile delinquents—far fewer than necessary to justify the maintenance of either a specialized program or a series of programs. It may be also that public opinion will not support expensive or extensive programs for this group.

In addition, there appear to be several treatment-relevant reasons for this absence. First there is as yet no understanding of the causes of serious crime adequate to prescribe specific treatments. For example, Wolfgang and Ferracuti hypothesize that a variety of strategies, ranging from better street lighting and gun control to milieu therapy and operant conditioning, may produce positive results with assaultive offenders. They note, however, that "no direct experimentation using the notions of a subculture of violence, and obviously no evaluative results are available."¹

For the most part, the various theories of delinquency apply to both serious and less serious offender populations. The determinants of serious and especially violent behavior are frequently situational and thus not accessible to treatment after the fact. "Serious" offenders may share only one characteristic—that of having commit-

ted a serious crime. Lumping them into a single treatment modality precludes the individualized strategies they require.

There is also the argument that even if the serious offenders shared certain treatment requirements, the harm done by isolating them might outweigh any subsequent good. Young people who are segregated because of the grievous nature of a past offense thus have their own and others' negative evaluations of them reinforced. Undifferentiated programs, on the other hand, reduce this deviation-amplifying process by reducing labeling and by allowing for functional peer teaching and role modeling.

Thus, while we did not locate any programs exclusively for serious offenders, the absence of such programs appears to be both understandable and defensible. But the lack of such programs should not be confused with ignoring these delinquents. Programs—in the sense of organized if unobtrusive efforts to monitor these juveniles—should be instituted in order to design, evaluate, and enhance effective interventions.

The Lack of One Sufficient Intervention

The Sara Lee Corporation uses the advertising slogan "There's nobody who doesn't like Sara Lee." Similar claims about universal efficacy have been made on behalf of various treatments in this field.² This project did not encounter any treatment which was beneficial for all serious juvenile offenders. Yet states, and especially institutions, sometimes devote themselves wholly to, for example, guided group interaction, as *the* treatment to be applied to everyone. At one level, that approach can be justified. People should do what they are best equipped to do. If a treatment facility gathers or develops a group of people who are skilled in and devoted to a particular intervention, then they are justified in making it available wherever and as long as it is effective. The danger lies in overgeneralizing one approach to individuals who will not respond to it. As we said, we encountered no evidence to support the contention that any single treatment modality could be effective for all serious juvenile offenders.* Moreover, even the most dedicated staff can wear out or become disenchanted with a given technique. Some administrators think that it is important for workers to be able to change treatment methods.

The fact that no single treatment is useful to all serious juveniles should not be misinterpreted. It does not mean that career education doesn't do considerable good for some youths or that peer cultures should not be part of a rehabilitative community. Later in this section we will summarize those features of treatment programs which appear to be related to success. But there is no single thing which works for everyone.

* The logical problems in making a sufficient demonstration that something does not exist are well known, e.g., the continuing attempts to determine that there are no monsters in Loch Ness.

The Limited Utility of Most Programs

A number of perfectly reasonable questions can be asked about the treatments we are discussing. Probably the first question—one being asked with increasing insistence by the media, policymakers, and criminologists—is, Does what we know about treatment justify its continued support? While this issue will be discussed further in Sec. VII, it deserves mention here.

Since the publication of Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks¹³ survey of studies of treatment outcomes, the death of correctional treatment has been widely heralded. For several reasons, the obituary seems premature. The first has to do with the generalizability of Martinson's work. The program studies surveyed, as Martinson indicates, were all conducted prior to 1967, but only after 1967 have prison reforms been widely implemented. For example, though group work with juveniles began more than twenty years ago at Highfields (see Sec. III), it has only become a national phenomenon in the last several years.⁴ The stock of practical knowledge available to refine programs may be several multiples greater than the number of years from 1967 to 1970 would suggest. In addition, Martinson necessarily concentrated on institutional treatment and traditional forms of probation and parole. It is premature to predict that the outcomes of the variety of treatments now becoming available in community settings will be no different.

There is also the question of the perhaps differential amenability to treatment of various age groups. Martinson found some evidence that, for example, pragmatically oriented—i.e., street problem—psychotherapy can reduce recidivism in young offenders.⁵ Continued attempts to design and implement treatments should take account of the criticisms leveled against their predecessor efforts. The new designs should be informed by data from the past. We cannot yet reject the null hypothesis—that treatments do not work—but neither need we accept it. Careful interventions, systematically evaluated, are desperately needed.

Given this answer to the question "Should we bother?" other questions remain. For example, considering the treatments surveyed—aren't some better than others? Which modalities are most effective with what sorts of juveniles? Given limited resources in a jurisdiction, which type of program should be instituted—one depending on links to psychiatric/psychological services or one stressing community-based social-welfare institutions? Questions of that sort beg for answers which, as we have indicated, cannot be supported by the existing data. Far too little is known about serious juvenile offenders in general, and about treatment programs in particular, to allow any comparative judgments.

Instead, the project staff encountered limited success within every treatment area. The success was limited both by the numbers of offenders who could be reached and by the extent of the outcomes, but it was still success. The fact that practically all treatments appear to do some good for some juvenile offenders is not surprising. As we have seen, there is a fairly extensive array of intervention techniques in practice. That array reflects the concern and judgment of clusters of professionals. Each technique is grounded in a technology of human service which, while not omnipotent, is still not impotent. Finally, childhood and adolescence is, among other things, a somewhat plastic period. These youths are accessible to one or more behavior-changing techniques, and, given an encounter between the right delinquent and

the right technique, behavioral change will result.* Thus, in spite of the absence of good data we are convinced of the limited utility of most interventions.

A NOTE ABOUT HARM AS A LIMIT

As we have said, treatment success is limited in the sense that no treatment will be of use to every individual. It is also limited in the extent, scope, or duration of any change produced. For example, an intervention may reduce (but not totally remove) the violence a juvenile uses (extent). An intervention may be limited in that it deals only with the vocational but not the personal or social relations of a person (scope). The duration limit is frequently remarked when a released juvenile recidivates three months, six months, or a year later.

To those limits, we need to add another—the probability that some interventions do harm to some juvenile offenders. One kind of harm comes from applying behavior-changing techniques to adolescents who are not prepared to accept or cope with them. For example, most institutions have some sort of orientation or reception center where an initial adjustment to institutional life can take place. Despite that, some juveniles confronted with the personal demands of participating in therapy sessions then act violently against the therapist, where such demands are piled on top of involuntary incarceration in a new place.

Another sort of less specific but nonetheless real potential for harm needs to be considered in the process of juvenile justice that exposes these youths to these programs. Some programs include youth who ought not to be involved in the juvenile justice system at all. Much has been written about the issue of juvenile rights, the question of status offenses, and the problems of defining, much less predicting dangerousness. Let us only iterate that, for those youth who for one reason or another (e.g., "convicted" by social evidence, falsely predicted as "dangerous," etc.) are unjustly and/or unnecessarily subjected to treatment, there are two potential harms. The first is the deviation-amplifying effect of labeling; the second has to do with what Matza calls the juvenile's sense of injustice.⁶ In addition to potentially influencing future delinquency through labeling a youth delinquent when detention and treatment are perceived as unjust, that perception can weaken the bonds that hold a youth to conventional behavior, allowing him, in Matza's term, to "drift" into delinquency.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS

No one is very satisfied with measures of "successful" programs practiced in this field. This project began with analysis of the existing literature about programs and used the expert judgment of both practitioners and academics at several points. Where there was a substantial amount of agreement about the ability of a program to deliver intended changes with serious juvenile offenders, we examined the records

* Of course the plasticity of adolescence also insures that some youths will spontaneously change their behavior without respect to the treatment being provided, and those changed behaviors will then be incorrectly attributed to the program.

related to claimed outcomes and made site visits. While the data have distinct limitations, in general they support program claims about their behavior-changing efficacy.

The early work of this project was done by four separate teams (represented by Secs. II through V of this report) reviewing their literatures and analyzing their case study sites independently. The strategy was designed to facilitate distinct conclusions about effective practice from within each treatment area. Exactly the opposite occurred. The individual teams documented remarkably similar features from successful projects in each modality and from the literature reviewed. Regardless of treatment modality, we converged on a set of characteristics which seemed to be associated with successful practice.

The eclecticism of good practice is well known to practitioners, who tend to use whatever works, not just what they were trained in or what their professional association endorses or even what their grant proposal promised. On a more abstract level, there are similarities in the general process of any people-changing endeavor. The precursors and the process of behavioral change are relatively constant across the sites of their application. The processes of changing assembly-line workers, or managers, or school teachers, or serious juvenile offenders will demonstrate *some* similarities. The existence of such regularities makes disciplined generalization possible, and it also strengthens the confidence we have in proposing a series of features of hypothesized successful practice for the treatment of serious juvenile offenders.

Before we move to that discussion, we need to note some of the distinctive features of the serious juvenile offender population. From the behavioral and diagnostic point of view and apart from the presenting offense, they are not distinct from less serious juvenile offenders, but there are differences in their *situations* that need to be noted. Many of the aspects of successful intervention programs reflect a value system that might be described as humanistic or person-centered, yet acting on those values with serious juvenile offenders may run counter to aroused public opinion. Vengeance is not compatible with treating a youth adjudicated for a serious offense as a valuable person, yet in the absence of that latter attitude, rehabilitation may be impossible. In addition, in planning for serious offenders, the impact of incarceration must be considered. The simple but omnipresent fact that many of these youths are being held against their will has a serious bearing on treatments most of which assume some degree of cooperation from their participants. Coercion and cooperation are not often compatible.

A final caveat: these features are listed as being *associated* with success. Our analysis of the field gives us sufficient confidence in this set to argue that they should have more careful attention. But that is exactly the point—these features hypothesized to be successful need to be scrutinized in practice over time and over a range of situations. They need careful testing through a series of procedures outlined in the concluding section. With these caveats, we present the major features associated with successful treatments.

Client Choice

Successful programs were those that maximized the choices of their clients. Of course, in the case of the serious offender, the range of choices may be limited. As

we have mentioned, the decision between incarceration and release will be the court's, but once that decision is made the juvenile offender can be afforded several sorts of choices, beginning with whether or not to participate in any treatment program.

Whether or Not To Participate. Individuals who are forced to take part in programs enter with hostility, resentment, and resistance that defeat the intended purpose of their participation. Those who choose to make themselves available have fewer such obstacles to overcome.

This feature may be difficult to accept. For many people, the serious juvenile offender needs, even requires, treatment and should have it. By virtue of his or her crime, the juvenile has forfeited the privilege of choice. But here we have a nice question: Is the public's interest (and the juvenile's) served by the form or by the substance? It is certainly possible to require attendance and it is sometimes possible to require participation. Overt schemes such as compulsory attendance and covert devices such as linking ostensible participation to release dates are sufficient to guarantee high program enrollments and satisfying figures about the gross number of individuals exposed to treatment. But they do *not* yield authentic behavioral change. Thus it may be necessary to sacrifice the (ineffective) form for a better chance at the substance of changed behavior.

Juvenile offenders may have to be extended the opportunity to choose whether or not they will enter—and continue—in any treatment program. (The possible exception to this may be schooling in those cases where state compulsory attendance laws apply. Of course, the meager successes from such forced school attendance helps make our point about client choice as a precursor condition.) If the initial decision about entering/not entering a program is granted, then extending choice to the point of exiting should not be too great a leap. Juveniles should be allowed to opt out of treatment programs that they dislike or that they feel are not useful.

Some may choose not to take part in any program, not from any infirmity but as a matter of personal predilection. If they use that surcease from involvement to make an adjustment to institutional life, so much the better. If they do absolutely nothing but serve time, then it is very likely that they are only doing overtly exactly what they would otherwise be doing while in physical attendance at some program. The likelihood of successful behavioral change in the absence of client cooperation is infinitesimal.

The absence from treatment programs of those who refuse even a small amount of initial cooperation thus costs the system very little in terms of missed opportunity and may even enhance the prospects for rehabilitation through smaller and more cooperative treatment groups. Where juveniles eventually opt out of nonparticipation and into some preferred activity, they will be in a more advantageous position to gain from that involvement than they would otherwise have been.

Which Treatment To Participate In. Similarly, allowing the client the opportunity to choose which of several treatments to participate in should also be feasible. While some may argue that the serious offender has dramatically demonstrated his/her incapacity for responsible action, some programs have demonstrated that it is possible to increase client choice substantially over that which now prevails.

Among the case studies presented, for example, the BUILD program requires that the juvenile assist in planning and agree to the kind of program he/she would

pursue. That is not simply a matter of asking each juvenile what he/she wants to do. Client choice is never exercised in a vacuum. The same assessments, diagnoses, counseling, and other intake or orientation procedures now in use would continue and perhaps be expanded so that the juvenile will have a better chance to make an informed choice. (The assessment procedure can be used to identify those juveniles who are so disabled or so incapacitated that the opportunity to make a voluntary choice should not be extended until the disability is removed or ameliorated.)

The concept underlying client choice is a simple one—voluntary change is more probable, faster, more complete, and more permanent than is coerced change. Giving the offender this measure of responsibility for his own behavior increases the process of self-investment in rehabilitation at an early point. The public quite properly objects to the vividly irresponsible behavior (at least at one point in time) of the serious juvenile offender. Yet responsibility is difficult to develop when no one expects it and there are no opportunities to practice it. Maximizing client choice is one way to elicit the development of that responsibility. Finally, it seems worth trying if for no other reason than that compulsory participation does not work.

The Participation Hypothesis. This is one of the most empirically established features of successful behavior-changing efforts. The basic premise is that as the individual's participation or involvement increases, the individual's acceptance of a new behavior will also increase. The participation hypothesis recurs over and over again in most of the social and behavioral sciences. (In political science it is part of the argument about the circular reinforcement from sense of political efficacy to political participation; in social psychology it is used to explain the power of peer and group influence; and in organizational development it has been a prominent feature of group work.)

Several mechanisms seem to be at work. For one, participation in groups makes one more accessible to group influences; where those group influences can be controlled or manipulated in positive ways, they can be used for therapeutic purposes, as in GGI. That participation can also shift the communication encountered by an individual from critical sources to sources that are more likely to be supportive of the group. Becoming a participant in a group identifies the participant with the group in the eyes of other people, who then modify their expectations accordingly. Such changed expectations help to shape the behavior of the participant.

At the level of the individual, the participation hypothesis also exerts some powerful effects. For the individual, the act of involvement requires the expenditure of some minimum amount of resources—time, concentration, intellectual and emotional expression. Investing personal resources is likely to increase one's commitment to the thing being participated in, whether it is a sensitivity group, a cottage government, or a career training program. It comes as no surprise, then, that where participation was maximized, as for example in the Providence program, so also was the likelihood of the program's success in changing the behavior of the individual. Of course, the juvenile justice system is already aware of this precept, although it is most often demonstrated in the negative direction.

Relationship to Fixed or Indeterminate Sentences. Where institutions use program participation as a precondition to release, inmates frequently go through very inauthentic motions of involvement which evaporate upon release. Such "conning" is frequently lamented. One way to reduce it is to reduce the incentives to anything except genuine participation by, *inter alia*, the imposition of fixed senten-

ces announced prior to incarceration. The argument for a more explicit sentencing procedure coupled with optional treatment programs has been put forth by, for example, David Fogel of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission in Chicago.⁷

Conditions that Make for Successful Learning

Although not all learning theorists (or teachers) would agree on every aspect of learning theory, there is a growing area of agreement about desirable practices that promote learning—and learning is, by definition, the acquisition of new behaviors. Some of these desirable practices are listed here.

Clear Tasks. Those situations which elicited the most successful performances on the part of serious juvenile offenders did so, at least in part, because the juveniles could understand what it was that they were supposed to be doing. One of the strengths of the CASE program, for example, was the clarity of the rewards immediately contingent on the individual's behavior.

Early and Frequent Successes. Similarly, most of the exemplary practitioners we contacted agreed that persistent failure was a hallmark of the backgrounds of delinquent youths. Thus, it was important to give them reasons to believe in themselves, and in their own efficacy. Tasks structured to be eminently "do-able" contributed to that. The Providence Educational Center, for example, emphasizes successful experiences in their individually prescribed instruction. If a student is "failing," the program adjusts the criterion until it is one which the learner can and will reach.

Behavior Models. Emulation is an important learning technique. Programs that sought to instill responsible, fair, consistent, and thoughtful behavior in their clients often succeeded in doing so by having a staff that would enact such behavior and with which the youths could identify. The BUILD staff is an excellent example of this.

Belief in the Possibility of Achieving. Juveniles who believe that they are defeated by others every time they try to do anything often stop trying or move into areas of endeavor that aren't socially sanctioned, like delinquency. Such children believe themselves to be controlled from the outside,* which discourages their own efforts and diminishes the benefits they might gain from participation. On the other hand, children who believe that they can succeed will act in a fashion that helps make that belief a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Successful programs tried to minimize experiences that would reinforce the external control notion and to maximize those that would lead to developing an "internal locus of control." Guided group interaction, for example, stresses the responsibility of each member to and for the group.

Reward Structures. Successful programs organized their incentives to reinforce behavior which could be perceived as mutually desirable by the program staff and the clientele. The rewards were significant, and they were contingent on relevant tasks where achievement was a realistic expectation. The staff of many programs constantly stressed to their enrollees the possibility of succeeding, whether in the acquisition of marketable skills (e.g., the BUILD program) or the manifestation of prosocial group norms (e.g., Michigan's Green Oak Center).

* Given racism and other forms of discrimination, this perception is an accurate one on the part of many juvenile delinquents.

Credible or "Integrated" Training. The training situations which were most effective were those which simulated the location where the new behavior was to take place. Vocational education programs, for example, needed to have machinery and working conditions like those used in the world outside. Obviously, moving the treatment program to that world, as in the community-based strategies, maximizes the benefits of this feature.

Availability of a Wide Range of Techniques

Virtually everyone agrees that serious juvenile offenses, as with juvenile delinquency in general, spring from many different causes. We have earlier discussed our conclusions that no single technique works for everyone but that many techniques seem to be useful for some individuals. Yet, in the absence of a valid and reliable knowledge of precipitating behaviors, prescribing a particular treatment for a particular individual is highly imprecise. Most practitioners agree that diagnosis cannot yet be used to steer interventions. Therefore, the conclusion is that programs need to have a lot of different sorts of treatments available. When one fails, another can be tried. When one has moved a given child as far as it can, another technique can be employed. Or, several different techniques can be used during the same intensive time period (e.g., programmed learning in the classroom, supplemented by high intensive counseling sessions, with a peer culture maintained in the juvenile offenders' residence). The most effective programs had available diverse techniques to fit a variety of needs (see especially Providence Educational Center, and BUILD).

Summary of Reasons for Having a Wide Range of Treatments Available.

The reasons for having a wide range of available programs can be summarized as follows:

1. Different juveniles respond to different treatments, and thus the diversity inherent in any group requires an array of treatments.
2. With a given juvenile, trial and error may be necessary before the child is matched with a technique that does any good.
3. Given the limited utility of all techniques, it is useful to have other methods that may be applied when one begins to fade.
4. A range of treatments is helpful to the staff as well, because (a) it facilitates the eclectic "borrowing" process that provides them with a repertoire of skills, and (b) it allows them to rotate among methods and thus control some of the personal, psychic demands that are so burdensome in this field.

The Least Drastic Measure. Treatments make different sorts of demands on the individuals exposed to them. Some require a personal investment that is exhausting and very threatening; others may be much less burdensome. Some go deeply into the juvenile's person and psyche, effecting (or attempting to effect) basic transformations in personality, values, and so on. Those changes may or may not be functional, personally or socially, in later life. Other treatments work at a more superficial level and entail far less investment and far less risk. In behavior-changing treatments, as in any other therapeutic practice, there is an obligation to apply only the least drastic measure. Where a number of treatments are available and may work, the one which is least costly and least risky to the client should be applied, not the one which is the diagnostician's favorite or the one that has the empty bed. The availability of a range of measures also follows from the principle

of the least drastic measure, which requires real alternatives. The "client choice" feature of successful practice shifts some of the burden for adhering to this principle to the client.

Implications for Institutional Size. In institutional settings, a minimum population is necessary in order to justify the availability of a range of treatments (and the concomitant staff). A minimum population size is probably on the order of 50 to 100 juveniles, although they certainly do not all have to be serious offenders.

Heuristic Management

The best programs we encountered seemed to be using their failures as a guide to new initiatives and eventual success. They were conscious of their own performance and they took a frankly problem-solving, trial-and-error attitude toward their work. Given what is known—and especially what is not known—about intervening with serious juvenile offenders, such an heuristic management strategy is emphatically indicated.

Notes

1. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence*, Tavistock Publications, New York, 1967, pp. 301-316.
2. Frank Zimring, *Dealing with Youth Crime: National Needs and Federal Priorities*, unpublished paper, September 1975, p. 75.
3. Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, *The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Evaluation Studies*, Praeger, New York, 1975.
4. Michael S. Serrill, "Is Rehabilitation Dead," *Corrections Magazine*, May-June 1975, pp. 3-32.
5. Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks, p. 581.
6. David Matza, *Delinquency and Drift*, Wiley, New York, 1964, pp. 101-151.
7. David Fogel, "The Justice Perspective in Corrections," in "The Proceedings of the Southern Conference on Corrections, 1972," manuscript, the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, 120 South Riverside Place, Chicago, Illinois.

VII. DISCUSSION

Our review of the literature, our study of the case sites, and our work with the consultants all emphasize the absence of a universally efficacious treatment and the partial efficacy of most treatments.

Documenting that there is nothing which works for everyone and that most things do some good for some individuals will startle only true believers (who know that their treatment is *The Answer*) and total cynics (who reject even successive approximations to better practice). But there are several interesting implications from these two conclusions.

First, intervening with dangerous juvenile offenders is at least as difficult an area as is any other people-changing endeavor. Although behavioral technologies are not powerless, none of them measure up to the demands which their public policy applications would put on them. Programs designed to change client behavior in manpower, in race relations, in education have not worked as well as their proponents wished. Treatment efficacy has been particularly disappointing where, as with juvenile offenders, there is no firm understanding about the causes of crime, or even a classification of offender characteristics that might be useful for treatment purposes.

Delinquency and violence are often attributed to poverty, to racism, to lack of opportunity, to poor education, to anger, to inadequate ego structures, to bad socialization in the family or the peer group, and on and on. But even when these multiple tributaries of hypothesized causation are simplified into a few major causal streams (social causes, economic causes, cultural causes, psychological causes), there is no reliable knowledge about how much propensity to delinquency is contributed by which streams. Should treatment be concentrated on "remediating" the offender's schooling deficiencies? Or reconstructing coping behaviors? Or preparing him or her for a job?

Asking how much antisocial activity can be avoided by enhancing what sorts of prosocial activities is a reasonable question from the standpoint of policymakers, service providers, and taxpayers. Yet definitive answers cannot be constructed from existing data. (The questions are within the purview of the behavioral sciences, although with traditional survey analytic procedures, finding answers is very likely to be regarded as prohibitively expensive given the size and social consequences of this population.) In light of the fact that we don't know the causes of serious crime among juvenile offenders, it should come as no surprise that the treatments are not definitive ways to change behavior.

But the lack of a definitive cure does not mean that there are no useful palliatives. Because of our interest in "what works," we set out to examine programs which had exemplary reputations and we found that most of these programs could support their claims for success with some of their populations. They were not, of course, exempt from the familiar measurement problems of juvenile justice. "Successful" behavior was too often documented only inside the institution and may never have survived the street, or may have been diminished over time. Still, the programs had reason to believe in what they were doing because at least some of the behavior of some of their enrollees was less damaging than, if not downright

improved from, that which had brought them into the program. Some of those successes may be due to serendipitous changes in the youths themselves (they may mature out or be attracted out of crime), part may be due to an avoidance of situations that precipitate dangerous crime, part may be due to a calculated wish on the part of some juveniles to win release or avoid being locked up again—nonetheless, there appears to be a substantial residue of positive treatment effects with some serious juvenile offenders. Of course, the immediate but unanswerable question is, With *which* offenders, how described?

The fact that these juvenile offenders are regarded as "serious" permeates thinking and reactions in this field. The faint effects of treatment leave projects open to criticism anyway; the gravity of their clientele's presenting offenses makes those treatments even more vulnerable to criticism.

Lock Up, Give Up, or Try Harder

Most areas of public social welfare have been suffering a similar hangover from the enthusiasms of the 1960s. Where once it had been thought that Federal programs could remedy virtually any problem, it now sometimes appears that such programs cannot help at all. Evaluations, commissioned in an effort to make programs more effective, have documented how extraordinarily difficult individual and social change is (if it happens at all) and have thus contributed to real skepticism about the efficacy of any efforts at systematic, conscious intervention. Some people look at the evidence and conclude that we should give up; others look at the same evidence and say we should try harder.

The deterrence versus rehabilitation debate in criminal justice is in some ways another case of the give up/try harder dilemma. Similarly, what is known about interventions with serious juvenile offenders can lead different observers to very different conclusions. In the absence of a definitive way to rehabilitate, then the heinous nature of the crimes committed by serious juvenile offenders comes to the fore. Since nothing else works for sure, one conclusion is that we should at least punish with some surety, that is, *lock 'em up*.

Another conclusion begins at the same point: since there is no definitive intervention, then why pretend that we can rehabilitate? Since treatments are expensive, chancy, trial-and-error efforts that yield only limited outcomes when they work at all, why not save the money or put it where it will do more good with a more deserving population? Thus, with serious juvenile offenders, give up. This conclusion says nothing about punishment or incarceration, only about treatment. It should be noted that this *is* the policy of the majority of treatment programs. Most exclude serious juvenile offenders, and thus have given up.

A view from the other pole can also be defended. The lack of a set of behavioral characteristics that differentiates serious juvenile offenders from others, and the fact that most things do some good for some youths can support a conclusion of *try harder*. Since efforts at the current level of application already yield some benefits, increasing the support and intensity of those efforts should yield even more. The following sections discuss the lock up, give up, and try harder conclusions.

Most of the debate orients itself around two variables, imprisonment and treatment (see illustration).

Imprisonment	Treatment	
	No	Yes
Yes	1	3
No	2	4

Box 1 is occupied by those people who despair of or disapprove of any rehabilitation, who therefore wish to deemphasize treatment and who wish to stress the incapacitating, punitive, and deterrent effects of imprisonment. While some people will argue for that and for policies that might fall into the first box, very few would support the second box, especially given the serious crimes committed by the population we are considering. It should be noted however that many critics of existing practices maintain that those practices look like our box 2: i.e., neither imprisonment nor (effective) treatment.

The third and fourth boxes are very interesting. The third combines imprisonment with treatment and thus would include most of the programs now in existence, except of course for those deinstitutionalized, community-based programs which also provide treatments (box 4).

THE GIVE-UP VIEWPOINT

The give up/try harder dilemma refers to the focus of this analysis, treatment efficacy. As a group, the give-up alternatives share some characteristics, especially the view that treatment or rehabilitation does not work. On the evidence gathered for this study, that conclusion is overstated. True, treatments do not work with much certainty (the likelihood of a given offender recidivating is not what we would all wish) or precision (specific treatments cannot usefully be targeted on juveniles with known characteristics). Nor do treatments work at the societal scale that their boosters have claimed. But the argument is really over what constitutes an acceptable threshold of treatment results.

For some, the lack of certainty, precision, and demonstrated societal outcomes means that the treatment strategy has failed; others attack treatment because it has been used to disguise a multitude of abuses to juveniles. These two groups of critics are very different. The first argues that treatment doesn't work and should be abandoned. The second says that it doesn't work well enough to justify the legal safeguards foregone in its name. Where the first group would be satisfied if the juvenile justice system abandoned its rehabilitation posturing and simply gave up, the second group would still press for subsequent reforms in other parts of the juvenile justice system. What is for the first an intrinsic goal is for the second only a tactic.

In any case, where treatment is judged bankrupt because not enough rehabilitation occurs, then several conclusions follow. There is almost no justification for exposing youths to those interventions which are the most personally intrusive, e.g., aversion therapy, some forms of behavior modification, some types of psychiatric intervention. Since the gains are so uncertain, the risks are unacceptable. Second, the costs associated with providing those ineffectual treatments can be saved. (Some

might argue that they could be reinvested, but social costs are rarely transitive. Money saved by cutting one program for serious juvenile offenders is not likely to be put into another program.)

A third argument is heard most frequently. The child-regarding premise of the legal parts of the juvenile justice system is compromised by the rehabilitative inefficacy of treatments. Those due process and constitutional privileges which were sacrificed because juvenile justice was supposed to be a rehabilitative and child-saving system, not a restraining and child-punishing system, have to be reexamined. In the absence of benignly effective correctional treatments, it is not to the juvenile's interest to forego constitutional safeguards in order to be provided an intervention that does not work. Thus, if there is no behavioral treatment which works for everyone, then the best we may do is to provide each juvenile offender with an equitable judicial process and, once in an institution, a sentence of determinate length.

An additional conclusion is sometimes drawn from the fact that no treatment works for everyone. Institutions should be prevented from intervening in a juvenile's life where coerced participation is really a form of punishment masquerading as rehabilitation.¹ If institutional treatment is not effective in correcting behavior, then the purposes of institutions should be scaled back to that which they are capable of providing, e.g., temporary incapacitation and with that, some punishment for the offender and some temporary security for the society (box 1).

Other arguments against treatment stem from criticism about indeterminate sentences. The logic of those sentences has been that the offender would be retained until properly prosocial behavior was evidenced. In turn, that behavior was to be produced by behavior-changing techniques of the sort examined here. But those techniques vary in their efficacy in poorly understood ways which often seem to have little to do with the client. Thus, some young people may serve long sentences because they happen to be placed in a facility which does not have the treatment that would help them. Others may (and certainly do) "con" their way into early releases by faking rehabilitation. Still others, who *are* rehabilitated, are held because parole boards suspect them of faking rehabilitation. Indeterminate sentences (which were originally premised on an inflated idea of treatment efficacy) do not produce "corrected" behavior but they do lead to substantial injustice among groups or individuals who have been convicted of similar crimes but who may serve vastly differing lengths of time. Thus, many critics of the present indeterminate sentence advocate fixed sentences scaled to reflect the seriousness of the crime and not contingent on evidence of rehabilitation. (Additional arguments for fixed sentences revolve around society's expectations for just retribution, around incapacitation, and sometimes around a hoped-for deterrent effect which such sentences may have.*)

Most of the "give up" arguments focus on the failure of institutionally-mediated rehabilitation, but do so *in order to achieve some other reform*. Because the rehabilitation flag has obscured so many abuses, it is necessary to discredit it first in order to direct attention to other needed changes. While that makes some tactical sense, it may also throw the baby out with the bath water. Minimizing the harm done by some interventions in some circumstances can be achieved short of dismantling

* The counterargument holds that longer imprisonment leads to greater recidivism because of the increased opportunity to learn to be better criminals. Because of that, society's need to be protected against dangerous crime is not as well served by long periods in institutions as popular opinion believes.

institutional attempts to help juvenile offenders. The cases for due process, for determinate sentences, and for deinstitutionalization are certainly not so weak as to depend on the prior dismantling of treatment programs.

Distinguishing Serious Offenders from Status Offenders in Adjudication

It is usually necessary to balance the good that may come from public action with the harm from the same action. We agree with those who want to reform aspects of the juvenile justice system and who argue that the inflated claims for rehabilitation have delayed those reforms. A more realistic assessment of the prospects for rehabilitation can facilitate reform. But the versions of the "give up" argument that do not lead to reform seem to be insufficiently justified.

In addition to considering the abuse done to juveniles because of a flawed justice system, we should also consider the abuse done to society because of the existing system. The population for this study presents two defining characteristics: they are (1) juveniles who have (2) been convicted of serious crimes. A focus on the first characteristic, their youth, stresses a presumed reduction in responsibility for their acts and a presumed greater likelihood of successful rehabilitation. An alternative focus, on the crime, sharpens the salience of punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence (the presumed outcomes of imprisonment).

The adjudication processes of the system (arrest, trial, sentencing) lean heavily on the juvenile status. Unfortunately, one effect of that is to equate status offenders with serious offenders. It also denies serious offenders several aspects of legal due process. An adjudication system that took cognizance of the gravity of the presenting offense (i.e., separating serious from less serious offenders) could then make much more acceptable decisions about the conditions of sentencing, such as its determinate length, the place where it will be served, and the availability of treatment. Such reforms in the adjudication process might then allow criticism of the treatment process to proceed in its own right and in a constructive fashion.

It should be noted that this bifurcation of the juvenile justice system refers to the adjudication process, not to the treatment process. There is no evidence that the causation of serious juvenile offenses differs from less serious offenses. Nor is there evidence to indicate differential responsiveness among the populations (either in general or between treatment modalities). What *may* differ is the *conditions* under which the serious juvenile offender serves a sentence (duration, place, security characteristics). Those differences will certainly require adjustments in treatment, but the basic point remains that there should be a distinction between serious and less serious juvenile offenders in adjudication but not in treatment.

TRY HARDER OPTIONS

We may at this point move to the "try harder" options (boxes 3 and 4). The difference between these two is the difference between treatments conducted in prison and those conducted outside. As explained earlier, because of the gravity of the presenting offense, the bulk of the treatments provided to serious juvenile offenders are institutionally based. Although the data from those few places which have deinstitutionalized are interesting, they are not yet conclusive. One of the questions

that need to be addressed, then, is the impact which the site of the treatment has on the efficacy of the treatment.

The evidence summarized in the previous section (Sec. VI, Summary of the Findings) supports the "try harder" conclusion more than it does the "give up" conclusion. But how much harder should we try? The answer will be provided in part through the political process that compares the needs of the relatively small numbers of serious juvenile offenders with those of other groups competing for public resources.

A second element in the calculation will deal with the relative outcomes associated with imprisonment and with treatment. By and large, treatment has a single goal—rehabilitation. Imprisonment has three goals—punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence. What is done with serious juvenile offenders will rest not only on the answer to the question Do treatments rehabilitate? but also on the answer to the question Does imprisonment punish, incapacitate, and deter? Beyond that, there are interaction effects between imprisonment and treatment. To the extent that successful behavior-changing interventions require that the serious juvenile offender be treated humanely, that humane treatment diminishes the punishment outcome (and also, in the case of community-based treatments, the incapacitation outcome) of the imprisonment. From the other side, of course, the circumstances of imprisonment dilute the prospects for successful rehabilitation.

A final element in the calculation may deal with the inevitability of some amount of crime in any society or even the necessity of some crime. Durkheim claimed that a society requires crime in order to define its limits, and, by assigning criminal sanctions to undesired behaviors, to reinforce normative behavior. How much crime, by whom, against whom, are we willing to tolerate? Answers to the basic question, How much harder should we try?, will be found within those parameters.

We believe that the limited success of the various treatment modalities deserves continued support but under more consciously experimental conditions that can eventually lead to more effective and efficient results. It is not advisable to simply "try harder" but rather to try harder in conjunction with a strategy for program assessment and improvement *and* in conjunction with substantial reforms in other parts of the system. That limited "try harder" option should allow the improvements that can be effected with existing technology to emerge, at less risk to the juvenile population and to the general society.

Management Options for a Program of Research, Development, Dissemination, and Evaluation

This review was undertaken because of the interest of the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the serious offender part of its responsibilities. The Institute can affect practice in a number of ways; those to be discussed here are concentrated on R&D management as a tool for bringing about change. Or, to use an expanded set of activities that contains some important differentiations, the Institute can foster improvement through research (of several sorts), development, dissemination, and evaluation. NIJJ's choice of strategy rests on some judgments about the state of practice in the field, the condition of the existing

knowledge base, and the receptivity of organizations and the system to the various vehicles for planned change. The first appendix to this report shares some notes about organizations and systems as targets for change efforts. In this part, we outline some of the standard building blocks for R&D programs and relate them to the serious juvenile offender area.

Throughout, we have been asking basic questions about serious juvenile offenders: (a) How much good is done (b) for which juveniles (c) by which program features? The first part of the question, "How much good . . .?" assumes more detailed and more valid outcome information than we encountered. The second part of the question, "for which juveniles," assumes that it is possible to differentiate juvenile offenders by characteristics that are relevant to treatment. Yet, it is generally acknowledged that there are no theories about the causes of serious juvenile crime that are adequate to the demands of policy formation and there are no empirically validated taxonomies specific to serious criminal behavior by juveniles that are adequate to the demands of treatment. On the contrary, there is considerable agreement in the field that there are no causal or behavioral differences between serious offenders and other juvenile offenders. What criteria, then, can be used to discriminate among features of program design? The classification employed by the literature search and fieldwork phases of this study was based on academic fields and on the assumptions about causality and cures that are explicit there. Yet, at least at this time, all treatments seem to have some utility, and the most desirable programs were those which were able to utilize a range of techniques from across the professional bases.

Although we have been able to document several important regularities about treatment efficacy, there remains an extraordinary gap in data. That gap is due to the fact that the research and evaluation work has simply not yet been done. It is exactly situations of this sort which the Institute is designed to remedy. In the following section, we will outline some program options.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AS A MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

The National Institute can serve several purposes by adopting a hypothesis-testing strategy in the management of its R&D support programs. One consequence of the lack of data is that the features which we found to be associated with success cannot be relied on to guide Institute practice without additional refinement. While there are several reasons to believe that these features are related to desired outcomes, that linkage should be tested explicitly. But the features identified in Sec. VI (above) can be formulated as a set of hypotheses and those hypotheses can then be used to guide part of the Institute's grant management program.

For example, if individual choice seems plausibly related to changed behavior, then roughly similar projects, which do and do not allow for client choice, can be monitored over time. Or the Institute can identify the component practices or indicators of heuristic management and follow their use and effect in a series of cases. In a few instances, it may be necessary to support a series of projects (or to encourage some grantees to adopt some practices) in order to test a hypothesis.

It should be emphasized that we are not recommending research of a theoretical or pure nature. Knowledge production, for its own sake, is the responsibility of others. The literature on juvenile delinquency and violence is dominated by theoretic-

cal formulations, discussion, and debate concerning causes and cures. Some approaches are more theoretical than others, and some appear quite pragmatic; but even the most pragmatic allude to theoretical foundations, and the more theoretical formulations become pragmatic in application. Theoretical formulations serve an important purpose in furthering understanding of human development in general and delinquency in particular; but the resolution of basic theoretical issues is *not* necessary at this stage of delinquency program development.

There is already considerable agreement about general kinds of treatment (or services) required for delinquents. These have been summarized in the preceding section. Further, the apparent differences between the various major approaches to delinquency (psychiatric, community-based, comprehensive, etc.) are not so much the result of differences in opinion about what should be done, as they are the result of practical considerations and available options. Perhaps foremost among these is the consideration of program cost. We have seen how expensive psychiatric programs are, and even then some important supporting services are not provided (due to lack of funds). Community-based diversion projects, parole programs, and the like are often the only real options available. The practitioners' choice among treatments is based on expected outcomes (what works) and available resources (what can be paid for), not on theoretical consistency.

In the preceding discussion we have argued that lack of theoretical resolution is not necessarily an impediment to the sort of successively approximated treatment improvements that seem most feasible. NIJJ can make a major contribution to the field by the relatively simple expedient of hypothesis-testing within the activities it supports. It is apparent, for example, that one of the most powerful assists to treatment would come from constructs which explain the causes of juvenile delinquency. One possible classification divides this behavior into the following categories: emitted, caused, compelled, and chosen behaviors.

Emitted Behavior. Some juvenile delinquency seems simply to happen; it is perhaps a product of the chance conjunction of a particular individual, and particular events and opportunities. Behavior in this category has no very profound causes in the individual and can be seen as unlikely to recur and therefore not accessible to treatment.

Caused Behavior. In this category there are situational dictates, outside the individual, that operate on the individual to force or mandate a serious crime. Here, the situation mandates and the individual has no alternative but to respond. Some passionate crimes and some crimes of desperation may fall here. Juvenile offenders whose behavior can be categorized here probably have less need for treatment and are less appropriate as points of intervention than in the *compelled* situation. Here the situation, not the juvenile, is the appropriate point of intervention.

Compelled Behavior. Here the crime springs from forces inside the juvenile offender that are beyond his coping ability. Many psychological treatments assume this sort of motive.

Chosen Behavior. The classic rational calculus is the best example of this category. Juveniles who weigh the gains from a prospective crime against the likelihood and severity of punishment are making choices about that behavior. There are obvious ramifications from this category to the treatment question. Increasing the cost of crime through more certain and harsh punishment should deter some delinquency, but only if it stems from this source.


The treatment ramifications of this sort of taxonomy of causation are obvious. It might help even to divide the cases into, e.g., those who have become serious offenders passively versus those who have entered that state actively or willfully. Still, the programs we examined by and large did not distinguish among possible causations. Treatment was dictated by the juvenile's assignment to the program, not by an attempt to understand the roots of the precipitating behavior. Instead, existing treatment programs in the field are grouped as we have reported them, and those groupings more closely resemble the professional training of the practitioners than the causal forces behind the juvenile's behavior.

One approach which the Institute may consider would be the use of a causally oriented taxonomy as a way to order its hypotheses. In the paragraphs below we will recommend that the framework for those hypotheses be grounded more directly in the features of successful treatment practice. Perhaps a combination of approaches may be used.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Although the resolution of purely theoretical issues may not be the highest priority in the design of juvenile programs, a number of issues are in need of clarification. Essentially, this is a recommendation that the Institute be systematically self-conscious about its own practices. Over a few years, it should be possible to accumulate a far larger and more policy-relevant stock of information about program practice than that which now exists. Much of that work can be done as a direct extension of existing grants by the relatively simple expedient of requiring data collection activities about topics specified in the set of hypothesized successful features.² The major added activity would be a centralized analysis function supported over a term long enough to allow the accumulation of data.

This hypothesis-testing activity would go forward within a context of other Institute activities. Those activities might include the utilization of any one of a number of R&D vehicles discussed below. The choice of R&D strategies, or the selection of other activities designed to affect practice, is governed by the size of the stock of knowledge relevant to the practice to be improved. "Pure" research strategies are appropriate where little is known about an area; applied research, demonstration, or diffusion activities are recommended as more and more becomes known about an area. These options are arranged below in order from those which assume that everything is known about intervening with dangerous juvenile offenders to those that assume that nothing is known.



For all options, Institute strategy would be the same: to pursue systematic testing of the features of intervention programs which are thought to be related to success.

Demonstration Programs

In this option, NIJJ would identify those places which are doing the best work with serious juvenile offenders. Such programs would then be elevated to a demonstration status and publicized in a variety of ways, including travel grants, operations manuals, training sessions, and other promotional devices. For the present, two things preclude the use of this option: there are very few programs with a concentration on this population;* there are no techniques with the proven sufficiency necessary to justify such Federal sponsorship.

Targeted Research

Where existing knowledge about a field is generally well developed except for a few gaps, it can be fruitful to have highly directed or specified research efforts pointed at particular problems. The ability to specify such targets is a function of the existing knowledge base, and thus a targeted research strategy is less appropriate with serious juvenile offenders than with others.

Planned Variation

This research management strategy isolates a series of theoretically important variables and then arranges for them to be applied, usually in a concentrated and mutually exclusive fashion, in a number of different sites. For example, a planned variation experiment in correctional education might support concentrations of computer-assisted instruction, peer teaching, open classrooms, and differentiated staffing in four separate sites, each dealing with similar populations under otherwise similar conditions. If outcomes differ, then we will know more about what works and how well than is now the case in correctional education.

The planned variation strategy is more feasible than targeted research, although some difficulties may be anticipated. Planned variations in other social welfare areas have sometimes failed to reveal outcome differences. That failure thus reinvokes the familiar "give up/try harder" dilemma. Second, planned variations need very careful monitoring and technical assistance, since they fall prey to the same implementation problems as do ordinary projects. The decay in project features, project cooptation by the sites, and project regression to a previous institutional mean—all tend to wash out the distinctive features of planned variations. (See App. A for discussion of these difficulties.)

Naturally Occurring Experiments

Given the range of institutions providing services to serious juvenile offenders, given the lack of a cogent theoretical basis, and the consequent lack of an orthodoxy, it is inevitable that a relatively large number of approaches will be tried across the

* Nor, as we have said, should there be such exclusive or homogeneous treatment programs.

country at any given moment. That diversity provides a pool of naturally occurring experiments which may be studied to considerable effect.

The first problem is to know what is salient, that is, to discover what sorts of things should be used to categorize different, potentially experimental situations. The list of hypothesized good practice features already discussed is one set of such indicators. The second problem is to search the universe of treatment programs in order to identify relevant programs. With time and incentives to the various sites, that should be entirely feasible. The third problem is to record the workings and results of the sites. The discussion immediately below is relevant to this problem.

Evaluation and Documentation

These are two distinct activities. Evaluation is the process of monitoring and assessing a program's activity in order to make decisions about its support. Documentation looks at largely the same activities, but is *not* directly connected to the continued well-being of the project being documented. Documentation in this case would be carried on solely in order to gain a better understanding of treatment effects with serious juvenile offenders. While evaluation deals with the success, failure, or improvement of a particular site, documentation addresses the same questions at a more aggregate policy or strategy level. The data collected in a documentation effort would go to a different part of the Institute (not to the responsible program operations officers) and it might be reported with some confidentiality safeguards.

In theory, evaluation data should be useful for the same purposes as documentation data, but given the exigencies of sustaining a project that depends on the avoidance of failure and the appearance of success, data derived from so-called "evaluations" cannot be used for these purposes. (As more is known about the pitfalls of evaluation, improvement in the practice of evaluation is facilitated.) Documentation efforts are not at all immune to some of the problems of organizational politics which contaminate evaluation data. The point is that both activities should be pursued; certainly no grant should be made without the grantee's acceptance of a systematic evaluation process.

Atheoretical Basic Research

When nothing is known about a field or its causation, then there may be no alternative but atheoretical basic research. For a considerable period of time, cancer chemotherapy research was consciously managed in exactly that fashion. The only criteria for support were reputable credentials, adequate facilities, and a nonredundant research topic. Although not a lot is known about treating serious juvenile offenders, atheoretical basic research does not seem indicated.

The middle range options are the most appropriate for this field. A program of planned variations that took maximum advantage of naturally occurring experiments (including those funded by non-Federal sponsors) and relied on a documentation and analysis procedure—not solely on an evaluation procedure—should be able to yield significant information about treatments for serious juvenile offenders. Such an effort is a feasible initiative in this field and, because it would draw upon existing programs and technologies, it could be rather flexibly managed.

TRANSLATING KNOWLEDGE INTO PRACTICE

Yin, in a background paper for the R&D Task Force on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, has looked directly at the models currently used to translate knowledge into practice.³ He has identified four traditional strategies for bringing about change:

1. "The Innovation Approach." This approach emphasizes support for specific projects, each of which is designed to be a contribution to practice.
2. "The Dissemination Approach" emphasizes providing easier and more comprehensive access to data about new practices on the assumption that better practices will spread.
3. "The Intermediate Institutions Approach" consists of creating and supporting independent technical assistance groups, such as regional R&D centers, third party evaluators, etc.
4. "The In-Agency R&D Strategy" tries to equip local agencies with their own internal analytic and problem solving capabilities.

Yin argues that studies of the knowledge utilization process clearly demonstrate the need to go beyond these traditional approaches. He is particularly concerned, first, with the development of soundly based knowledge that is directly related to the problems faced by practitioners. In that regard he recommends supporting work that will aggregate individual evaluation studies and case analyses. He points out that single studies do not establish credible facts (nor should they be expected to). Only replication, refinement, and aggregation lead to sound knowledge that can be expected to inform practice. Thus, a systematic aggregation of discrete studies can create a sound knowledge base for better practice.

Second, Yin points out the need for more attention to seeking "natural" points of entry for changes in practice. Persons working in juvenile justice, for example, (1) often receive advanced professional training, (2) are socialized by their early work experiences, (3) have that socialization continued through professional associations, and (4) have their practices bounded by legal regulations and bureaucratic necessities. Each of those constitutes a "natural" entry point for knowledge utilization that is potentially far more powerful than the unrefined traditional approaches.

Yin's call for more attention to the aggregation of sound knowledge about practice is directly related to this study's recommendation that NIJJ's program management be conducted in a consciously hypothesis-testing mode. His second recommendation, "natural" points of entry, relates to the organizational and systemic change questions discussed in App. A of this report. The initiatives proposed here—hypothesis testing as a management strategy, planned variations, naturally occurring experiments, and evaluation and documentation activities—should all contribute to improved treatments.

There is a sense in which this proposed activity is not much different from the accumulation of wisdom and expertise that characterizes any good program management. The things which should distinguish this effort are its scope and intensity. At the present time, no single actor or group of actors in the juvenile justice system has the incentive, the inclination, or the resources to undertake such a task. Thus, as we have all discovered, the data are not now being collected. It is hoped that the National Institute will remedy the existing oversights with respect to treatment programs for serious juvenile offenders.

Notes

1. For related arguments, see Sanford F. Fox, "The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment," *Juvenile Justice*, Vol. 25, August 1974, p. 6.
2. Some useful guides already exist; see Stuart Adams, *Evaluative Research In Corrections: A Practical Guide*, U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA/NILECJ, Washington, D.C., March 1975.
3. Robert K. Yin, "R&D Utilization," The Rand Corporation, in preparation.

Appendix A

NOTES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND SYSTEM CHANGE

The National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention exists to improve practice in its area of responsibility. One way in which it does that is through its research, development, and dissemination activities. "Improving practice" is a euphemism for bringing about change. Recent work by The Rand Corporation and others has consolidated the findings of a series of studies about the process of change through Federally sponsored programs. Many of the questions about R&D as a practice-improving technique in other areas have relevance to juvenile justice. This appendix links those findings to some of the same phenomena in the juvenile justice system. The appendix is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise but rather to raise some issues, related to the serious juvenile offender, which should have systematic attention from policymakers.

For policy management, change exists at three distinct levels: individual or "people change," organizational change, and systems change. At the macro-end of that scale, the creation of the Institute is an example of something intended to have system-changing effects. The national juvenile standards projects aspire to the same sorts of goals. Systems changes often rest on the ability to modify component organizations, for example, prosecutors' offices, court procedures, practices in correctional facilities, and so on. At the organizational level, questions of change or improvement revolve around issues such as the manifest and latent goal structure of the organization, patterns of resource allocation, clientele demands, input-output relations, and the integration of individual workers with the organization. Change in individuals starts at the micro end of this scale. An obvious example is the area of the present analysis, techniques for intervening with serious juvenile offenders.

We believe that interventions with serious juvenile offenders can be made more effective. Systematic attention to maximizing the features of successful programs coupled with testing the efficacy of those features would yield much better information about desirable program practices. Unfortunately, better information alone does not bring about significant improvement in a field of practice such as juvenile corrections. Organizations improve their practices (*if* they improve at all) for reasons beyond the simple attractiveness of doing a better job.

The most salient feature of these organizations is their clientele. Most of the time most people would prefer to forget about these young people, especially as long as they are "safely" locked up. Most public reaction is confined to pointing with alarm. The public is not clamoring to be of assistance to juveniles who have been found guilty of murder, armed robbery, rape, aggravated assault, and arson. Correctional institutions are near the bottom of the public's social welfare shopping list. If that list also has on it aid to physically handicapped children, or free lunches for poor children, or curricular enrichment for college-bound youth, then serious juvenile offenders will be moved even farther down the list. Of course, it costs several thousand dollars a year to keep one juvenile locked up, and that figure is many

multiples of the same jurisdiction's per-pupil expenditure for education and twice what a community-based correction program might cost. And of course the circumstances of that incarceration seriously compromise any prospects of rehabilitation and even enhance the chances of recidivism. Still, if they thought about it at all, most people would respond that at least the "dangerous" ones are locked away, and that's enough. It is very difficult to believe that a supportive climate of opinion exists for serious juvenile offenders.

The reality of institutions for serious juvenile offenders reflects those attitudes. There are no programs of concentrated assistance for these offenders. Those that include them along with others are underfunded and vulnerable to further economies. The good programs are a patchwork of special-purpose short-term projects, and grants from a variety of sources. Project support is notoriously unstable and thus it is difficult to attract and retain high-quality personnel. Where the juvenile justice system is not the happy hunting ground for patronage appointments, the people it does draw are seldom the most able practitioners in their respective fields. Personnel responsible for sophisticated treatment which should require advanced professional training are often simply moved over from the security forces of the institution. The lack of a public constituency deprives organizations in this field of an external force that could require them to change. Finally, the extraordinary complexity of the juvenile justice system, with its many separate components making independent decisions and inputs, further insulates and isolates these institutions. Changing the juvenile justice system can be like punching a pillow.

The picture drawn here is melancholy but realistic. What does it say about the prospects for innovation among institutions dealing with this population? Like individuals, organizations need certain precursors, certain conditions if they are to change. And on an organizational level, these precursors to change are highly problematic.

PRECONDITIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Take the first of the earlier-cited preconditions for individual change, *client choice*. The recent studies of the implementation of planned change in other settings indicate that at least some parts of the organization (usually a small group of middle managers) have to seek or choose change. But what if the personnel of an institution—or a whole set of them—unanimously decline to change? If an individual offender decides to sit out offered treatment, that may be acceptable. Is it acceptable on the part of individual agencies? How can the feature of "client choice" be reconciled with the responsibility of an agency like NIJJ to bring about improvements? When it is considered that those places which are least likely to change are the most likely to need to change (or to be changed), then the tension between client choice and (some) Federal responsibility is greatest.

Similar questions are raised by the *participation hypothesis*. It seems undeniable that organizations which participate in formulating their own new departures will then be more enthusiastic participants in subsequent changes. But those who do not enter into such participation are likely to be in greater need of change. Some participating institutions may also change in ways that the Federal government may think are undesirable. Finally, the participation hypothesis implies that the

most effective change will come from the bottom, or service-delivery, level of the system. But that means an enormous amount of redundancy, replication, and trial and error. User-driven systems are not often seen as efficient, and their consonance with Federal purposes is only haphazard. In circumstances such as these, it may be very difficult to defend agency programs and appropriations in a variety of forums.

The components that learning theory finds are associated with successful change may be equally difficult to arrange at the organizational level. *Clear tasks that provide opportunities for early and sustained success* are very rare. Where they exist, organizations have already leapt to achieve them. Demonstration programs have not had the beacon or lighthouse effect that had been hoped for—and that says something about the prospects for modeled behavior. Organizations make the same sort of dispirited, resistant responses to external control as do individuals, yet many of their current repertoire of inadequate practices represent the best that they can achieve on their own. Controls internal to the organization have led to a situation that needs changing, but if the source of change is from outside, then those external (Federal?) controls will dampen the organization's response. Finally, in an atmosphere where public and many official attitudes range from indifference to hostility, where are the incentives to change? Few institutions seek to call attention to themselves for doing semisuccessful work with a clientele that frightens, outrages, and embarrasses the public.

Some additional characteristics seem less difficult to arrange on an organizational basis. Successful programs were those with *an extensive array of techniques and services to match the range of treatment needs*. There are two obstacles to realizing this. First, aggregating enough serious juvenile offenders to justify assembling an array of treatment modalities may require reorganization of services on a regional and/or state basis. Second, the cost of maintaining such an array cannot feasibly be added to an already expensive custodial security system. Providing these treatments will probably have to come from the savings derived from having a deinstitutionalized, community-based system. Even on that basis, the intensive supervision provisions which are likely to be required for serious juvenile offenders are going to be expensive.*

It should also be possible to provide *heuristic program management*. The chief obstacle is the prevailing practice of grants management which makes demonstrated success (or more accurately, disguised failure) a condition of continuation. That circumstance depresses trial and error and retards the accumulation of program knowledge which is so important at this time.

One obstacle to change in the treatment of serious juvenile offenders may be overcome: the conflict between constitutional and due process rights, on the one hand, and secure imprisonment on the other. Eric Steele's *A Model for the Imprisonment of Repetitively Violent Criminals*¹ discusses the design of an institution for dangerous adults which incorporates a number of desirable constitutional and due process features which are ordinarily thought to be inimical to secure incarceration. Thus, regard for the institutional rights of the juvenile offender and for the features

* Cost analysis is noticeable by its absence in this field. Where the public is reluctant to spend more on dangerous juveniles and where there is already considerable disagreement about how much is saved by deinstitutionalization—and at what price in diminished security for serious juvenile offenders—then cost analysis could play an important role. See App. B, following, for further discussion.

of well-designed behavior-changing programs can go forward together. But designing change and bringing it about on an organizational basis are two different things.²

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNED CHANGE

Most analyses of behavioral treatment programs focus their explanations for the program's successes and failures on one or more of three factors: knowledge about causation, the state of the practical art of intervening, and/or the characteristics of the target population. We have already discussed those factors as they recurred in this work, but a fourth factor—the implementation of planned change—needs to be considered.

Like most other areas of social welfare, improvements in the juvenile justice system move through a variety of channels including that of research, development, demonstration, and diffusion. Generally speaking, the process involves supporting the development of good ideas in one setting and then exporting them to other places. The traditional procedure in the evaluation of Federally supported R&D programs has been to look for the effects of the R&D projects on sites of their intended change. More than a decade of evaluations have documented that these intentional project-to-site effects usually range from slight to nonexistent.

In the last few years, studies of Federal programs in a variety of areas have begun to turn these traditional questions on their heads. These reveal that the lack of effect has been *incorrectly* attributed to a number of factors: (1) a lack of understanding on the part of the adopting site; (2) an inadequate project technology; (3) insufficient funding; and (4) inefficient management processes involving Federal percolation (from Washington agencies to state agencies to local agencies and often involving additional filters through service delivery contractors, universities, and management and analysis firms). Instead, much of the explanation for what hasn't happened rests with site-to-project effects in which the nominally "adopting" site actually *adapts* the project faster and more completely than the project can change the site. Thus, the project and the site are in a kind of arm wrestle to change each other before being changed. The sites have won with stunning regularity.

This whole area falls under the heading of implementation, and has special relevance for Federal practices in a loosely coupled system such as juvenile justice. The implementation question is particularly salient if substantial improvement rests on the *serial cooperation* of (1) one or more Federal agencies, (2) the SPA, (3) a state legislature, (4) a county or municipal district attorney's office, (5) a police department, (6) a mayor's office, (7) court officers of various jurisdictions, (8) parole officers, and (9) various social welfare agencies like school systems and family assistance agencies. Despite the number of actors, this description is a simplified one (it omits legitimately differing interests, competition, personalities, and the necessity of sustained cooperation, for example), yet the impact on the prospects for program diffusion from one site to another should be apparent.

Other parts of the implementation puzzle deal with:

- The phenomenon of *project decay* (the simplification and diminution of goals and treatments over time).

- *The reinvention of the wheel* (each site seems to need to discover its own truths and techniques rather than accept them from elsewhere).
- *The extreme rarity of spontaneous or complete diffusion or adoption.*

Similar characteristics are being documented with increasing frequency in several different areas of government.³ The consequences for program management, especially in R&D, are severe. For one thing, the major (and often disabling) changes that sites make in programs can be seen as a sort of price charged by those sites for accepting any change at all. McLaughlin argues that even with all of its dramatic departures from the changes originally planned, implementation is the process of change and that it is only through substantial local modification of exported practices that change occurs.⁴ But those local modifications are unpredictable and often inimical to Federal purposes.

What then of the management of Federal programs for nationally expressed purposes? If, as many now believe, the course of any large project is so dynamic and situationally dependent that it cannot be specified in advance, then how can Federally supported efforts be designed so as to allow for or to encourage local modification in desired directions? Moreover, it now seems to be the case that any significant organizational innovation is so thoroughly contingent on the dynamic interaction of so many idiosyncratic factors that it is impossible to make an adequate prior specification of the course of that innovation. If that is in fact the case, then it will have profound consequences for the planning and management process in R&D management.

There are some relevant reasons for the complete lack of implementation.* In the first place, innovators do not always (or often) know what needs to be done to bring about change. Theoretical formulations are not precise enough to translate into actual program applications and, as a result, program objectives are often vague and processes unclearly specified. Empirical social science is woefully inadequate for exact or detailed process specification. Secondly, bureaucratic and political objectives sometimes contradict the interests of better service delivery.

A diversity of objectives exists regarding delinquency programs, some stemming from individual differences of opinion, but most from institutional or bureaucratic differences. The community wants protection and security, the victim wants revenge, the police want to get the offenders off the streets, the courts want to protect constitutional rights, the healers want to rehabilitate, the bureaucracy wants to maintain itself, and politicians want visible and immediate action. This is of course a great oversimplification but it does show that the objectives of these groups obviously cannot be simultaneously fulfilled.

If rehabilitation were sure (the treatment is applied and the "disease" is cured) many of the implementation problems would probably go away, because the delinquency problem itself would go away. But no one really believes in this model; no one expects a relatively short term of treatment to overcome a lifetime of training and behavior, especially when the juvenile is returned to the pretreatment environment afterward. As the treatment concept is expanded to include relatively long-term services such as housing alternatives, outpatient and family psychotherapy,

* The balance of the discussion under this heading was drafted originally by Dr. Theodore Donaldson and Dr. Gail Zellman of Rand.

education, job training and placement, financial assistance, and more, the opportunity for conflict among the interests of the various factions increases. For example, bureaucratic and political objectives have a relatively short time horizon, and thus programs requiring long periods of continuous funding are in trouble.

Problems of implementation exist at every turn. Some programs appear to do very well on Federal funds, but once this source runs out, program support is rarely picked up at the local level. Political issues often play a major role in program success, and political emphasis on reducing (or eliminating) "crime in the streets" usually results in the degradation of long-range program goals and services—they simply cannot wait. Legal aid groups, in the interest of protecting the juvenile's rights, often impede service delivery, especially if full consent of the juvenile is not obtained. Service providers themselves, overanxious and willing to compromise program objectives in order to survive, sometimes render their own programs ineffective.

IMPACT ON PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

Given that programs are rarely (if ever) implemented the way they were intended, program evaluations are certainly suspect. Program evaluation usually aims at measuring outcome or program effectiveness, with the primary thrust on accountability, and with the aim of establishing funding (and other) policy. Evaluators have done much that furthers confusion by focusing on arcane issues of methodology and measurement, the resolution of which would add very little to knowledge about differential program effectiveness. A review of program evaluations in any area of social action leads to the same conclusion—nothing makes much difference, adding, of course, the usual caveat that this result must be viewed in the light of inadequate outcome measures. However, it is becoming clear that one reason for the lack of positive findings is that there are few real differences among the treatments, because differences within a program are generally as large as differences between programs.

Few treatments are applied the way they were planned, due mostly to pitfalls in implementation. Programs may not be implemented as designed because the processes or objectives of the program do not fit local capabilities and skills, they do not meet certain local needs, or they may not fit local organizational structure. The implication of this for program design is that local factors must somehow be accounted for in the design. For example, if a community will tolerate only the lock-up of "violent" juveniles, it makes little sense to design a program with other options, and certainly it makes little sense to *evaluate* the impact of those options.

Another central issue in outcome evaluation is the problem of defining measures that relate to program objectives. In most social action programs, long-range objectives are measured only by short-term output proxies. Actually, surrogate measures are rarely adequate indicators of long-range objectives. For example, the major short-range measure in delinquency programs is recidivism, but this measure by itself may not be worth much. To even begin to work, such a measure would have to include a dimension of "seriousness," and simple re-arrest data is not good enough. Even if recidivism data were reliable and valid, programs could still have dramatic influence on the juvenile's ultimate exit from crime, and on any number

of other factors that one might call quality of life, while still not changing recidivism rates.

Of course one does expect a "successful" program to change recidivism at some time. The issue here is that outcome evaluations *assume* that the prescribed treatment has taken place, while it is evident that it has frequently not occurred. Outcome evaluation cannot be entirely dismissed but it must be placed in perspective relative to the adequacy of outcome indicators, and especially relative to the phantom of program implementation. Evaluations of implementation must determine whether or not treatment processes do in fact occur, and this requires the development of procedures for measuring process. Evaluations also must identify factors that interfere with implementation. That is, what options exist for avoiding or removing obstacles, and what are the "costs" of the obstacles in the program if they remain?

The implementation topic, like the topic of treating serious juvenile offenders, offers a great many problems and very few solutions. It remains, however, part of the context for program management. Thus, there is a heavy premium on the use of heuristic techniques such as the hypothesis-testing strategies discussed elsewhere in this report.

SYSTEMWIDE REFORM*

Most of this analysis has concentrated on the service delivery level. In concluding, we wish to consider briefly the proposition that *system* reform—i.e., change in some of the aggregate or macro features of juvenile justice—may have some useful external or spillover benefits for behavior-changing interventions.

Schur⁵ has commented extensively on the criminogenic aspects of the juvenile justice system. Labeling theorists assert that processing through the juvenile justice system stigmatizes the youth and tends to increase the chances that his/her delinquent behavior will be perpetuated, but these assertions have recently come under attack. Research findings with respect to labeling theory are mixed. Nevertheless, there does appear to be some agreement on certain points. First, the criminal justice system, including the juvenile justice system, is overextended. Norval Morris has referred to it as a "moral busybody."⁶ One reason we have so many delinquents is that we define so many things as illegal or delinquent. Advocates of this point of view argue that many acts currently classified as criminal or delinquent should be decriminalized.

Decriminalizing Juvenile Status Offenses

In the juvenile justice system, "status offenses" (acts which would not be regarded as criminal if committed by an adult) are a significant proportion of the total load and account for a substantial number of those incarcerated (half, by some estimates). These "offenses" are of a minor nature and pose little threat to the community or to the rights of others. Nevertheless, they continue to clog the juvenile courts, take

* The discussion under this heading was originally drafted by Professor C. Ronald Huff of the University of California at Irvine.

up much of the resources available to law enforcement officials and local correctional personnel, and yield little if anything positive in return. The resources now devoted to status offenses would be better applied to treatment and/or prevention efforts with more serious juvenile offenders. (This assumes the absence of "plea bargaining" that may result in a real crime being adjudicated as a status offense. Society may agree to divert its attention from truancy, but only if the "truancy" is not actually a plea-bargained burglary.)

Possible reforms of the juvenile justice system, then, might include restricting its overreach by defining as delinquent only those behaviors which pose substantial threats to society. Other problematic behaviors (such as running away from home, illegal drinking, etc.) can perhaps best be handled in a family court or in some way other than legal adjudication as a delinquent. Restricting this overreach may have the concomitant effect of freeing some resources currently allocated to the enforcement and prosecution of status offenses.

Due Process for Juveniles

In addition to its overextended scope, the juvenile justice system suffers from other defects, at least from the perspective of constitutional democracy. Juveniles are systematically denied the due process guarantees theoretically afforded to adults. For present purposes, it is enough to note that the assumptions underlying the juvenile court system were well-meaning, paternalistic, and oriented toward enhancing rehabilitation. They have also proven to be terribly flawed. The philosophical orientation which presumes that everything will be done in the child's best interest, has in fact resulted in denying young people their due process "rights" and subjecting them to social control programs in the name of "treatment."

The increasing formalization of the juvenile justice system, including the expansion of due process rights for juveniles, may be a useful reform. The discretion found in the current system leads to the unequal and unpredictable administration of justice. Many of the clients of this system rationalize their subsequent criminal behavior by saying, "Look what the system did to me!" It is difficult to effect the evenhanded administration of justice *with* full due process guarantees; without such guarantees, official but personal discretion inevitably leads to the abuse of relatively powerless persons. This is true of police discretion, prosecutorial discretion, the discretion of correctional officers and staff, parole board decisionmaking, and—in some cases—even judicial discretion, which is the most visible and scrutinized of all.

A further irony of the system is that justice is social-class-specific for the young. Evidence from studies relying on self-reported behavior consistently indicates that the kinds of behavior labeled "delinquent" are widespread throughout all social strata in America.⁷ Yet lower-class children are overrepresented among those prosecuted and tremendously overrepresented among those convicted and incarcerated. Some youth are adjudicated as delinquents for behavior which is the *norm* among their peer groups (e.g., certain drug offenses).

If one of the primary objectives of a justice system is the fair, rational, and equal administration of justice, then clearly the present system has defects. We might further hypothesize that the establishment of a system of justice which acts swiftly, fairly, and consistently would deter some criminal behavior. Such a system, including the correctional component of the post-adjudication stage, might be designed to

enhance respect for the law, rather than the feeling that the system is there "to be beaten" and all one needs to do is "learn the rules of the game."

In summary, then, we have suggested that our current system of juvenile justice is at best inefficient and ineffective and at worst criminogenic and dehumanizing. The restructuring of the system into a more principled and humane one might include restricting the scope of its jurisdiction and power, expanding the due process guarantees afforded accused offenders, and reducing the discretion currently available to those in positions of power whose decisions have major impact on the lives of juveniles. Such reforms may or may not increase the resources available to deal with more serious crime; they would more certainly minimize the harm done to those processed by the system.

Notes

1. Eric H. Steele, *A Model for the Imprisonment of Repetitively Violent Criminals* (Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School, 1974).

2. D. Street, R. Vinter, and C. Perrow, *Organization for Treatment*, Free Press of Glencoe, a division of Macmillan, New York, 1960.

3. Some of the most complete studies available are in The Rand Corporation's ten-volume report to the U.S. Office of Education, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change*, R-1589-HEW, April 1975. For a distillation of the entire report, see Paul Berman et al., Vol. V: *Executive Summary*, R-1589/5-HEW.

See also Aaron Wildavsky and Jeffrey Pressman, *Implementation* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973.) For an excellent review, see Edwin C. Hargrove, *The Missing Link* (The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975).

4. Paul Berman and Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. I: A Model of Educational Change*, R-1589/1-HEW, The Rand Corporation, September 1974.

5. Edwin M. Schur, *Radical Nonintervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973).

6. Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control* (University of Chicago Press, 1970).

7. Maynard L. Erickson and Lamar T. Empey, "Class Position, Peers and Delinquency," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 49, April 1965, pp. 268-282.

Appendix B

NOTES ON COST ANALYSIS

What little attention is given to costing intervention programs often neglects several important dimensions. For example, the multiplicity of cost considerations are usually aggregated to a single number (such as a cost per client, or a cost-benefit ratio) which may be a meaningless or irrelevant piece of information given the actual concerns of decisionmakers.

Consider one example:

Program Alternative	Effectiveness (E)	Cost (C)	E/C
A	20	10	2
B	20,000	10,000	2
C	200,000	100,000	2

If the decisionmakers were preoccupied with the effectiveness/cost ratios, this analysis would lead to the conclusion that the three programs are equally viable alternative courses of action. Actually, programs A, B, and C exhibit wide differences in scale and may not be relevant alternatives at all.

A program cost analysis is most likely to satisfy decisionmakers when it contains detailed descriptions of the physical resource requirements of the program. Precise and comprehensive descriptions of program resource requirements will allow decisionmakers to calculate what would be the incremental dollar cost to implement the program in their jurisdiction. Detailed inventories of several programs will allow administrators to make comparative analyses of incremental physical and dollar resource requirements. The incremental costs to implement a program in a given location will depend on local prices, on what facilities, equipment, and skilled personnel are already on hand, and on the number of persons to be served in the program.

Care must be taken in resource analysis to be comprehensive. "Hidden" costs such as training and retraining, maintenance of equipment, and fringe benefits must be included in program requirements. Variable costs, which depend on the number of clients, rooms, or professionals in the program, must be clearly defined. The cost of most programs for juvenile offenders can be adequately encompassed within the following general categories:

Acquisition Cost

- Design of program
- Development of materials
- Evaluation design
- Program implementation
- Equipment
- Program-related

- Client-related
- Materials and supplies
- Program-related
- Client-related
- Pre-service training
- Facilities (space)
- Installation

Operational Cost

- Program direction
- Evaluation
- Management support
- Staff salaries and benefits
 - Security personnel
 - Rehabilitation personnel
 - Support personnel
- In-service training
- Materials and supplies
 - Program-related
 - Client-related
- Equipment
 - Replacement
 - Maintenance
- Facilities operation and maintenance
- Food
- Insurance
- Contracted services
- Media services
- Transportation

SOURCE: Adapted from Sue A. Haggart, *Program Cost in Educational Planning*. (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, P-4774, December 1971.)

Appendix C

READERS FOR THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT

The following people served as readers of a preliminary draft of this report. We would like to thank them for their criticisms and comments. They were uniformly insightful and to the point, and contributed greatly to the final version.

We were not able to circulate the report in its final version and thus this group of readers should be held blameless for any errors of fact or interpretation. The author assumes full responsibility for its contents. The readers are listed in alphabetical order.

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Dr. Coates is Associate Director of the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard. The center is involved in a seven-year study of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, which is moving from an institutional way of handling youth to community-based alternatives.

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Dr. Dinitz is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at Ohio State University. He has done extensive research in criminal behavior and deviance, including investigations in the area of sociopathy, and has served as President of the American Society of Criminology.

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Mr. Lalley is the Acting Deputy Chief at the Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency of the National Institute of Mental Health.

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Dr. Lerman is the Chairman of the Doctoral Program at the Graduate School of Social Work, Rutgers University, as well as a consultant to Can-deub, Flessig Associates, a city planning firm in Newark, New Jersey. In this capacity he has assisted in local planning efforts on law enforcement and the administration of justice. From 1971 to 1973 he directed the evaluation of Community Treatment Programs in California for the National Institute of Mental Health's Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, and he is currently an editorial consultant for the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*.

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Mr. Livesay is the Head Deputy of the Juvenile Division of the District Attorney's office of Los Angeles County, California.

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Dr. Rutherford is a Guggenheim Fellow and Assistant Director of the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Program in Criminal Justice at Yale Law School. He has done extensive work in corrections both in England and the United States. While a visiting Associate Professor at the University of Minnesota, he directed a seven-month project for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) assessing community-based alternatives to incarceration and diversion strategies.

Ms. Elizabeth Schack
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Ms. Schack is director of the Office of Children's Services, a unit of the Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State. The office was established to conduct research into the needs of children and to serve as ombudsman in the development of appropriate services. The office will shortly become the Juvenile Justice Institute, and will be charged with developing standards and goals for the administration of juvenile justice in the state of New York. Ms. Schack was a chairperson of Task Force I of the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence, New York State.

Mr. Paul Strasburg
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Mr. Strasburg is Project Director at the Vera Institute of Justice. He has directed the development and implementation of a job development project for ex-addicts and ex-offenders, and has directed a study of violent juvenile delinquents. He has also served as a member of the New York State Governor's Advisory Panel on Juvenile Violence.

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Dr. Tumin is a Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Princeton University. He has published numerous books and articles dealing with a variety of social issues including crimes of violence. Among the related posts he has held are: a member of the Board of Managers, New Jersey Reformatory, Bordentown, 1962-1965; the Board of Governors, Lemberg Center for Study of Violence, Brandeis University, 1966-1970; and Director of the Task Force on Individual Violence, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1968-1969.

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Dr. David Ward is a Professor in the Departments of Sociology and Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Minnesota. He has done extensive research in the area of criminology and corrections. He is currently a consultant to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, and is Chair-Elect of the section of criminology, American Sociological Association. He is in addition an editorial consultant for the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, and in 1968-1969 was a consultant to the President's Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Appendix D

DATA SOURCES AND SEARCH TERMS

GENERAL

Sources Examined

Education Resources Information Services/NIE
Medlars/NIH
National Center for Juvenile Corrections
National Center for Crime and Delinquency (Davis)
National Center for Juvenile Justice (Pittsburgh)
National Criminal Justice Reference Services—LEAA
Psychological Abstracts
Journal of Forensic Science

Search Terms

Juvenile delinquency	Juvenile offender
Social behavior disorders	Aggression
Violence	Crime
Homicide	Infanticide
Rape	Sex offenses
Sociopathic personality	Child adolescence
Social class	Adaptation-psychological
Social adjustment	Social values
Socialization	Personality development
Prospective	Studies diagnosis
Probability	Prognosis
Family characteristics	Cultural deprivation
Culture	Poverty
Preventive health services	Preventive medicine
Psychiatry-community	Social service psychiatric
Criminal psychology	Prisoners
Prisons	Child institutionalized
Aggression	Juvenile delinquents
Female delinquents	Male delinquents
Juvenile gangs	Antisocial behavior
Felons	Thefts
Arson	Stealing
Child	Childhood
School-age children	Preschool-age children
Adopted children	Stepchildren
Youth	Youth problems
Socially deviant behavior	Foster children
Migrant children	Corrective institutions
Recidivism	Parole officers

Probation officers	Probationary period
Socially disadvantaged	Culturally disadvantaged
Social disadvantage	Social environment
Sociocultural factors	Poverty areas
Psychosocial rehabilitation	Vocational rehabilitation
Recidivism prediction	Predictability measurement
Prognosis	Penitentiary
Legal arrest	Incarceration
Reformatories	Probation
Parole	Correctional education
Data analysis	Delinquency prevention
Delinquency rehabilitation	Educational assessment
Educational needs	Educational objectives
Evaluation methods	Institutional administration
Institutionalized (persons)	Institutional schools
Interviews	Measurement instruments
Program administration	Program evaluation
Research projects	School surveys
Secondary education	Special schools
Tables (data)	Juvenile offenders
Juvenile delinquents	Juvenile rights
Juvenile court	Emotionally disturbed
Violent crime	Violent offender
Vocational education	Career world education

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC PROGRAMS

Sources Examined

ERIC
 Medlars
 National Criminal Justice Reference Service—LEAA
 Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual—American
 Psychiatric Association
Journal of Adolescent Psychiatry
California Law Review
 State of California Board of Corrections, Monographs
Journal of Community Psychology
American Journal of Psychiatry
Child Welfare

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